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ABSTRACT
AL
-MUGHTARIBUN
:
LAW AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MUSLIM LIFE
IN NORTH AMERICA
MAY 1992
KATHLEEN M. MOORE, B.A., UCLA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor John Brigham
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the
experiences of North American Muslims (estimated at over
4 million) as their claims for religious tolerance and
inclusion in a pluralistic society have emerged. It
traces a historical shift in consciousness of a
religious minority precipitated by interactions with the
legal institutions of the dominant culture.
As members of a minority faith living in a non-
Islamic context, Muslims have been subject both to what
Islam teaches about vmarginality ' and what the North
American civil tradition promises about religious
liberty and racial equality. The focus of this work has
been on the gradual transformation of North American
Muslims' perceptions and self-identification coaxed by
the often subtle ways civil law has penetrated and come
to dominate their daily lives. It shows how the
normative ordering of Muslim life in North America has
replicated certain aspects of the legal order, and where
legal mechanisms have been v subverted' by those at the
vi
margins who wish to express their autonomy from the
state, to assert and protect their religious freedom.
North American Muslims' decisions whether and how
to maintain a corporate life in a non-Muslim society
have been viewed differently by Muslims over time and
through different types of contacts with North American
institutions. Chapters of this dissertation examine the
erection of immigration and naturalization barriers at
the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth
in the United States and Canada, and the responses of
immigrants from the Muslim world to the emerging
standards for citizenship; the religious liberty claims
under the First Amendment of Black Muslims in prisons in
the United States during the 1960s and 1970s; federal
N hate crimes' legislation at the close of the 1980s and
the inclusion of mosques as protected religious
property; and municipal zoning practices negotiated by
Muslims in two American cities where they built mosques
in the 1980s and 1990s.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In The Myth of the Judeo^ristian Tradition,
Arthur A. Cohen questions the notion that a s Judeo-
Christian' tradition even exists, and suggests that it
is an invention of twentieth century American politics
spawned by efforts to form a cultural consensus and, in
the process, syncretize religious identification and
promote interfaith harmony. The conception of such a
tradition is, in Cohen's words, "mythological or,
rather, not precisely mythological but ideological and
hence, as in all ideologies, shot through with
falsification, distortion, and untruth. 1
The origin of the concept is found in theological
inquiry; it was used at the turn of this century simply
to suggest that Church rituals had developed out of
xArthur A. Cohen, The Myth of the Judeo-Christian
Tradition (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), xiii. Cohen
writes, "We can learn much from the history of Jewish-
Christian relations, but one thing we cannot make of it
is a discourse of community, fellowship, and
understanding. How, then, do we make of it a
tradition?" (Ibid.) See also Martin E. Marty, "A Judeo
Christian Looks at the Judeo Christian Tradition," The
Christian Century , 8 October 1986, 858. For a different
analysis and an example of consensus history which
praises the Judeo-Christian tradition, see Will Herberg,
Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American
Religious Sociology (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
Anchor, 1960). See also discussion in Mark Silk, "Notes
on the Judeo-Christian Tradition in America," American
Quarterly 36 (1984): 74-77, and, for comments on the
fortunes of consensus historians, 84.
Hebraic practices. 2 Its theological basis, however,
did not mean that the concept was remote from the
polemics of the ideological and political contests of
the day. By the 1930s usage of the term in American
public life had come to signify something more than
continuity between Judaism and Christianity. At one
level it referred to a common body of beliefs including
the values of egalitarianism and individualism as well
as a modern world view that was based loosely on a
shared prophetic interpretation of life and history.
But the compatibility underscored by this account
belied the construction of an ideology of difference
that had brought the term v Judeo-Christian ' into popular
discourse in the first place. As Mark Silk notes, the
emphasis given in public discourse to the N Judeo-
Christian' character of certain values was meant to
signal a departure from the course plotted by the
2Cohen suggests the concept of a v Judeo-Christian
'
tradition appeared a little earlier in Europe, although
its use had unmistakably pejorative connotations. In
the late nineteenth century it was used infrequently in
German Protestant scholarship to acknowledge the Jewish
dimension of the Christian experience while, Cohen
argues, excising those parts of Judaism that were
incompatible with Protestantism. He continues, however,
to note that the concept was not as common in Europe as
it was in the United States (see Cohen, xvii-xix, 199).
Silk takes exception to this part of Cohen's analysis,
arguing that Cohen offers no evidence to support his
claims about German Protestant intentionality (see Silk:
80-81) .
3fascists and anti-Semites of the 1930s. 3 with the rise
of fascism and the appropriation of Christianity as a
symbol and source of identity on the part of such
organizations as Father Coughlin's Christian Front, the
Christian American Crusade, the Christian Aryan
Syndicate and others, those on the liberal left of the
political spectrum in the United States referred to a
NJudeo-Christian' tradition not so much to confirm a
confessional affinity as to distance themselves from the
extremists of the right who were the self-proclaimed
defenders of precisely Christian' values. The fact
that the concept was pressed into service to counter
fascism gave v Judeo-Christian
' a multi-layered meaning.
It implied not simply an affirmation of Judaism as the
precursor to Christianity; it also conferred a symbolic
bonding between Jewish victims of fascism and non-Jewish
sympathizers, a covenant among people of good will. It
attempted to signify, in its most important aspect, a
demarcation of political ground, the staking of a claim
to differ, and the qualification of political
credentials vis-a-vis the positions taken by the extreme
right
.
A political use of the term v Judeo-Christian ' has
regained particular currency in the latter part of the
twentieth century as reliance on certain religious
3Silk: 66.
4values, symbols, and rhetoric in public discourse both
generates and reflects popular approval, the ideal of
separation of church and state notwithstanding. This
time, however, politicians on the right of the political
spectrum have appropriated the term. Common assumptions
about the place of religion and morality in public life,
the nature of the relationship between church and state,
are being reevaluated and, in the process, the advocates
of social and political conservatism have emerged as the
most recent self
-proclaimed defenders of the v Judeo-
Christian' faith. 4 Use of N Judeo-Christian ' in this
context is meant to distance the subject from the
v
secular humanist', an appellation given to those on the
liberal left who represent values and trends that are
seen as antithetical to the morality espoused by the
conservative right, which lays claim to the values of
family, neighborhood, work and the defense of freedom
and liberty. 5
4For instance, Jerry Falwell has inveighed against
a "systematic pattern of discrimination against . . .
[books] which display philosophical positions rooted in
the Judeo-Christian tradition" (Moral Majority Report,
May 1983, 8)
.
5Religious conservatives identify a common foe in
secular humanism: "For the fundamentalist crusader,
secular humanism [has] become the source of all sins of
America, the multiformed beast of modern liberalism: the
cold idol of godless science; the brazen serpent of
pornography and homosexuality; the unpainted temptress
of women's liberation; the meddling giant of big
government" (Carol Flake, Redemptorama : Culture,
Politics, and the New Evangelism [Garden City, N.Y.:
5An effort is underway to resurrect a shared set of
traditional beliefs and values thought once to be the
backbone of American and Canadian life. Instead of
celebrating diversity and pluralism in North America,
however, the emphasis has been placed on the merits of
unity and a shared sense of ethics. Conservatives are
engaged in an effort to redefine American values and
beliefs and ameliorate what they see as deplorable
conditions precipitated by the liberalism, secular
humanism and moral relativism of the 1960s. The
putative aims of this corrective impulse are to restore
national pride, to bring contemporary legal and
ideological trends in line with established traditions,
and to promote a greater sense of collective well-being
connected to a romanticized vision of a past era, to a
renewed patriotism that presumably has been absent since
the early 1960s. This is proving to be an important
factor in reshaping the political scene in North
America
.
Praise of religious values and the resurrection of
religious symbolism became a basis of the v new
patriotism' of the 1980s, extending into the 1990s. The
imagery employed by Ronald Reagan, an immensely popular
president, reflects the hue of political discourse which
has effected the language of politicians on the left as
Doubleday, 1984], 218).
6well as the right of the spectrum. Such symbols have
become an important component in the dialectical
statement of what constitutes "America'. in the 1984
presidential campaign references to religious values
were prominent as well in the speeches of Reagan's
Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale. 6
The impact of conservative rhetoric has been far-
reaching. For instance, at the close of the 1980s the
Republican Party of Arizona adopted a resolution
proclaiming the United States to be a "Christian
nation'. The January 1989 resolution, passed at the
state GOP convention, endorsed "Christian principles'
and warned that such principles had been eroded by
certain forces. But the Arizona GOP "Christian Nation'
resolution made some Jewish Republicans uncomfortable.
Kurt Davis, the Arizona GOP executive director, said he
would have preferred that the resolution said "Judeo-
Christian nation', and Arizona Senate President, Bob
Usdane, said that he had problems with the reference to
a "Christian nation'. 7
The "Christian Nation' resolution garnered national
attention when U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, asked by the Arizona Republican Party for her
6See Paul Erickson, Reagan Speaks, The Making of an
American Myth (New York: New York University Press,
1985) .
7Church and State 42 (March 1989), 20.
7support, cited three cases—Church of the Holy Trinity
v. U.S. (1892), Zorach v. Clauson (1952), and McGowan v.
Maryland (1961)— in which the Supreme Court held the
United States to be a Christian nation. In opposing her
position, which he calls "an indiscretion," Harvard law
professor Alan Dershowitz challenged O'Connor's
interpretation of the law in the op-ed section of the
New York Times. Provoked by the implications of
O'Connor's view, Dershowitz writes that the Supreme
Court Justice was "just plain wrong. ... No Court
decision over the last 97 years lends any support to the
claim that we are a ^Christian Nation'. We are a
v
religious people' (says the Court) followed by
disclaimers that there is v no partiality to any one
group ' .
"
8
Current pressures toward conformity in effect
obscure the meaning of difference. An ill-defined
notion of pluralism, including the ideals of tolerance
and autonomy, persists in the national heritages of both
the United States and Canada as an essential but elusive
aim. References to the v Judeo-Christian ' tradition,
rather than promoting interfaith harmony, help to create
a two-dimensional world composed of those who adhere to
the tradition versus everyone else. Such references
8Alan M. Dershowitz, "Justice O'Connor's Second
Indiscretion," New York Times 2 April 1989, sec. 4, p.
31.
8serve to exclude those who are judged to deviate from
the social and cultural norm or to be nonbelievers
,
i.e., persons conceived to be a threat to the bedrock
values of America. In this dualistic world view the
limits of tolerable diversity are narrowly
circumscribed. Public figures appeal to our sense of
national identity and patriotism by talking about the
United States as a s Judeo-Christian nation'
,
which, in
effect, excludes other religious groups (such as
Muslims) and nonreligious groups from the mainstream of
American society. 9
Consequently the manipulation of the symbol of a
v Judeo-Christian' nation depicts a dualistic, two-
dimensional world of 'us' versus s them', of a
metaphysical Judeo-Christian heritage from which, in
Reagan's words, "our forefathers found their
inspiration, justification, and vision" to write the
Declaration of Independence emphasizing "the value of
life and the worth of the individual," 10 a source of
law and justice which is inherently good and orderly,
over against something else which is disorderly, chaotic
'Yvonne Y. Haddad, "A Century of Islam in America"
[The Muslim World Today] Occasional Paper No. 4
(Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Islamic
Affairs, 1986): 9.
"Reagan's "Radio Address to the Nation," Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents , 24 August 1985,
p. 1001.
9and, perhaps, immoral. Implicitly this presents a
framework of meaning that makes the world comprehensible
to us by referring to "our ethics, morality, and
values," and argues that it was never the intention of
the founding fathers "to bar God from our public
life." 11 In his 1980 victory speech Reagan reassured
the American public in ecclesiastical terms when he said
"I consider that trust you have placed in me sacred, and
I give you my sacred oath that I will do my utmost to
justify your faith." 12
In a 1983 address to the National Association of
Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, Reagan warned of the
encroaching spirit of "modern-day secularism" and the
designs of liberals and "secular humanists" who
"proclaim that they're freeing us from superstitions of
the past" in order to destroy the "tried and time-tested
values upon which our civilization is based." He goes
even further by claiming that "their value system is
radically different from that of most Americans." 13
What is implied by reference to s Judeo-Christian
'
is even narrower than the image it invokes of a joint
religious heritage. Allusions to the s Judeo-Christian
'
tradition of North America are not meant to applaud the
nIbid.
"Quoted in Time 17 November 1980.
13Erickson, 77.
10
religious diversity, but to confront the threat of moral
degeneracy-real or imagined-embedded in the advance of
secular humanism and liberalism. They cloak a
conservative political agenda aimed at containing if not
reversing the gains of the social movements of the 1960s
and 1970s. Very little, if any, recognition is granted
to what is distinctive about the Jewish legacy; what is
considered relevant—namely the Old Testament prophets-
is appropriated and "protestantized" in the narrative of
America's Puritan experience while the rest is elided.
Perhaps what is most ominous about this is the
manner in which the American political discourse shapes
our understanding of international as well as domestic
issues. By defining the country as exclusively v Judeo-
Christian', the rhetoric in effect places all others of
foreign cultures or belief systems beyond the boundary
of the civil society we live in. It suggests and
condones a particular standard of treatment for those
who are perceived to be distinct and, implicitly,
inferior, and it repudiates the role of changing social
conditions in continually defining public values.
Tacitly this creates fertile ground for unease,
suspicion, and hostility. It restricts access v aliens'-
-including immigrants and their descendants—might have
to the utility and protection of the law usually
afforded to members of the nation-state in a liberal
11
democratic society. In an interview with Time magazine
following the 1980 election, then President-elect Ronald
Reagan identified what he anticipated would be the
greatest danger his administration would face: "the
possibilities of, literally, a religious war [in the
Middle East]—the Muslims returning to the idea that the
way to heaven is to lose your life fighting the
Christians or the Jews." 14 in response to this various
leaders of the Muslim communities in the United States
attempted to counter Reagan's characterization which
they judged to be not only incorrect but prejudicial and
inflammatory. The Muslim leaders' fear was that his
statement "may have provided an opportunity for an open
season on Islam in America." 15 However Time magazine
refused to publish their letters of protest and Reagan
failed to respond to a request to receive a delegation
of five Muslim-American religious leaders. 16
The reality that this masks is one of growth and
complexity, both in the number and nature of religious
faiths that have appeared on the North American horizon
of late. Several variables have changed the religious
14Time 17 November 1980, 37.
15Y. Haddad, "The Challenge of Muslim Minorityness,
The American Experience," in The Integration of Islam
and Hinduism in Western Europe , ed. W.A.R. Shadid and
P.S. van Koningsveld (Kok Pharos Publishing House), 146.
16 Ibid.
12
composition of the United States and Canada since World
War II. Increased immigration from Asia 17 and the
Middle East, declining religious membership in the
conventional religious communities of Protestantism,
Catholicism and Judaism, and the concomitant growth of
secularism have produced a vastly more pluralistic
religious environment in both countries. A diverse
assortment of faiths now represents a sizable number of
North American religious adherents. 18 Among these the
Muslim community is growing the fastest, at a rate that
will make it the second largest religious community in
the United States by the twenty-first century, 19 when
it will have nearly doubled the size it was estimated to
"Between 1971 and 1979 approximately 1,350,000
Asians were admitted legally into the United States as
immigrants, accounting for more than forty-four percent
of the total of all Asian immigration between 1820 and
1980 (Jeff H. Lesser, "Always 'Outsiders': Asians,
Naturalization and the Supreme Court," Amerasia 12
(1985/6): 95, n. 45).
18One source estimates conservatively that the
nonconventional faiths (e.g., Muslims as well as
Orthodox Christians, Buddhists and Hindus) now comprise
four percent of the total United States population, an
increase from one percent in the 1950s (Roof and
McKinney, 17, 235).
"According to Yvonne Y. Haddad, if the American
Muslim community continues to grow at the present rate
it will exceed six million and become the second largest
religion—smaller than Christianity but larger than
Judaism—by the year 2015 ("A Century of Islam in
America, " 1 )
.
13
have been in 1980 . 20 islam, representing over 4
million adherents in the United States 21 and roughly
200,000 in Canada, 22 is a significant minority religion
in North America. The rapid growth of the Muslim
community led a prominent Muslim scholar and activist in
the United States, Isma'il Raji al-Faruqi (1921-1986),
to call for its inclusion in the mainstream, to be
reflected in the reformulation of the concept v Judeo-
Christian' to add v Islamic' to it or, more aptly, in the
recognition of the Abrahamic tradition shared by
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 23
20<See Carol L. Stone, "Estimate of Muslims Living
in America," in The Muslims of America , ed. Yvonne
Yazbeck Haddad (New York: Oxford University Press,
1991), 25-36.
21 Ibid., 28 and 34.
22John Berthrong, "Interfaith Dialogue in Canada,"
The Ecumenical Review 37 (1985): 464.
"See Isma'il Raji al-Faruqi, ed., Trialoque of the
Abrahamic Faiths . Second Edition [Issues of Islamic
Thought no. 1] (Herndon, Virginia: International
Institute of Islamic Thought, 1986). This volume is a
collection of essays emanating from the "Trialogue of
Abrahamic Faiths" meetings co-sponsored by the Islamic
Studies Committee of the American Academy of Religion
(New York) and the Muslim-Christian-Jewish Conference.
Al-Faruqi was pivotal in establishing Islamic Studies
programs in North American universities and scholarly
associations, and in organizing Muslims in America. He
contributed to the contemporary interpretation and
understanding of Islam among Muslims by, among other
things, creating an Islamic think tank, the
International Institute for Islamic Thought in Virginia,
and promoting the Islamization of knowledge. For more
information see John L. Esposito, "Isma'il R. al-Faruqi:
Muslim Scholar-Activist," in The Muslims of America , 65-
79, esp. 73-74.
14
Statement of the Problem
Symbols evolve and acquire new meaning as
ideological understandings and demographic realities
shift. This study grew out of the conviction that the
Muslim experience in North America has been different in
important ways from that of any other religious, ethnic
or racial minority and has not been captured in the
symbols of the dominant culture. A close look at the
circumstances of Muslims in the United States and Canada
can tell us something not only about the nature of that
faith community but also about the social relations of
the United States and Canada.
Ronald Takaki, in Iron Cages, Race and Culture in
Nineteenth-Century America , analyzes racial domination
in the United States in an effort to understand more
fully its relationship to the development of American
culture and to the political, social and economic
institutions the culture has helped to create and
maintain. Takaki borrows from the thought of Italian
theorist Antonio Gramsci for his analysis of race and
culture when he identifies the phenomenon of hegemony.
The relationship between culture, or the superstructure
of ideology, and material conditions correlates strongly
to produce what Gramsci has called cultural hegemony,
an order in which a certain way of life and
thought is dominant, in which one concept of
reality is diffused throughout society in all
its institutional and private manifestations,
informing with its spirit all taste
,
morality,
customs, religious and political principles/
and all social relations, particularly intheir intellectual and moral connotation. 24
Hegemony, then, according to this analysis, is the
organization of society along lines which benefit a
particular class which has gained the loyalty of
subordinate as well as dominant groups through a
combination of coercion and consent. The exercise of
hegemony consists of more than the simple dissemination
of "ruling-class" ideas; it also includes the ability to
define, through various media, the symbols and terms by
which people understand themselves and the world they
live in.
Takaki focuses on the role of "culture-makers and
policy makers, or the white men in positions of
influence and power" in creating symbols and structures
which communicate a shared set of ideas, images, values
and assumptions about human nature and society. Their
"ideas and decisions mattered, for they were
consequential." 25 Their task is to provide an
"interpretation of the world" for American society and,
as interpreters of social reality, they exercise an
24Cited in Ronald Takaki, Iron Cages, Race and
Culture in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979), xiv.
25 Ibid. , xv.
16
inordinate degree of control over institutions, having
the power to
disseminate information and ideas, make laws,
punish in courts and use the instruments of
state violence. [In short] [w]hat white men
in power thought and did mightily affected
what everyone thought and did. 26
The network of symbols that filters our perceptions
of the world and our places in it is fundamental to our
culture. Those who control institutions are able to
claim legitimate power because of the effective
v
universalization
' of certain interests in the name of
the collective good, reflected in cultural symbols.
This hegemony exists at the expense of the neglected
groups in the discursive production of state and
society
.
27
Or, to put it slightly differently, culture can be
understood as a historically transmitted pattern of
meanings embodied in symbols. 28 According to
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, religion relates a
26 Ibid.
"See Timothy Mitchell and Roger Owen, "Defining
the State in the Middle East: A Workshop Report," Middle
East Studies Association Bulletin 24 (1990): 179-184,
for a brief discussion of this idea. In part the
authors argue against relying on the conventional
distinction between state and society, suggesting that
the antithesis of state and society is a discursively
produced effect. The challenge, then, is to understand
how that effect is created.
28Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures:
Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 89.
17
people's view of reality to a set of ideas about how
they are expected or required to live:
"[religious
symbols formulate a basic congruence between a
particular style of life and a specific (if, most often
,
implicit) metaphysic.
. .
.... Cultural symbols also
perform the same function in a secular sense, linking
ethics and behavior. Moreover symbols synthesize and
disseminate a people's ethos. A system of symbolic
meaning constitutes public "frames of meaning" in terms
of which particular actions are "produced, perceived,
and interpreted. "3o They sustain a set of institutions
which must appear to be consistent with both the
eschatalogical vision of a people and the plane of human
experience; in sum, they tie together their "most
comprehensive ideas of order." 31 Symbols are derived
from common experiences and are fixed in identifiable
forms; they are "embodiments of ideas, attitudes,
judgments, longings or beliefs." 32 As such they must
continue to make sense to the people who are meant to
understand them.
29Ibid.
30Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an
Interpretive Theory of Culture," in Ibid., 7, 10, 28;
cited in Timothy Mitchell, "Everyday Metaphors of
Power," Theory and Society 19 (October 1990): 560.
31Geertz, 89.
32Ibid., 91.
18
Political scientist Timothy Mitchell, however,
warns against relying on the unexamined assumptions of
the frameworks for analysis developed by such theorists
of culture and ideology as Geertz and Takaki. While
sharing their focus on relationships of domination and,
like them, contributing to theories of power and
resistance, Mitchell takes exception to the distinction
they draw between material reality and culture, the
concrete and the abstract, a practice which he sees as
reinforcing the effect of a two-dimensional world
constituted as something divided between two neatly
opposed realms. This approach is problematic and
misleading, in Mitchell's estimation, because it
replicates uncritically a larger dualism characteristic
to modern means of domination. It conjures an image of
an "unphysical realm of order that stands apart from the
world of practice" 33 and imparts a lofty purpose to it.
The apparent existence of such "frames of meaning" as
described by Geertz is an artifact, "precisely the
effect introduced by modern mechanisms of power" 34
which separate the material order on the one hand from
the sphere of meaning or culture on the other. It is
through this structural effect that modern systems of
domination are maintained. Geertz 's analysis, by
"Mitchell: 572.
34 Ibid.: 561.
19
reducing the world to a binary form, would ascribe to
the "frames of meaning" a metaphysical authority, the
power to persuade, which exists as something external to
ordinary life, through which material reality and daily
practices are perceived, understood, and justified.
Mitchell argues that this approach is overly
simplistic; "the complexities of domination never quite
fit the terms of the opposition between a physical and
mental form of power
. . . [and] many forms of
exploitation and control cannot be reduced to this
binary form." 35 The very image of a binary world
itself inhibits political dissent by placing authority
ultimately in the v unphysical realm' of order and
meaning, communicated through symbols and terms
congruent with publicly shared understandings of an
imagined heritage. The parameters of society, or the
boundaries around various arenas of action, are
established not simply by "the agenda-setting of
particular interests" who control access to institutions
of power and the rhetoric of national debates, but also
by social processes. 36 Meaning is context-bound and
located in the social acts and attitudes of a given
historical moment. Human activity vests symbols with
meaning, which is continually reproduced. The analyses
35 Ibid.: 573.
36Mitchell and Owen.
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of many theorists of culture and ideology, according to
Mitchell, are inherently flawed because they do not
examine closely the ordinary social practices commonly
taken for granted, and the theorists themselves are
complicitous in reproducing a dualistic world view.
When social scientists place the phenomena of physical
coercion and ideological persuasion in two separate and
opposing realms, we see how the binary world created by
the methods of domination "works itself into the very
vocabulary with which we speak of power." 37 The
problem, then, becomes one of understanding the
provenance and effect of this larger dualism.
With regard to cross-national comparisons,
political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset notes,
"there is much to be gained, both in empirical and
analytical terms, from a systematic comparative study of
Canada and the United States." 38 A frequent point of
comparison concerns the imagery used to describe the
assimilation or amalgamation process in the two
countries, the vmelting pot' versus the vmosaic'.
Drawing on the work of Max Weber, Lipset links cross-
national differences in value systems and institutions
"Mitchell: 573.
38Seymour Martin Lipset, "Historical Traditions and
National Characteristics: a Comparative Analysis of
Canada and the United States," Canadian Journal of
Sociology 11 (1986): 114.
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to key formative experiences. Historical events, such
as the American Revolution, establish values and
orientations which in turn affect later events,
reinforcing congruent patterns of development. 39 For
Lipset an important distinction between the two nations
lies in the divergent responses to the American
Revolution, an event which had a crucial formative
impact and is constitutive of both nations, with the
former embracing and the latter rejecting revolutionary
change. The values inherent in the differing responses
to the Revolution have become embedded in and
perpetuated by each nation's institutions. 40 He views
the Revolution as an epochal event which led to the
emergence of the dominant values of equality and
achievement in the United States 41 and, conversely, the
continuation of ascriptive values in Canadian heritage.
Because Canada is a N counter-revolutionary ' nation which
exhibits communitarian values, it is more
particularistic (group-attribute conscious) than the
39 Ibid.: 118.
40Ibid.: 119.
"However, Lipset does not entirely neglect the
impact of racism in spite of these ideals. As Takaki
points out, Lipset is clear about the fact that
"American egalitarianism is, of course, for white men
only. The treatment of the Negro makes a mockery of
this value now as it has in the past" (cited in Ronald
Takaki, From Different Shores, Perspectives on Race and
Ethnicity in America [New York: Oxford University Press,
1987], 34).
22
United States, a ^post-revolutionary' nation which
espouses individualistic and universalistic principles.
Canada's emphasis on particularistic group organization
is reflected in the ^mosaic' pattern which symbolizes
the modern nation. This results in "explicit government
policies" such as multiculturalism which exhibit the
public's orientation to accept particularistic standards
for dealing with ethnic groups. 42
Lipset offers the rather ordinary observation that
"[a]ttitudes and values characteristic of a people do
not exist in a vacuum.
.
.",« and need to be seen and
understood in the context of social relations. People
create belief systems that define rights. National
values, he maintains, "become embodied in institutions
which help perpetuate them." 44 Further, with respect
to law, Lipset writes:
Institutionally, national values should be
clearly expressed in a nation's system of laws
and the way individuals are treated under and
react to them and, in fact, this is what we
find in examining these aspects of Canadian
and American society. 45
42Lipset: 144.
43Ibid.: 119.
44Ibid.
45Ibid.: 128.
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John Brigham, a scholar of law and society, makes a
similar point but for different ends. 46 Institutions
arise from specific values and social foundations. 47
He argues that "institutions are not ^simply there';
they are organic and very much the product of social
life." 48 While practices are "socially constructed
ways of acting," institutions are defined as sets of
practices which accomplish certain tasks. 49 They are
"composed of various ways of doing things" that are both
understood by the communities that are attentive to the
activities of the institutions (e.g. the legal
profession vis-a-vis the Supreme Court) and determined
and legitimated by the same communities. 50 In an
important way an institution is constituted through the
interactive process of establishing, refining and
understanding the way v things get done', or the
discourse within the interpretive community that is
familiar with the institution. Institutions share "a
46While Lipset focuses on the distinctiveness of
values rather than structural differences, Brigham has
studied an institution—the modern Supreme Court—and
the N cult" surrounding it. See John Brigham, The Cult
of the Court (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1987). Both, however, profess an interest in seeing the
ways values affect institutional arrangements.
47Ibid., 25.
48 Ibid., 18.
49 Ibid., 24.
50Ibid., 21.
capacity to order social life because people act as if
they exist, as if they matter." 51 Thus not only are
institutions socially constructed but, in a dynamic
process, they are constitutive of social life.
Institutions rest firmly on social foundations and their
actions must be congruent with the values and
expectations of the communities "who understand the
practices [of the institution] and operate according to
them. ""
Brigham's investigation into the practices that
constitute an institution, namely the United States
Supreme Court, places them within the social relations
that give legal doctrines and practices their
significance. His study is helpful first of all in that
it isolates for inquiry that which is taken for granted.
This view allows us to explore those practices which
continually produce the effect of a social order. It
traces how shared understandings about social reality
become ingrained, are reinforced by and in turn
reinforce the authority of institutions such as the
courts in ordering social life. Secondly the insights
revealed in Brigham's analysis are useful for the
present study because they help clarify the connections
51 Ibid., 17.
"Ibid., 25.
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between abstract beliefs and social practices, linking
ideology and legal institutions.
K The ideologies
53
of a society find their most
concrete expression in its legal institutions. 54 The
study of these institutions in the United States and
Canada, then, should provide some insights into the
development of North American ideologies. The potential
for multiculturalism55 has existed in Canadian politics
for nearly two centuries and yet this notion has only
recently become the center of highly-charged national
debates in the United States. 56 In the United States a
53-3As legal anthropologist Carol Greenhouse notes,
"the plural form [of ideologies] is significant"("Courting Difference: Issues of Interpretation and
Comparison in the Study of Legal Ideologies," in Law andSociety Review 22 (1988): 688). Sally Engle Merry, in
reviewing the literature on legal pluralism, suggests
that multiple normative orders co-exist in society, that
pluralism is a condition found to a greater or lesser
degree in most societies ("Legal Pluralism," in Law and
Society Review 22 (1988): 873, 879).
54See "From the Special Issue Editors," Law and
Society Review 22: 632, where the works of Clifford
Geertz ( The Interpretation of Cultures ) and Susan Silbey
("Ideals and Practices in the Study of Law," Legal
Studies Forum 9 [1985]) are cited in connection with
ideology and legal behavior and institutions. Carol
Greenhouse identifies courts as well as law itself as
places where ideologies are formed and articulated.
55The federal governmental policy of
multiculturalism was not promulgated until 1971.
"One Canadian observer writes, "The U.S. is a
melting pot. Canada is not. ... I prefer the Canadian
mosaic." In 1960, Quebec's Premier, Jean Lesage, said
that all Canadians wished to avoid a melting pot, for
not only French Canadians but other groups as well
wanted to retain their separate ethnic identities. See
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trend away from the amalgamation model of a ^melting
pot' in favor of a society which emphasizes pluralism
can be traced in general terms, and a look at the
institutions that reflect these notions-including
religious tolerance-is in order. An examination of the
record of legal institutions, which are often the
location of contests over issues of rights and freedoms,
particularly when faced with popular disapproval of a
specific faith such as Islam, can help to illuminate the
production of ideologies—e
. g . cultural pluralism—and
of the divisions within and boundaries around the social
systems of the United States and Canada.
A look at the reception of Islam and Muslims in the
United States and Canada can help to elucidate the
culturally productive role of law in the two North
American societies. The present study will shed some
light on the character of the Muslim experience in North
America by examining the responsiveness of legal
institutions as Muslims seek recognition and tolerance.
It will seek to clarify "the role of law in constructing
an authoritative image of social relations and shaping
popular consciousness in accordance with that image" in
the particular context of Muslim aspirations to be
Robin Winks, "The Canadian Negro: The Problem of
Identity," in Immigrant Groups , ed. Jean Leonard Elliot
(Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd.,
1971), 105, n. 9.
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included within the parameters of a pluralistic
society." How the law has been used to fashion
categories that may serve to exclude Muslims from full
participation in society will be examined. This study
focuses on the experience of Muslims in the United
States and Canada to ( 1 ) provide a contemporary and
concrete example which illustrates the functions of law
in defining how society orders itself; (2) say something
meaningful about the experience of a liminal group (a
religious minority) in two seemingly similar contexts
(liberal democratic states, one with a long tradition of
text-based constitutional guarantees and the other with
only recent experience in this regard); and (3)
contribute to the growing literature on Muslim life in
the Americas.
It has been noted that "Islamic scholars, students
of religion, Middle East experts, and analysts of the
American scene all tend to overlook the presence of
Islam in America, or to dismiss it as of only marginal
interest." 58 However the growth of the Muslim
community not only in North America but worldwide
results in demographic changes and social, economic and
57
"From the Special Issue Editors," Law and Society
Review 22 (1988): 631.
58Haddad, "A Century of Islam in America:" 1.
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political tensions that can no longer be ignored by
scholars, analysts and government officials alike.
Muslims in the United States and r* n=**
The size of the American Muslim population is
estimated at present to exceed four million, 59 while
Muslims in Canada, comprising that nation's third
largest religious community, have reached almost
200, 000. 60 The number of Muslim immigrants entering
the United States and Canada has more than doubled since
1960. During the same period, the number of North
American converts to Islam, both black and white, has
also risen. This rate of growth of the American-Muslim
and Canadian-Muslim populations, combined with the
recent wave of religious resurgence in the Muslim world
and the popular association in North America of Islamic
revival with international terrorism, presents a
challenge to the shape of North American societies and
their commitment to the principle of tolerance. The
evolution of the objectives of the indigenous African
American Muslim community— from black separatism to
accommodation and a stronger identification with the
global community of ^orthodox' Islam—is yet another
factor which helps define the diverse Muslim community
59Stone, 28 and 34.
60Berthrong, "Interfaith Dialogue in Canada:" 464.
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and Muslims' claims for greater tolerance within the
North American milieu. 61
A careful historical study of Muslim migration
ought to disprove the prevailing misconception held by
many in the West that Muslims and Arabs are synonymous.
An accurate portrait would show that the Muslims of
North America come from diverse national origins and
cultural backgrounds representing the Arab world but
also South Asia—including Afghanistan, Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, the Maldive Islands, and Sri Lanka-
Southeast Asia—including the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Malaysia—as well as Europe, Africa, China, Iran,
and Turkey. Additionally indigenous African American
Muslims were estimated in 1980 to comprise roughly
thirty percent of the total Muslim population living in
the United States. 62 North American Muslims are not
restricted to any particular national origin, but
represent a microcosm of the multi-national global
community of Islam.
61For a brief discussion of the transition of the
Black Muslim movement from a revolutionary movement to
one seeking recognition as an institutionalized faith
community in the context of the American constitutional
order, see Oliver Jones, Jr., "The Black Muslim Movement
and the American Constitutional System, " Journal of
Black Studies 13 (1983): 417-437.
62The estimate of African American Muslims living
in the U.S. in 1980 puts the number at 1 million. See
Stone, 27.
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In I slamic Values in the United Statps: a
Comparative Study
,
Yvonne Haddad and Adair Lummis
describe the pattern of Muslim migration as consisting
of five "waves', the first arriving in the United States
from 1875 to 1912. Most of these immigrants came from
the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire:
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine. For the most
part those who stayed in the United States settled in
urban communities. The second and third "waves', from
1918 to 1922 and 1930 to 1938, respectively, consisted
to a large degree of relatives, friends, and
acquaintances of earlier immigrants but also included a
very small number of immigrants from other parts of the
Middle East and Eastern Europe. 63 Many who came as
part of the second 'wave' have experienced the
disruptive effects of World War I. Some were enticed to
immigrate to the United States by the reports of
opportunities there from returning and visiting
immigrants, letters from immigrants, or Americans
"Yvonne Y. Haddad and Adair T. Lummis, Islamic
Values in the United States, A Comparative Study (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 14.
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visiting the region." Isma'il al-Faruqi, himself an
immigrant to the United States from Palestine, writes,
For two hundred years the image of America inthe minds of Muslims was one of a haven wherethe persecuted could lead lives of religiousfreedom and piety and where they could earnfrom God's bounty to feed and clothe
themselves and their families. 65
The fourth vwave' of Muslim migration arrived to
the United States from 1947 to 1960 and was more diverse
in national origins. It contained immigrants from the
Middle East plus South Asia, Eastern Europe, the Soviet
Union and other parts of the Islamic world. Displaced
by the upheavals of the post-Second-World-War era, many
of these arrivals differed from their predecessors in
that they were less likely to be from unskilled,
uneducated, or rural backgrounds. Many
were the children of the ruling elites in
various countries, mostly urban in background,
educated, and Westernized prior to their
arrival in the United States. They came to
America as refugees or in quest of a better
life, higher education, or advanced technical
64For details on the causes of chain migration of
the Arabic-speaking community see generally Eric J.
Hooglund, Crossing the Waters , and George Tumeh, Al-
Muqhtaribun al-Arab fi Amrika al-Shamalivvah ( The Arab
Immigrants in North America ) (Damascus: Wizarat al-
Thaqafah wa al-Irshad al-Qawmi, 1965), 10-13.
65,, How the U.S. and Islam Can Work Together,"
Arabia; The Islamic World Review , June 1982, 36. Cited
in Larry Allan Poston, Islamic v Da'wah' in North America
and the Dynamics of Conversion to Islam in Western
Societies (Vols. I and II) (PhD diss., Northwestern
University, 1988), 55.
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training and specialized work opportunities,
as well as for ideological fulfillment. 66
The fifth vwave' began in 1967 and continues at
present. The volume of this \ave' has been affected by
the relaxation of immigration quotas. in fact,
according to Carol Stone's study of immigration and
census statistics, the number of Muslim immigrants has
more than doubled in an eighteen-year period,
"increasing from 4% of all immigrants in 1968 to 10.5%
in 1986.
"
67 Most of these arrivals share the socio-
economic background (i.e. middle-class, highly educated)
of the immigrants of the fourth W. Many come from
Pakistan and the Arab world and, as a result of the 1979
Islamic Revolution in Iran, there are a substantial
number of Iranian newcomers. The arrival of Afghanis
has also increased throughout the 1980s as a result of
the war in Afghanistan. Very few Muslims from sub-
Saharan Africa, Europe, and other regions are now
entering the United States. 68
The international scene has had its effects on the
development of black nationalism and the indigenous
African American Muslim community, too. During the
post-Second-World-War period when several African
66Haddad and Lummis, 14.
"Stone, 31.
68Ibid., 31-32.
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nation-states achieved independence/ 9 the popularity
of black nationalism in the United States was enhanced.
Africa became the symbol for liberation, a model for
black Americans' efforts to deal with their own problems
of daily existence in America. "Freedom for the
Africans left the Blacks in America the only "colonized'
peoples in the world." 70 m these circumstances, under
the leadership of Elijah Muhammed, the Nation of Islam
grew. Called America's foremost black nationalist
movement in C. Eric Lincoln's classic study, The Black
Muslims in America (1961, revised 1973), the Nation of
Islam appealed to the oppressed as "a protest directed
at the whole value-construct of the white Christian
society--a society in which the Black Muslims feel
themselves (as Blacks) an isolated and unappreciated
appendage." 71 Distinguished from "orthodox' Islam by
their beliefs (e.g. that a black man named Fard was God-
in-the-flesh and Elijah Muhammed was his Prophet; the
White Man is Satan), members of the Nation of Islam, at
least until the transformation of the movement in
69 In one year alone— 1960--seventeen African
nation-states achieved independence.
70C. Eric Lincoln, The Black Muslims in America
,
rev. ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).
"Lincoln, xxvii.
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72 adhered to doctrines about black supremacy and
suspicions of white America and its institutions. Thus
the Nation of Islam cannot be understood as an isolated
phenomenon, but as an important part of a larger
liberation movement, or a mass protest against race
relations in North America.
The dynamics of the ideological and philosophical
conversion of this American subculture, leading to its
conformity with more "orthodox' Islamic beliefs and
practices after the death of its charismatic leader, are
a product of a particular set of forces. While much of
the immigrant Muslim community is middle class, many
members of the Black Muslim community were from the
lower socio-economic bracket. The v orthodox' Muslim
groups in America, composed of immigrants and their
descendants, by and large dissociated themselves from
the Black Muslims prior to 1975, but the rift has since
been mended. The Nation of Islam was renamed the World
Community of Islam in the West in 1976 once Elijah
Muahmmed's son, Warith Deen Muhammed, assumed leadership
of the movement, and the name was changed again in 1980
72See Clifton E. Marsh, From Black Muslims to
Muslims; The Transition from Separatism to Islam, 1930-
1980 (Methuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1984).
See also the writings of Warith Deen Muhammad, son and
successor of Elijah Muhammed, especially An African
American Genesis (Calumet City, Illinois: MACA
Publication Fund, 1986).
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to the American Muslim Mission. 73 By 1985 the racist
tenets of the former Nation of Islam had been expunged
and "the movement was officially integrated into the
general Muslim community in the United States." 74
Since 1985 immigrant organizations have made greater
efforts to extend their fellowship to embrace African
Americans. Their recognition as part of the global
Muslim community, rather than as strictly a black
nationalist movement, was demonstrated in the dinner
held to honor the memory of the Hajj Malik al-Shabazz,
otherwise known as Malcolm X, hosted by the Islamic
Society of North America, an 'orthodox' Muslim umbrella
organization, at the Muslim American Political Awareness
Conference in Washington, D.C. on August 5, 1989.
Islam in North America is maturing. Religious
consciousness in the Muslim community has been
reawakened and intensified by Islamic resurgence in the
Middle East, North Africa, and Asia. Muslim-Americans
and Muslim-Canadians, regardless of national origins,
are being galvanized by events in the Muslim world at
large as well as by their reception in the host
"However, not all members of the Nation of Islam
agreed with the changes following Elijah Muhammed's
death. A significant schism developed within the
movement. Minister Louis Farrakhan continues to preach
Elijah Muhammed's doctrines and still maintains an
organization called the Nation of Islam.
74Haddad, "A Century of Islam in America," 4-5.
societies of North America. For instance, Yvonne Haddad
has noted that in Montreal "politics has become a part
of the Islamic message as a result of the Iranian
revolution" and has affected changes in lifestyle,
resulting in an increase in mosque attendance and daily
prayer. 75 At the same time, the North American Muslim
community has become politically active and is presently
engaged in the process of articulating a collective
agenda that reflects Islamic moral principles. The
politicization of Muslims is evident in such events as
the Muslim American Political Awareness Conference,
organized by the Islamic Society of North America
Political Action Committee and held August 4-6, 1989, in
Washington, D.C.; the 26th Annual Convention of the
Islamic Society of North America, held September 1-4,
1989, in Dayton, Ohio, to discuss ways of increasing
public awareness of the Muslim presence in North
America; and the American Muslim Conference held in the
San Francisco-East Bay area on November 4
,
1989. 76 In
Canada seminars were initiated in 1985 and held
"Yvonne Y. Haddad, "The Impact of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran on the Syrian Muslims in Montreal,"
in The Muslim Community of North America , ed. Earle
Waugh, Baha Abu Laban, and Regula B. Qureishi (Edmonton:
University of Alberta Press, 1983), 174.
76 In its publication al-Mashriq , the Islamic
Society of East Bay-San Francisco touts this event to be
"the beginning of a Muslim action that will change
America .
"
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regularly in all provinces with the goal of helping
Muslims better understand how the Canadian political
process works as well as helping to promote better
understanding of Islam among non-Muslim Canadians. 77
Further, the Islamic Society of North America, 78
whose stated purposes are "to foster unity and
brotherhood among Muslims and to raise their Islamic
consciousness as a people enjoining the right and
forbidding wrong", 79 has established three professional
organizations: the Association of Muslim Social
Scientists (AMSS), Association of Muslim Scientists and
Engineers ( AMSE ) , and the Islamic Medical Association
(IMA) .
77These seminars are coordinated by Islam-West
Associates and the provincial governments. See John
Berthrong, "The Canadian Muslim Community," Exchanqe
(1985): 10. a~
78r3The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA),
founded in 1982/83, developed from the Muslim Students'
Association of U.S. and Canada. It is an umbrella
organization that provides services to individuals and
Muslim communities in the United States and Canada,
including a Zakah Fund, which collects and administers
donations for the needy and orphans; educational
workshops; a speakers bureau; a film library; a
publishing house; and a credit union.
79This last point is in reference to the Qur'anic
injunction to the community of believers to fulfill
God's will on earth by living in complete accordance
with Islamic principles ("enjoining the good and
forbidding the evil"). See Qur'an 3:110, "You are the
best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is
right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in
Allah.
"
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The presence of Muslims in North America is gaining
the attention of the larger society. Time magazine
published an article entitled "Americans Facing Toward
Mecca, The Fast-Growing Muslim Community is Invisible No
Longer" in its May 23, 1988, issue. USA Today featured
"A Growing Islam Community, Moslem Faithful in USA
Tackle Misconceptions," in its September 3, 1989,
edition. An article called "American Moslems" appeared
in the 5 October 1990 edition of The Wall Street
Journal. U.S. News & World Report followed suit by
publishing an article on American
-Muslims on October 8,
1990, which stated that "Islamic worship and lifestyles
are becoming an increasingly familiar part of the
American tableau." 80 Although Islam has been practiced
in North America for more than one hundred years 81 it
has only recently received even nominal recognition as
an American phenomenon. Islam is still widely perceived
80Jeffrey L. Sheler, "Islam in America," U.S. News
and World Report
. 8 October 1990, 69.
81For evidence that Islam was the faith of Africans
brought to the United States as slaves, see Allan D.
Austin, African Muslim in Antebellum America; A
Sourcebook (New York: Garland Publishing, 1984). In
addition, immigration of significant numbers of Syrians
and Lebanese to the U.S. and Canada by the 1880s helped
establish Islam in North America. For information about
the African American movements in the U.S. see E. U.
Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism: A Search for Identity in
America (New York: Dell Publishing, 1962); and Lincoln.
A bibliography of the literature on indigenous Islam is
provided in Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Muslims in America: A
Select Bibliography," The Muslim World 76 (1986): 93-
122.
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to be a foreign creed and is maligned by its association
in the media with terrorist activity abroad and black
separatism in the U.S. Because of a prevailing sense,
however erroneous, that Islam is a threat to society it
is a faith that is not easily accommodated.
The Muslim experience in North America is
considered in this study for several important reasons.
While it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze
the resurgence of Islamic identity in the Middle East
and elsewhere in the Muslim world, the impact of Muslim
experiences in North America on their changing
perceptions of the world and their ideas about social
order merits attention. Muslim impressions of North
American societies, and the unprecedented intellectual
freedom many Muslims enjoy here, have been essential in
shaping contemporary Islamic revival. Muslim students,
enrolled in American universities in increasing numbers
since the mid-sixties (estimated to be over one hundred
thousand per year in some years), have the opportunity
to explore ideas and structures "away from the watchful
eyes of wary governments and the criticism of [Muslim]
traditionalists," and can critically assess their
heritage, religious beliefs, and the global role of
Islam. 82 The benefits of relative religious and
82Haddad, The Muslims of America , 4-5. For figures
of Middle East students admitted to the United States
from 1960 to 1973, see Hossein G. Askari and John Thomas
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intellectual freedom available in North America have
proved to be crucial to the ideological formation of
contemporary Islam; the United States in particular has
of late become a center of "Islamic intellectual
ferment" in the shaping of an Islamic world view."
Key individuals who have returned to their countries to
assume leadership positions in their governments and
opposition movements have passed from enchantment with
North America to utter disillusionment due to personal
experiences in the United States and Canada. Some, such
as Sayyid Qutb84 who was angered by what he
"experienced as strong racial prejudice in the United
States," have been catalysts in the conception of
contemporary Islamic ideology and Islamic responses to
the challenges of the present. 85 Their experiences in
the North American context have influenced Muslim
assessments of the true nature of North American
societies—including the extent of the commitment to the
Cummings, "The Middle East and the United States: A
Problem of v Brain Drain'," International Journal of
Middle East Studies 8 (1977): 65-90.
83Ibid., 4.
84The Egyptian Sayyid Qutb was one of the most
influential ideologues of the contemporary Islamic
revival. His interpretations of Islam and politics
continue to circulate.
85Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb, Ideologue of
Islamic Revival," in Voices of Resurgent Islam , ed. John
L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983),
69.
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espoused principles of religious tolerance, liberty and
•quality—and have led many foreign Muslims to
reevaluate their own societies. Some provide leadership
for religious reform movements. Many have adhered to an
alternative vision, based on an Islamic ideology, which
is deemed to be more appropriate for their societies
than the Western secular paradigm with Westernized
political and social institutions adopted by previous
generations. On the contemporary impact of Western
models on the emerging Islamic identity in the Middle
East, Haddad writes:
The West that the last century Arabs idealized
as ethical, honest, and enthusiastic is flawedby racism, by corruption, by a degenerate
"pornographic" society in which every person
seems to strive for his own interests rather
than for the collective good. The
disenchantment with the West is due not only
to its treatment of Arab hopes and goals vis-
a-vis Israel, but also to the apparent
inconsistency of Western ideals and what is
perceived as the imminent collapse of the
West. 86
The implications of Muslims' experiences in and
observations of North America have been profound. 87
"Yvonne Y. Haddad, Contemporary Islam and the
Challenge of History (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1982), 44.
87For instance, Haddad has reported Sayyid Qutb's
observations about American life in the following
passage from his book, Nahwa Mujtama v Island ( We are an
Islamic Society ) : "I do not know how people live in
America, the country of the great production, extreme
wealth, and indulgent pleasure. ... I saw them there
as nervous tension devoured their lives despite all the
evidence of wealth, plenty, and gadgets that they have.
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This factor, along with regional and international
factors that have been well-documented, 88 has been
responsible for the rising popularity of Islamic revival
and the intensification of Islamic identity. This
phenomenon abroad has, in turn, effected the goals and
identity of the Muslim community remaining in the United
States and Canada. Muslims who stay permanently and
those who are North American converts are encouraged by
the global resurgence of Islam to assert their religious
identity more publicly and to be more religiously
observant. Global and local factors combine to
constitute the North American milieu in which Muslims
Their enjoyment is nervous excitement, animal merriment.
One gets the image that they are constantly running from
ghosts that are pursuing them. They are as machines
that move with madness, speed, and convulsion that does
not cease. Many times I thought it was as though the
people were in a grinding machine that does not stop day
or night, morning or evening. It grinds them and they
are devoured without a moment's rest. They have no
faith in themselves or in the life around
them.
. .
" (cited in Haddad, Contemporary Islam . 90).
His aim in this and other writing is to condemn the
American obsession with the material aspects of life,
and denounce the Western path as anti-spiritual and
destructive. To imitate the West would be cataclysmic.
88For material on contemporary Islamic revival and
a discussion of its sources, see Asaf Hussain, "Islamic
Awakening in the Twentieth Century: an Analysis and
Selective Review of the Literature," in Third World
Quarterly 10 (April 1988): 1005-23; and Haddad,
Contemporary Islam . Most analysts attribute the impetus
of the current resurgence to the Arabs' defeat in the
Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 and frustration with the
outcome of the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973.
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now emerge as new claimants for religious tolerance and
protection.
As Muslims become more involved in the North
American political process, the character of the
community is subject to change. Political involvement
may tempt a religious community to compromise or even
ultimately to eschew their religious mission. Once the
attention of the Muslim community is diverted from the
internal concerns of interpreting the past and present
in accordance with scripture and prescribing the
normative Islamic lifestyle and is broadened to include
a functional understanding of North American society,
the nature and identity of the community will have
evolved. As the Muslim community interacts with the
surrounding legal and political systems of North
America, and becomes attentive to the authoritative
institutions in them, it is likely that the
institutional setting will have a transformative impact
on the community. 89 The concerns of Muslims as
89:A good guideline for what is likely to happen to
the Muslim community in transition may be found in the
North American experience of the Jewish community and
the development of a Jewish strategy (or strategies) for
survival in North America. Several books have been
written about the transformation of the Jewish community
in North America; for reference to this literature, see
R. Lawrence Moore, Religious Outsiders and the Making of
Americans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987),
chapter 3. Not mentioned there but also noteworthy are
Chaim I. Waxman, America's Jews in Transition
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983) and M.
Weinfield, W. Shaffir, and I. Cotler, eds., The Canadian
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participants in American political life will alter to
some extent their practices and adherence to literal
interpretations of scripture. How Muslims retain an
islamic identity while being part of the mainstream will
merit greater attention as the North American Muslim
community continues to grow and develop.
An example of this happening can be seen in the
fact that the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)
now issues Islamic marriage certificates to Muslims only
if the following provisions are met: (1) a 'proper'
marriage license has already heon secured fr-om a court
in the United States or Canada ; and (2) an Islamic
marriage has been performed by or in the presence of an
ISNA representative in the United States or Canada. 90
The first requirement indicates compliance with an
American civil practice. The two provisions together
demonstrate the intertwining of diffferent normative
orders, one official (i.e. the courts, state law) and
the other unofficial (i.e. a voluntary association), in
identifying plural sources of authority for the
sanctioning of a marriage. This may be seen as an
Jewish Mosaic (Toronto and New York: J. Wiley, 1981).
For discussion of the transformative nature of relations
between nineteenth-century religiously based American
Utopian communities and the legal system, see Carol
Weisbrod, The Boundaries of Utopia (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1980).
90See the ISNA membership handbook, P.O. Box 38,
Plainfield, IN. 46168.
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instance in which aspects of the dominant legal order
are replicated in the rules of ISNA, which, as a
voluntary association, might appear to be remote from
the processes of state law.
Another example, which is examined in detail in
Chapter 6, is the cautious approach recently taken by
the Islamic Society of East Bay-San Francisco in
building a mosque in Fremont, California. 91 The
Islamic Society has worked closely with the Fremont
architectural review board and made sure that the size
and height of the dome on the proposed mosque was
acceptable to the board, the Fremont city planning
department and neighborhood groups. Further the mosque
is being built on a site adjacent to the United
Methodist Church in Fremont and, to insure their
success, the Islamic Society has cultivated an amicable
relationship with their neighbors. The church and the
mosque have a formal arrangement to share in the
construction and maintenance of parking and landscape
and in the cost of sewer service. With this arrangement
the Islamic Society gained a strong ally before the
91The project began when land was purchased in
April 1987. In February 1990 the Fremont City Council
approved the site plans. As of July 1990 fund raising
efforts continued and building permits remained to be
obtained before construction could begin. For
information see the Islamic Society of East Bay-San
Francisco publication, al-Mashriq , (August 1989), 6, and
al-Mashriq (July 1990), 7.
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planning board and other municipal boards, including the
City Council, as well as neighborhood groups from whom
approval is necessary for the construction and operation
of the mosque. 92
The Islamic Society found that gaining approval was
not a simple matter. It was "a task in educating not
only the City Staff, but also the public" about the
functions of a mosque and the intention of its
prospective worshipers. To accomplish this task the
Society utilized the print media. Plans for the mosque
were published in such newspapers as the Fremont Argus ,
the San Jose Mercury, the Oakland Tribune and the San
Francisco Chronicle
.
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Mapping the Terrain:
The United States and Canada
The principle of religious tolerance becomes valid
and meaningful only through its elaboration within the
particular circumstances of time and place. Muslim
aspirations to be recognized as full members of North
American societies raises questions about the meaning of
"Khalid Abdullah, the Chairman of the Mas j id
Planning and Development Committee (i.e. the mosque
project), writes that " [i]t took a tremendous amount of
effort to obtain final approvals from the City of
Fremont" and the "Masjid Project looked more feasible
after negotiating a joint parking arrangement with the
St. Paul Methodist Church" ( al-Mashriq , 1990: 7).
93al-Mashriq (July 1990), 7.
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religious tolerance. Relatively little scholarly
attention has been paid to the circumstances of Muslim
communities in North America to date.- Most of what
has been written have been sociological case studies of
specific immigrant communities and do not differentiate
clearly between the influence of religious and ethnic
factors. These offer valuable insights into the
patterns of assimilation and acculturation of certain
immigrant communities that happen to be Muslim and begin
to discuss Muslim responses to challenges presented by
the host society. However they do not deal in any
systematic or analytical way with the responsiveness of
the host societies—the United States and Canada—to the
special circumstances presented by Muslims.
Moreover these studies have a fragmentary nature.
That is to say, they have broken apart the totality of
the Muslim experience by treating various national
groups as hyphenated' Americans or Canadians going
through essentially the same acculturation process as
every other immigrant. These virtually, if not
completely, ignore the religious element of identity and
94For reference to the literature on Muslims in
North America, see Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Muslims in
America: A Select Bibliography." The Muslim World 76
(1986): 93-122; and "Muslims in Canada: A Preliminary
Study," in Religion and Ethnicity , ed. H. Coward and L.
Kawamura (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University,
1978), 71-100. See also Haddad and Lummis; and Waugh,
et al.
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the historical dimension of their experiences. There is
a need to overcome excessive fragmentation, heal the
fractured approach and focus on the meaning of religious
tolerance in relation to what we constitute as state and
society. An analysis of legal institutions in the
United States and Canada can contribute to this
endeavor. As Canadian cultural anthropologist Selim
Abou has pointed out, "the fact remains that the chances
of acculturation and recognition essentially depend on
the kind of welcome which the host society provides for
immigrants and their descendants." 95
The paucity of information and studies about the
reception of Islam and Muslims in North America conceals
an important aspect of the evolution of North American
society, ideology and institutions. While scholarly
literature tends to focus on the experiences of
Protestants, Catholics and Jews as the mainstream
faiths, and of Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Native
Americans, Hutterites and Amish as minority faiths,
nothing has been written about the reception of Islam as
a faith that seems to many people to be foreign to, if
not at odds with, the dominant Judeo-Christian
tradition. Most people are in favor of religious
freedom and tolerance in principle, but are less
95Selim Abou, "Ethnical History and Migration,"
Cultures 7 (1980): 84.
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supportive of these norms in specific situations.
Popular conceptions of Muslims and Islam may mitigate
the willingness of Americans and Canadians to adhere to
the espoused principles of religious freedom and
tolerance when called for by Muslims in North America.
Studies of memoirs, articles and letters written by
immigrants from the Arab96 countries and from other
areas of the Muslim world, 97 as well as African
American Muslims 98 reveal early Muslim experiences with
See, for instance, Michael W. Suleiman, "Early
Arab Americans, the Search for Identity," in Crossing
the Waters, Arabic Speaking Immigrants to the United
States Before 1940 . ed. Eric J. Hooglund, 37-54
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1987),
and "Arab-Americans: Community Profile," in Journal
Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs (JIMMA) 5 (1983/4):
29-35; Adele L. Younis, "The First Muslims in America:
Impressions and Reminiscences," in JIMMA 5 (1983/4): 17-
28; Philip M. Kayal and Joseph M. Kayal, The Syrian-
Lebanese in America, A Study of Religion and
Assimilation (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975); Alixa
Naff
,
Becoming American. The Early Arab Immigrant
Experience (Carbondale and Edwardsville
, Illinois:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1985); Harry A.
Sweeney, Jr., A. Joseph Howar, the Life of Muhammed Issa
Abu Al-Hawa (Washington, D.C.: the Howar Family, 1987);
and Gregory Orfalea, Before the Flames, A Quest for the
History of Arab-Americans (Austin, Texas: University of
Texas Press, 1988 ) .
"See, for instance, Raymond Brady Williams,
Religions of Immigrants from India and Pakistan
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,
1988); Salim Khan, "Pakistanis in the Western United
States, "in JIMMA 5 (1983/4): 43-46, and "A Brief History
of Pakistanis in the Western United States," M.A.
thesis, California State University at Sacramento, 1981.
98See, for instance, Muhammad Speaks (publication
of the Nation of Islam) and Malcolm Little and Alex
Haley, Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1964).
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discrimination in the United States and Canada. Several
recent works have examined negative stereotyping of
Muslims, especially Arabs, and of media distortions of
the Muslim image." Problems of misunderstanding,
prejudice and hatred have become acute during the last
quarter of the twentieth century as Islam and Muslims
are maligned by association with terrorist acts
abroad. 100
Crude caricatures of Muslims appear abundantly in
the production and organization of popular culture.
"See especially Edward W. Said, Covering Islam.
How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the
Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), and
Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978); Michael C.
Hudson and Ronald G. Wolfe, eds. The American Media and
the Arabs (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary
Arab Studies, 1980); the 1979 International Press
Seminar, The Arab Image in Western Mass Media (London:
Morris International Ltd., 1980); Laurence Michalak,
"The Arab in American Cinema: A Century of Otherness,"
in Cineaste 17 (1989): 3-9, and Cruel and Unusual:
Negative Images of Arabs in American Popular Culture ,
Second Edition [Issue Paper no. 15, ADC Issues]
(Washington, D.C.: American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, n.d.); and Janice J. Terry, Mistaken
Identity: Arab Stereotypes in Popular Writing
(Washington, D.C.: American-Arab Affairs Council, 1985).
100In May 1986 the U.S. Justice Department's
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) prepared a
31-page document called "Alien Terrorists and
Undesirables: A Contingency Plan," in which details for
surveillance and detention of people are developed.
Only Iranians and Arabs are mentioned explicitly as
possible suspects. The plan states that the government
would "concentrate its counter-terrorism efforts against
particular nationalities or groups known to be composed
of certain nationalities [i.e. Muslims], most probably
those citizens of states known to support terrorism"
(cited in "Aliens face jail in plan," Detroit Free
Press , July 7, 1987 )
.
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Events and situations, whether fictional or real, are
presented to us through a framework of symbols, concepts
and images through which we mediate our understanding of
reality. Our ^common sense' ideas about race, ethnicity
and religion help us order social life in a way that is
easily understood and meaningful, and provide us with
clues about appropriate behavior and shared
expectations. The news and entertainment media both
generate stereotypes and rely on our familiarity with
them in order to formulate the world in their terms and
communicate ideas and information in an efficient, i.e.
timely, fashion. Discussion of the effects of such
overt manifestations of prejudice on Muslims has only
just begun, although the primary focus to date has been
almost exclusively on the distorted image of the
Arab. 101
A study of the particular circumstances and claims
of Muslim communities for tolerance and acceptance as
part of the North American landscape will help
illustrate the extent to which these misconceptions have
been operationalized through the legal institutions of
the United States and Canada. Such work will reveal the
degree to which the secular state in North America has
the capacity to accommodate pluralistic forms of
101The one notable exception, which deals with Islam
and Muslims rather than Arabs, is Said, Covering Islam .
52
community and can sustain a truly heterogeneous society
It will also atte.pt to show the connections between
concepts of race, religion, and culture, on the one
hand, and national identity on the other. m essence it
seeks to show how Muslims' claims are a constituent
element of the discussion about who North Americans are,
and how the cultural setting-its characteristics and
arrangements-both suggest and inhibit behavior. The
purposes of this project in its broadest sense are to
question whether the essentially egalitarian ideals that
form the basis of ideologies of tolerance, diversity and
pluralism represent accurately the realities encountered
by Muslims in the United States and Canada, and to
analyze the influence of the culture on the expression
of Muslim life in North America.
Outline of Chapters
The claims that Muslims are making are conditioned
by their historical experience as a religious minority
in the United States and Canada. To understand this it
is necessary to look at the Muslims' experience over a
relatively long period of time and to contextualize
their claims. In the following chapters this study
takes a historical perspective. It begins in Chapter 2
with a review of the immigration and naturalization
debates at the end of the nineteenth century which
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continued well into the twentieth century. This era
marks the end of open immigration to the United States
and Canada and the erection of restrictions in the face
of s new' immigration, principally from Central and
Southern Europe but also, significantly, from the
^Orient'. The turn-of
-the-century debates about
immigration and naturalization are an essential part of
the historical development of a national identity in the
United States and Canada. The purpose of Chapter 2 is
twofold: (1) to review how legal constructions have
constituted an important element in shaping North
American ideology; and (2) to show the ways race and
culture, or race and moral character, are understood and
linked in the discourse on citizenship.
The perennial question about who constitutes an
acceptable if not ideal citizen is one which conditioned
the voluntary arrival of Muslims to the United States
and Canada. The first wave of Muslim immigrants to
North America (1875 to 1912) arrived when popular
sentiments running toward exclusion of Asians from the
United States and Canada were reaching their peak. 102
102For information about immigration to the United
States see, generally, Haddad and Lummis. About Canada
Baha Abu-Laban writes: "The earliest record of Muslim
presence dates back to 1871, when the Canadian census
recorded 13 Musiim residents" ("The Arab—Canadian
Community, in The Arab-Americans: Studies in
Assimilation , ed. Elaine C. Hagopian and Ann Paden, 76
[Willmette, Illinois: Medina University Press, 1969]).
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That Muslims began to arrive at the height of the anti-
Asian furor in North American politics is extremely
significant. It continues to be relevant today as the
interaction between the early generations of Muslims and
the constitutive debates that redefined the rules for
citizenship at the turn of the century worked a profound
impact on the shape of Islam in North America—its
identity, institutions, doctrines and practices.
Chapter 3 looks at the connections between what was
being said about citizenship and how the Muslim
community was affected. It considers the actions taken
by immigrants from the Muslim world in response to the
articulation of standards for citizenship. An
important part of the affected community has followed
the courts' lead in adopting racialist and eugenicist
criteria to construct a national identity which in
effect denied equal access to citizenship to "Asiatics'.
Chapter 4 reviews judicial considerations as to
whether Islam and Muslim practices constitute protected
v
religion' under constitutional provisions in the United
States. It investigates how Islam and Muslims have been
treated by the courts when they have made constitutional
claims to maximize their religious freedoms.
Specifically the focus in this chapter is on religious
liberty claims raised by Muslims in prisons. The
circumstances of Muslim inmates came to the attention of
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the courts during the 1960s and 1970s when Black Muslims
used law to challenge prison policies that denied them
racial and religious equality. Black Muslims have
worked, through litigation, to expand the individual
rights of prisoners, including religious liberty. Their
efforts have created precedents that have helped to
establish broader prisoners' rights. 103
Moreover Black Muslim organizations have made
significant inroads in the prison population, extending
their outreach to serve the needs of African American
male convicts as part of their overall religious
mission. By the close of the 1970s Muslims were
estimated to comprise roughly six percent of the inmate
population in Federal prisons. 104 The notion that
Black Muslims are subversive and members of a cult bent
on the destruction of Anglo society has contributed to
the outcome in many court cases involving Muslims in
prison and is considered here as a contributing factor.
The history of mosques as institutions of a faith
community closely associated with immigrants in the
United States and Canada is in many ways unique and in
others quite typical. Chapter 5 focuses on the
103Jim Thomas, Prisoner Litigation; The Paradox of
the Jailhouse Lawyer (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1988), 5.
104
«• Federal Prisons Giving Considerations to
Muslims," New York Times , 18 November 1979, 57.
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phenomenon of ^hate crimes '
--crimes motivated by hatred
of race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity—and
discusses how mosques came to be included among the
types of religious property protected by ^hate crimes'
laws
.
Victims of vandalism, arson, and bombing motivated
by hatred of religion now, by virtue of the v hate
crimes' laws, would appear to have legal recourse.
People who are victimized by more subtle forms of
discrimination, such as exclusionary practices in
zoning, however, have a more difficult obstacle to
overcome. Thus Chapter 6 deals with the politics of
municipal zoning during the 1980s which in effect
limited the operation of mosques. It looks at claims
raised before zoning boards in suburban settings where
efforts by Muslims to build and operate mosques in the
communities in which they live provoked local
resistance. This resistance was wielded through legal
and political means, by using zoning systems and
building codes to control what can be built. Municipal
zoning affords suburbanites the power to define
themselves and guide their growth as a community, which,
in effect, allowed Muslims' efforts to be blocked in
certain locales. These are historical moments which
merit close attention if only by virtue of the fact that
they reinforce the instrumentality of local government
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in deciding who can live and worship within its
jurisdiction and how their public life manifests itself.
My concern in this work is with pluralism and, most
directly, with the principle of religious tolerance in
the context of changing social conditions. To examine
this closely I have chosen to study a particular
microcosm of the North /American religious scene,
represented by the Muslim community in the United States
and Canada. This approach has two advantages. First,
it shows a more accurate picture of the social and legal
systems, of the interests and rights protected by law,
than currently exists. Second, it brings the human
factor into sharper focus, by looking at the activity
and views of a significant religious minority which has
utilized legal structures in North America to assert and
protect its claims for religious tolerance. I have
tried to do so, hopefully, without distorting or
glossing over the complex history through which civil
rights in general and the Muslim experience in
particular have evolved. Chapter 7, the concluding
chapter, integrates the experiences of Muslims over time
and shows how law has served as a mediating and
transformative link between those who control and those
who are controlled.
CHAPTER 2
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP TN
TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY UNITED STATES AND CANADA
The first influx of Muslim immigrants to North
America began when popular sentiments running toward
exclusion of Asians from the United States and Canada
were reaching their peak. While directed primarily
against Chinese and Japanese immigrants, the
exclusionary impulses that shaped public policy from the
late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries
affected the lives and prospects of other Asian
immigrants as well, including many who professed the
Islamic faith. Just as the flow of Muslim arrivals
(from South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East) was
gaining momentum it was interrupted by the racially
inspired immigration and naturalization policies of the
United States and Canada. 1
The first wave of Muslim migration, from about
1875 to 1912, consisted mainly of Arabic-speaking
immigrants from Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan,
then under Ottoman rule. See Yvonne Y. Haddad and Adair
T. Lummis, Islamic Values in the United States; A
Comparative Study (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 13. For details see also Alixa
Naff, Becoming American: The Early Arab Immigrant
Experience (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Illinois,
1985); and Gregory Orfalea, Before the Flames: A Quest
for the History of Arab-Americans (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1988). For information about Canada see
Earle Waugh, Baha Abu-Laban, and Regula Qureishi, eds.,
The Muslim Community in North America (Edmonton:
University of Alberta Press, 1983), and Abu-Laban, "The
Arab-Canadian Community," in The Arab-Americans: Studies
in Assimilation , Elaine C. Hagopian and Ann Paden, ed.
(Wilmette, Illinois: Medina University Press, 1969).
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Immigration and naturalization policies have both
reflected basic principles of social organization (e.g.
pluralistic vs. homogenous) and contributed to
particular self
-definitions in the United States and
Canada. In this chapter and the next we will consider
the debates about immigration and citizenship generated
by the influx of new immigrants in the late nineteenth
century and the early part of this century to gain some
insight into the American and Canadian responses to the
problem of community identity and see how they delimit
the outer boundaries of the polity. This chapter takes
as its starting point the considerable literature about
the nativist movement in North America and proceeds to
This is not to slight the presence of Muslims
among the slave population in North America, which
antedates the recorded arrival of Muslim immigrants fromAsia, North Africa and Eastern Europe. An estimated 30%
ot Africans enslaved in the U.S. were Muslim while a
small number of Muslim African slaves were transportedto Canada. For details see Y. N. Kly, "The African-
American Muslim Minority: 1776-1900," Journal Institute
of Muslim Minority Affairs 10 (1989): 152-160. However,
Muslim African slaves were brought to North America byforce and were not subject to the immigration and
naturalization regulations that Muslim immigrants were
and which are the subject of discussion here. Moreover,
Muslim-African slaves, severed from their religious and
cultural origins, lost knowledge of Islam, to be
Reconstituted' only in the 1930s as a result of the
Garveyite movement. See Allan D. Austin, African
Muslims in Antebellum America: A Sourcebook (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1984); Beverlee Turner Mehdi, The
Arabs in America 1492-1977 (New York: Oceana
Publications, Inc., 1978); E. U. Essien-Udom, Black
Nationalism: A Search for Identity in America (New York:
Dell Publishing, 1962); and Charles Eric Lincoln, The
Black Muslims in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961).
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look at legislative and court records at the turn of the
century for expressions of a hierarchical social order
and ideals of citizenship. it attempts to show the
influence racialist and eugenics arguments had in
constituting political reality by, for instance, linking
N
race' and national character. It also shows how legal
constructions were used to deny citizenship to certain
categories of people. The purpose of the following
chapter then is to discuss the consequences of the
debates about citizenship for a particular faith
community (Muslims) that is not treated by the standard
works on immigration. 2
The legislative and court records discussed in this
and the next chapter are illustrative of the debates
that colored political discourse of the day. They are
useful to look at not only because they say something
fundamental about the standards for citizenship but also
because they reveal how an ethnocentric or nativist
conception of civic identity has contributed to the
political debates. Concepts of rights, obligations, and
social order evolve, and the tensions which generate
2For example, they receive no attention at all in
Oscar Handlin, Race and Nationality in American Life
(New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957); John Higham,
Send These to Me, Immigrants in Urban America Revised
Edition (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1984); Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); and Carl
Wittke, We Who Built America, The Saga of the Immigrant
(2nd. ed. rev.; Cleveland, 1964).
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change are often reflected in law. We can observe the
mutual interaction "between the values
.
. . [o f] a
nation and the institutions which both reflect and shape
them,- notably, between the values of ethnic and
cultural homogeneity on the one hand and the
legislatures which enacted and the courts which upheld
restrictive measures on the other.
A second and related point is that the court cases
looked at are useful because they demonstrate the
authority courts have in defining the parameters of
possible action and in "channel [ ing ] human action." 4
The discussion here looks in part at appellate court
decisions about the question of citizenship to see what
impact the courts have in providing structure to
political life (e.g. defining who is entitled to
citizenship). By paying some attention to the influence
they have had in constituting political reality and
articulating "doctrines and perceptions of what is
possible," we will begin to see the role played by the
courts in "interpreting the authoritative concepts
governing politics"— in this case, racialist and
3Seymour Martin Lipset, "Historical Traditions and
National Characteristics: a Comparative Analysis of
Canada and the United States," Canadian Journal of
Sociology 11 (1986): 124.
"John Brigham, "Judicial Impact Upon Social
Practices: A Perspective on Ideology," Legal Studies
Forum 9 ( 1985) : 52.
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eugenicist theories that validated exclusion of certain
people from citizenship-and associating them with the
authority of the state. 5
Membership in the Political Commimity.
Several scholars 6 contend that American civic
identity has been based on universalistic notions of
citizenship:
Admission to the political community as acitizen involves a voluntary pledge of
allegiance and an agreement to follow the lawsof the country's sovereign government. In
return, the government confers legal
constitutional status and political privileges
on its citizens. 7
Technically citizenship is acquired in one of three
ways: jus soli (birth within the boundaries of a
nation); jus sanguinis (through the nationality of
parents); or the process of naturalization. As legal
scholar T. Alexander Aleinikoff notes, citizenship by
naturalization in the United States reveals the
5Ibid.: 51-52.
See especially Samuel Huntington, American
Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (New York: Belknap
Press, 1981); and discussion of it in Rogers M. Smith,
"The ^American Creed' and American Identity: The Limits
of Liberal Citizenship in the United States," Western
Politica l Quarterly 41 (1988): 225-251. See also
Higham.
'Stephen Thernstrom, ed. Harvard Encyclopedia of
American Ethnic Groups (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard
University Press, 1980), s.v. "Naturalization and
Citizenship," by Reed Ueda: 734.
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preeminent place accorded the Constitution in the
configuration of loyalties. He writes,
to obtain naturalization, an alien does not
III ?
6
*
lle9lar
^
e to the American people or tothe land mass of the United States. Rathershe must promise "to support and defend the'Constitution" and "to bear true faith and
allegiance to the same." Becoming a citizen
means joining a national political
association—one founded by, dedicated to, andunited around the Constitution. 8
Yet the history of the rules governing citizenship
reveals the influence as well of an ethnocultural
conception of identity both in the United States and
Canada. 9 More particularistic criteria than simply an
adherence to liberal democratic principles—place of
birth, gender, 'race,' disease, special skills,
domicile, and political beliefs—all have figured
prominently in immigration and naturalization laws.
Such laws were systematically defended in the historic
traditions of discourse, which is evident in the
legislative and court records of the turn of the century
T. Alexander Alienikoff, "Citizens, Aliens,
Membership and the Constitution," Constitutional
Commentary 7 (1990): 13.
9Rogers M. Smith posits that the ethnocentric
perspective is but one among multiple conceptions of
citizenship which still compete in American political
thought, and that no single conception has ever won
exclusive sway. He argues that the ethnocultural
perspective runs counter to and has been obscured by
Enlightenment philosophy. For details see Smith.
10Restrictive immigration and naturalization laws
would seem inconsistent with the premises of liberal
democracy and historians and ideologues of American
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In both the United States and Canada immigration
policy has long been thought of as "membership rules
.
. .
[which] lie at the core of national self-
determination and self-definition."- As Aleinikoff
points out in his description of the citizenship-as-
membership model prevalent in the United States,
immigration policy is concerned with "membership in a
national community.
. . . Immigration decisions are
membership decisions, and the immigration system is a
process of selecting and evaluating candidates for
membership." 12 Admission of immigrants, both north and
south of the forty-ninth parallel, implies their
eventual acceptance as full members (i.e. citizens) of
the political community, barring exceptional
political thought have had trouble reconciling them.The problem, as immigration historian John Higham seesit, is that immigration policy inevitably entails
discrimination, "and a system of discrimination thatdoes not offend the democratic conscience has proved asyet unattainable" (Higham, 30). In spite of what he
acknowledges as "America's traditional susceptibility to
race feelings," Higham persists in a sanguine line of
argumentation which posits that free immigration is a
cornerstone of American society which can not be
dislodged easily (Higham, 47; 40). Essentially,
exclusion based on race is portrayed as an aberration
from the general adherence to Enlightenment ideals. See
also Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship
Without Consent, Illegal Aliens in the American Polity
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985),
which tries to show historically how 'consensual' and
v
ascriptive' models of citizenship have competed for
dominance in American law.
iiAleinikoff: 9-10.
12 Ibid., 10; 15.
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circumstances." Thus immigration policy serves as a
"quantitative and qualitative screen.
. .
. citizenship
is clearly the intended end of the immigration
process
.
1,14
Further, Aleinikoff cites an 1874 U.S. Supreme
Court decision: "The very idea of a political community,
such as a nation is, implies an association of persons
for the promotion of their general welfare." 15 The
stress is placed on the word "their" for, Aleinikoff
writes, a nation is not a community "established for the
benefit of non-members." 16 The concept of national
membership is doubly exclusive for it designates non-
members by defining members. 17
Recently a material criterion has been proposed as
a standard for naturalization in a provocative policy
introduced in the United States by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service: immigration based on investment.
Any foreign national who invests $1 million in the
United States and creates at least ten permanent jobs
Aliens can be naturalized after a probationary
period during which they are free to return home and
government has the power to deport them.
14Aleinikoff: 15-16.
15iaMinor v. Happersett
. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165-
66 (1874) (Chief Justice Waite)
.
"Aleinikoff: 14.
17Ibid.
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can, according to this proposal, acquire American
citizenship in two years. Scheduled to begin in October
1991 with 10,000 investor or job creation visas offered,
this provision is similar to a Canadian investor visa
program which has been in effect since 1986, but which
requires a smaller capital investment: as much as
$350,000, but less in most instances, depending on where
in Canada the capital is invested. 12,074 investor
immigrants went to Canada in 1990, with 3,498 investing
in British Columbia alone. News of the American plan to
institute a similar provision elicited criticism,
however. While its supporters, such as immigration
lawyer Lawrence D. Bastone, say that it is long
"overdue" and that "America needs not just the tired and
the poor ... [but also] the wide awake and the not-so-
poor, the people who have money to invest in America and
want to," opponents argue that immigration and
citizenship based on investment is crass and
"offensive." Such criticism, coupled with the fact that
applications for investor or job creation visas were low
and regulations remained unclear, led the INS to decide
to suspend implementation of the program. 18
Historically the political struggle to develop and
continually reconstitute a national identity in both the
18Andrew Blake and John H. Kennedy, "Million-Dollar
Visa: Courting Investors, INS Puts Price on
Citizenship," Boston Globe . 5 September 1991, 2.
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United States and Canada has been characterized by a
strain of racialist thought. Scholars of the history of
racism, such as Ronald Takaki, have pointed out that
while blacks and Indians were the prototypical oppressed
racial groups, the social reality in North America has
been more complex than that. it was, and is,
multifarious. it is
dynamically multiracial. What whites did toone racial group had direct consequences for
others. And whites did not artificially view
each group in a vacuum; rather, in their
minds, they lumped the different groups
together or counterpointed them against each
other. 19
Yet, while the basis for social organization along
racial lines has been more complex than a simple black-
white dichotomy, the traditional expression of American
race consciousness has been predominantly bi-racial.
The presence of blacks and Indians in the New World was
the central factor in the development of racial theories
in the nineteenth century. 20 "New racial ideas which
influenced the whole of Western society in the first
half of the nineteenth century fell on especially
Ronald T. Takaki, Iron Cages, Race and Culture in
Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1979), xiv.
20For discussion of racialist thought in
nineteenth-century America, see especially Reginald
Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny, The Origins of
American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard
University Press, 1981); and Takaki.
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fertile ground" in North America.- Racialist thought
was stimulated by overt contacts between the dominant
group-whites '--on the one hand and the oppressed
groups-blacks and Indians-on the other. Grassroots
antipathies toward blacks and Indians found expression
in intellectual-scientific circles which "found
necessary empirical evidence to confirm views that had
become increasingly common
. . . since the last decades
of the eighteenth century" and helped articulate the
idea that blacks and Indians were inferior varieties of
humankind. 22
It was in this historical context that racialist
thought arose in America. Social relations between
whites on the one hand and blacks and Indians on the
other were the genesis for systemic racism. Before the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, blacks, both
enslaved and free, were denied the status of American
citizen. 23 By the end of the nineteenth century,
despite efforts to expand the rights of blacks through
21Horsman, 99.
22Ibid., 61.
23In the oft-cited Dred Scott decision, the Supreme
Court declared that Dred Scott was not a citizen but a
"Negro" of African descent whose ancestors were slaves.
He was thus prohibited from filing suit in court to
obtain recognition of his freedom once he entered and
resided in free territory. See Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. 393 (1856).
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post-Civil War legislation and amendments,- the
persistence of a dual system of justice based on race
was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the Plessy
decision (1896) enunciating the Separate but equal'
doctrine. 25 Segregationist law continued to operate in
the South of the United States effectively unchallenged
by federal interdiction. 26
It was in this light that racially-based concepts
of social order endured, and, as they were developed and
refined, they came to stress racial differentiation
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to guarantee the rights of blackpeople to citizenship. Proponents of the amendment
argues that the Emancipation Proclamation had freed the
enslaved, but was not sufficient to confer citizenship.
That would require an amendment to the Constitution.
"Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Jim
Thomas points out that, in writing the majority opinionin the Plessy decision, Justice Brown argued that races
cannot be "put on the same plane" by judicial command:
"Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts,
or to abolish distinctions based on physical
differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.
If the civil and political rights of both races be
equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or
politically" (cited in Thomas, 41).
26See Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige's
description of American political history, which states
that the Second Republican political era (1896-1932)
"was marked by the almost complete halt to all attempts
to protect black Americans ..." ( The Federal Courts
as a Political System . 3rd ed. [New York: Harper and
Row, 1985), 231). For a v black perspective' of this era
and the national retreat from civil rights, see the
Messenger magazine, published from World War I to 1928
and edited by African American intellectuals Chandler
Owen and A. Philip Randolph.
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among Caucasian groups as well. The publication of
William Z. Ripley's The Races o f Europe (1899)
popularized a classification of Europeans into three
physical types: Nordic (Northern European); Alpine
(Eastern European); and Mediterranean (Southern
European). Reasons for exalting Anglo-Saxonism as a
superior v race' were posited and other national and
cultural groups were, in comparison, debased. v Race',
not environment, was the independent variable accounting
for the inequality of peoples. Thus, in light of the
general scholarly and popular interest in the study of
^race', the arrival of new immigrant groups from
southern and eastern Europe and Asia in the late
nineteenth century took on special significance.
Restrictionist writers such as Madison Grant ( The
Passing of the Great Race . 1916) warned that Nordics had
to close the gates against the flood of the latter two,
inferior, types that were pouring in from southern and
eastern Europe. 27 The new influx "forced open the
boundary of American [and Canadian] citizenship" and
renewed debates about membership in the political
community. 28
748.
27See Higham, 47.
28Thernstrom, "Naturalization and Citizenship:"
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Ethnic and racial heterogeneity has elicited
various responses, which in part give clarity,
definition, and some intellectual substance to visceral
racial anxieties and express an underlying concern for
national identity and homogeneity. Newcomers raise
numerous questions in a new, slightly altered light, but
the fundamental issues remain unchanged. In his work on
migration patterns and ethnic conflict in India Myron
Weiner has looked at social movements and government
policy to show "how indigenous ethnic groups attempt to
use power to overcome their fears of economic defeat and
cultural subordination by more enterprising, more
skilled, better educated migrant communities." 29 He
suggests that policy is "an instrument [used] by one
group or another in the struggle to maintain or
transform the ethnic division of labor," rather than a
disinterested attempt on the part of government to
ameliorate inter-ethnic tensions. 30 Thus Weiner
understands the motivations behind policy-making
regarding migration as efforts either to uphold or
challenge the status quo, motivations which may be
fueled by irrational fears.
29Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil; Migration and
Ethnic Conflict in India (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978), 17.
30Ibid., 11.
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Elsewhere Weiner notes that, globally, neither
notions of what constitutes Excessive' immigration nor
responses to Excessive' immigration are uniform:
As the world-wide flow of refugees and
migrants continues, each country decideswhether to accept immigrants, how many, underwhat terms how it will treat those who havealready entered, and whether it will force itsmigrants to go home. 31 l S
Thus, he contends, explanations for anti-migrant
movements and policies must be provided on a case-by-
case basis: "Contextual explanations seem more
appropriate than a general theory in determining what
constitutes a politically acceptable level of
immigration. " 32
A tension between nativists, who advocate a
homogenous society, and pluralists, who emphasize the
value of cultural diversity, is "at the heart of the
controversy" in several countries faced with difficult
migration problems. 33 While the debate about the
desirability of particular migrants is often cast in
economic terms—opposition is especially strong during
periods of high unemployment—it is important to
recognize that fears about the social, cultural and
Myron Weiner, "Immigration: Perspectives from
Receiving Countries," Third World Quarterly 12 (1990)
140. x V '
32 Ibid.: 160.
"Ibid.: 154.
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political impact of migrants and additional migration
lie not far beneath the surface. Consciousness of kind,
that "state of mind in which a [person] is vividly aware
of [being] a member of a group different from other
groups»-is aroused especially when a dominant group
feels that its prized values (e.g. social status, racial
purity, religious cohesion) are threatened by the
aspirations of newcomers or a minority group. 34
Economic security and physical survival may be
under a real or imagined threat, but this is not
necessary nor even central to elicit group
consciousness. For instance, V. S. McClatchy, former
editor of the Sacramento Bee and a vocal leader of the
Asian exclusion movement on the Pacific Coast of the
United States and Canada during the early twentieth
century, argued that the fundamental objection to
immigration was racial, not economic. He writes, "local
[i.e. Californian] opposition to this class of
immigration had its inception in economic
considerations, but basically the opposition is
racial." 35 As Weiner observes,
Nativism in the USA was only marginally linked
to the issue of job competition, for the
34C. Eric Lincoln, The Black Muslims in America
revised edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 36-37.
35Cited in The Alien in Our Midst , ed. Madison
Grant and Charles Stewart Davison (New York: Galton
Publishing, 1930), 188.
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target of the nativists was not the number ofmigrants who came, but their composition
SrieSS
S
and
g
T
rd
-
d
,
Ca
^
h°liC
'
Gre^k Orthodox,
. fWlsh ^grants as disrupting apre existing American culture which thevregarded as Nordic,' white and Protestant.-
A practical rejection of the liberal ideal of
tolerance is evident in some instances where discrete
groups, distinguishable from one another on some basis
(e.g. skin color), live in close proximity. As W. Peter
Ward suggests in his book, White Canad, Forever. Pnpn 1a ,
Attitudes and Public Policy Tow.H rental s in grj ^ -k
Columbia
,
"racism and nativism are among the common
consequences of interracial and cultural contact." 37
In Canada "it was because of the plural condition that
whiteness came to form the core of the host community's
identity. " 38
36Weiner, "Immigration:" 153-4.
37W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular
Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in BritishColumbia (Montreal: McGill-Queen
' s University Press
Ibid., 22. For further discussion of pluralism
and the development of the dominant group's self-
perception founded upon race, see Ibid., 19-22. While
Takaki posits that racism has cultural and economic
bases, and results from the "interaction among
psychological needs, ideology, and economic interests,"
(Takaki, 11) and Horsman explores the intellectual
origins of racism that came to influence popular
attitudes, Ward argues that racism is primarily a
problem of social psychology in race relations.
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Racial and Eugenics Criteria
Anxieties over immigration are often expressed in
the use of such terms as "cultural pollution, - "over-
foreignization" and "minoritization. » Anti-migrant
sentiments are linked to concerns about preserving the
composition of the social and political community, and
cultural attitutes about the nature of the sending
countries. The (real or perceived) possibility that
foreigners might gain political control, or may change
the cultural or social order, is central in determining
who is an ^acceptable' immigrant and what constitutes an
Acceptable' level of immigration. In the United
States, beginning in the late nineteenth century,
changes in thinking about immigration and the erection
of barriers to further immigration of specific types
gave governmental validation to the idea that
immigration from places other than northwestern Europe
was unacceptable.
Exclusionary politics in the context of
constitutive debates about the membership of the
American and Canadian social and political communities
acquired a very powerful conceptual tool by the late
nineteenth century whose provenance was in the
'''Weiner, "Immigration:" 154.
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ascendancy of genetics and evolutionary theory.
Racialist classification schemes were developed,
borrowed from the apparently neutral fields of science
and medicine, and were applied in the realm of public
policy. The subject of immigration control and the
reform of the rules of naturalization was already a
matter of great interest in American public discourse
from the mid-nineteenth century on as immigration from
southern and eastern Europe and Asia began to rise. The
application of scientific principles and methods in
explicating the dangers presented by this influx for the
most part was grasped with enthusiasm, for it provided
the necessary justification to support the exclusion of
unwanted immigrants. Science was used to reaffirm
prejudices many already held.
"By the middle of the nineteenth century, science
had become such a dominant cultural idea that it rivaled
religion in its explanatory power." 41 As the
principles of evolutionary biology were popularized and
According to Weiner, nativism "became a
respectable attitude" among North American social
scientists, theorists, and humanists certainly by the
end of the nineteenth century ("Immigration:" 152).Social Darwinism, eugenics, and a concern for cultural
preservation did not come from fringe elements alone,
but shaped the North American intellectual tradition.
:Stuart C. Gilman, "Degeneracy and Race in the
Nineteenth Century: The Impact of Clinical Medicine,"
Journal of Ethnic Studies 10 (1983): 29.
77
es
gained credibility, the conceptualization of taxonomi
of peoples, like flora and fauna, became evident and
reflected the biases of the day. Genetics inspired many
to hope for the improvement of society by regulating the
inheritance of bad traits.- The assumptions of such a
classification scheme rested on the presupposition that
acquired characteristics, such as moral character, could
be inherited, and led to the use of genetically-based
distinctions among people as a justification for
systemic inequalities and racism.
The belief "that character, disease, and
temperament were inherited was called diathesis, or more
commonly a constitutional bent." 43 Tuberculosis,
cancer, and mental illness were atavisms triggered not
only by the sufferer's moral and physical conduct but by
those of his ancestors. Miscegenation thus became a
serious threat to the well-being of a healthy v stock' of
people because it introduced the possibility of
injecting moral as well as physical deficiencies into a
sound genealogy. "Miscegenation between races was
viewed as both biologically and morally corrupting, with
both understood as having physical causes." 44 Any
racial mixture weakened the superior N stock'.
42Higham, 47.
43Gilman: 34.
44 Ibid.: 35.
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These beliefs rested on the scientific learning of
the day, and the works of social theorists and natural
scientists alike reinforced basic presumptions about
race and culture. For instance the works of the French
scholar Gobineau were translated in English and
published in Philadelphia in 1856, with an addendum by
the American craniologist Josiah Nott which corroborated
the scientific validity of Gobineau's theories.
Gobineau's work gave
an exposition of the laws of nature which
revealed that races differed from one anotherin their physical beauty, in their culturalpower, and in their spiritual capacity, as
well as in language and body structure. 45
It also delineated a relationship between racial
characteristics and the rise and fall of civilizations.
Throughout history, as inferior v blood' of the lesser
N
races' of a civilization came into preponderance, the
civilization degenerated. Gobineau contended that, "In
particular, the Semites had time and again injected
Negro strains into the dominant race and thus enfeebled
it beyond the power of recovery." 46 Handlin notes
that, as empires disintegrated and populations shifted,
"The moral for the nineteenth century was
inescapable." 47 Gobineau's theories of race received
45Handlin, 67.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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increasing acclaim in the United States and Canada over
the next four decades as the two nations faced a
transforming immigration situation.
This line was adopted and developed by other
eugenics specialists and proponents of immigration
restriction who attempted to prove that no degenerate
stock could "ever be converted into healthy and sound
stock by the accumulated effects of education, good
laws, and sanitary surroundings." 48 This argument had
an intellectual as well as popular vogue. By the middle
of the nineteenth century, as Horsman points out,
the very phrases of the new scientific
defenders of innate racial differences
appeared in the mouths of politicians.
Americans were reminded constantly that the
observable differences between races could be
shown scientifically to be based on physical
and mental factors which had remained the same
throughout history and against which
environment and education were helpless. 49
Essentially, restrictionists found in scientific
discourse what they wanted to find: confirmation of
inherent racial differences and their connection to
supposedly observed cultural traits. 50 The science of
48Ibid., 70.
49Horsman, 140.
50Horsman writes that phrenology, popular by mid-
century, promoted the concept of inferior and superior
races. "They found in skulls and heads what they wanted
to find.
. . . Whites were inventive, creative,
powerful; blacks were docile and ignorant; Indians were
savage and intractable" (Ibid., 145).
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the day "made the language of race an impelling vehicle
for thinking and talking about culture." 51
The "concept of race had become a basic category
of social analysis" in Canada as well." The idea that
character and physical flaws were inherited served as a
basis not only for racial distinctions but to
discriminate politically and socially against the poor,
the insane, and certain ethnic minorities. m the
growing xenophobic atmosphere of the mid to late
nineteenth century the meaning of ^race' expanded to
include a variety of national groups. Southern and
eastern Europeans were viewed as distinct and inferior
racial groups. Asians, whether classified as Caucasian
or Mongolian, constituted distinct and inferior racial
groups as well.
Thus scientific principles and the newly-
popularized knowledge of investigatory methods based on
empirical evidence were borrowed and applied to social
and political problems. The appearance of what in the
natural sciences were "objective" measures was
"incredibly persuasive, and this apparently benign
clinical tool was suddenly crucial for legitimating
prejudice." 53 Problems of v race', crime, poverty,
51Higham, 47.
"Ward, 13.
53Gilman: 35.
81
insanity, or deviation of any kind fit into a very
simple explanatory category: genetic disease. The
simplicity of the explanatory model enhanced its
acceptability, as did the expanding public knowledge
about disease and its transmission. These ideas became
a vital part of the eugenics arguments of the turn of
the century and became an integral part of public
policy, as we shall demonstrate.
Legislative Record
Race
During the middle years of the nineteenth century
arguments began to circulate about the dangers of ^race
suicide' and the risk that the Anglo-Saxon - stock' would
not survive if current immigration from southern and
eastern Europe and Asia continued. 54 Heterogeneity of
v
race' was considered to be damaging and the
v
unassimilability' of peoples of dark complexions, etc.,
was emphasized. 55 These arguments were advanced
without any explicit recognition given to the fact that
Milton R. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic inAmerican Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1946), 31; see also Ward, 84-5.
55The Commissioner-General of the U.S. Bureau of
Naturalization acknowledged this line of reasoning when
he wrote in 1909, "From one point of view, at least,
heterogeneousness [of race] is undesirable,
homogeneousness desirable. There can be but little
homogeneity between the people of southern and eastern
Europe and the real American."
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the Anglo-Saxons were themselves the product of 2,500
years of racial mixture.
Essentially, by the 1850s the idea was firmly f ixed
that the vast majority of the world's populations were
incapable of creating democratic governments or living
in a republican society.- The eagerness with which
restrictionists wished to justify homogeneity by proving
that non-whites, or at least those who were not Anglo-
Saxon, were innately incapable of comprehending or
benefiting from democratic freedoms helped theories
about general racial distinctions gain wide acceptance.
Pressures for stricter enforcement of immigration
regulations already on the books and for the legislation
of further restrictions increased as the campaign for
exclusion won popular support.
Advocates for the exclusion of objectionable
immigrants (i.e., from southern and eastern Europe and
Asia) were plentiful. Restrictionists preyed on fears
about job competition, the unassimilability of
newcomers, and cultural degradation which were broadly
based. The primary vehicles for expressing public
anxieties over immigration were trade unionism and
exclusion leagues. The Farmers Educational and
Cooperative Union of America passed a resolution in 1908
calling on the U.S. government to exclude
56Horsman, 298.
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Just as their American counterparts had, the newly
formed labor unions in Canada discriminated against
Asians in the early 1900s.- The call for restrictive
measures appeared in such Canadian labor journals as the
Industrial World, which queried,
Is nothing to be done to stop the influx ofmongols into this province [i.e. BritishColumbia]? What is in store for us as anAnglo-Saxon community? ... The workers ofBritish Columbia may be forced to give thegovernment to understand, once and for allthat they intend this community shall remainAnglo-Saxon. 59
About South Asians the secretary of Victoria Trades
and Labour Council in British Columbia argued in 1906
that
The people of India, in common with all
Asiatic races, are reared and nurtured in and
under the influence of civilization and
environments that seem to be, in principle,
totally opposed to the civilization and
environments under which we of the Western
Congress, House, Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization, Hearing on Immigration
r 61st Cong., 2d.
sess., 25 January 1910, 87.
58In 1899 and 1900 as many as 20,000 Asians entered
British Columbia. See Ward, 55.
-Industrial World (Rossland) , 28 April 1900, cited
in Ward, 56.
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Similarly the Liberal MP for Vancouver and vocal
opponent of Asian immigration, R.G. MacPherson,
reiterated this sentiment when addressing the question
of South Asian immigration. In the following statement
he defines his sense of Canadian nationality and places
South Asians beyond the pale:
It is not enough to call it a question ofcheap labour; it is not enough to raise thequestion of colour, race or creed. To be aCanadian citizen, at the beginning of thistwentieth century, is no small thing. The menwho built up this country, who hewed homes out
of the forest, were men of first class, A 1
stock, and the responsibility they left us isgreat. The sentiment expressed in the proudphrase, Civis Romanus sum, becomes the citizen
of Canada as well as it became the citizen ofRome. A race of men who cannot appreciate our
mode of life, our mode of education, all thatgoes to make up Canadian citizenship, are notfit immigrants of this country. On the
grounds of Canadian citizenship I attack this
question. 61
60Cited in Ward, 84.
61Ibid.
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In the construction of the category of Citizen',
MacPherson makes it clear that i n ~n , his estimation, South
Asians are excluded.
The 1908 report of MacKenzie King, the royal
commissioner appointed to investigate the problem of
Oriental' immigration, was only slightly less harsh in
its assessment of South Asians in Canada. King framed
his objections to the anticipated consequences of South
Asian immigration in terms of the welfare of the South
Asians themselves and the best interests of the nation.
He writes,
That Canada should desire to restrict
immigration from the Orient is regarded as
natural; that Canada should remain a white
man's country is believed not only desirablefor economic and social reasons, but highly
necessary on political and national grounds.
It is clearly recognized in regard to
emigration from India to Canada that the
native of India is not a person suited to this
country; that, accustomed, as many of them
are, to conditions of a tropical climate and
possessing manners and customs so unlike those
of our own people, their inability to readily
adapt themselves to surroundings entirely
different could not do other than entail an
amount of privation and suffering which render
a discontinuance of such immigration most
desirable in the interest of the Indians
themselves. It was recognized, too, that the
competition of this class of labor, though not
likely to prove effective, if left to itself,
might, none the less, were the numbers to
become considerable (as conceivably could
happen were self-interest on the part of
individuals be allowed to override
considerations of humanity and national well-
being and the importation of labor under
contract be permitted), occasion considerable
unrest among the workingmen whose standard of
comfort is of a higher order, and who, as
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Thus the protection of the interest of Canadian
citizens, "whose standard of comfort is of a higher
order" than South Asians, requires that South Asians,
who are not citizens, be excluded from Canada.
The potential for this exclusion to be actualized
rested in earlier legislation and court decisions. m
the United States the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882
prohibited Chinese laborers from entering the country
and those who were already here became ineligible for
naturalized citizenship." The statute introduced a
of i
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This legislation was passed in the wake of asteady increase in the number of Chinese immigrants in
iQQn tu
ed states. Takaki writes that "between 1850 andlbbO, the Chinese population in the United States shot
?P 7;520 to 105,465, a fifteenfold increase; in1870 the Chinese constituted 8.6 percent of the totalpopulation of California and an impressive 25 percent ofthe wage-earning force. Significantly, in theirdescriptions of these new immigrants, whites tended toidentify them with groups they had historically set
apart from themselves—blacks and Indians" (Takaki,
216). The Chinese were subjected to a process of
"Negroization" which depicted them, like emancipated
blacks, as threats to republicanism and made their
exclusion by law possible (Takaki, 216). South Asians
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new category into immigration laws: "aliens ineligible
for citizenship.- The Supreme Court , s affirmation q£
the Act's constitutionality in the Chinese Exclusion
cases contained the potential for exclusion of non-
Chinese immigrants from Asia as well." These
decisions laid the groundwork for various statutes in
later years which restricted the rights of such aliens.
For instance, in 1913 the California legislature enacted
the Alien Land Law, a statute that prohibited Asians
from owning and cultivating agricultural land. While
the law was directed primarily at the Japanese it also
affected other Asians, including "the few hundred
[Asian] Indians" who farmed in the Sacramento, San
Joaquin, and Imperial Valleys. 66 m 1914 a letter from
the U.S. Secretary of Labor was appended to a
were subjected to the same process, which rendered theirexclusion via the Barred Zone provision of the 1917Immigration Act intellectually reasonable. Details willbe discussed below. ^j-a W U
"Thernstrom, "Naturalization and Citizenship:"
7 39. The impact of the statutory phrase "aliensineligible for citizenship" will be discussed below inconnection with the situation of South Asians and UnitedStates v. Baohat Singh Thind
r 261 U.S. 204 (1922).
"See Chae Chan Ping v. United States
,
130 U.S. 581(1889) (Chinese Exclusion Case); Fong Yue Ting v. UnitedStates
. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
66Gary R. Hess, "The "Hindu' in America:
Immigration and Naturalization Policies and India, 1917-
1946," Pacific Historical Review 38 (1969): 63. Fordetails see also Karen Leonard, "The Pakhar Singh
Murders: A Punjabi Response to California's Alien Land
Law," Amerasia 11 (1984): 75-87.
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Congressional bill on "Hindu" immigration which
explained in full detail the implications of the Chinese
Exclusion cases for Caucasian immigrants such as South
Asians who were, like the Chinese, undesirable."
In 1917 the enactment of new immigration
restrictions provided the legal means, including a
literacy test, to exclude more of the new immigrants.
The "Barred Zone" provision of the Immigration Act of
1917 (39 Stat. 874) explicitly prohibited virtually all
Asian immigration to the United States. It excluded
immigrants from India, Siam, Arabia, Indo-China, the
Malay Peninsula, Afghanistan, New Guinea, Borneo, Java,
Ceylon, Sumatra, Celebes, and parts of Russian Turkestan
and Siberia.
Canadian legislation similarly excluded Asian
immigration. As early as 1884 the British Columbia
legislature passed a Chinese Immigration Act which
forbade further immigration and imposed draconian
restrictions on all Chinese residents. However the
federal government of Canada disallowed the Act, largely
because the transcontinental railroad was not yet
completed and Chinese labor was in demand. Further, the
courts struck down one of the discriminatory
67,See Congress, House, Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization, Hearings on Hindu Immigration
(Restriction of Immigration of Hindu Laborers), 63rd
Cong., 2d. sess., 13 February 1914.
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restrictions, a poll tax on Chinese, but a prohibition
on Chinese land acquisition remained in effect.- m
1885 the federal Franchise Act was amended to prohibit
all Asians, including Chinese, from voting. 69
At the same time that he nullified the Chinese
Immigration Act, Canadian Prime Minister MacDonald
promised an investigation of Chinese immigration and
possible federal measures to regulate it. As Ward puts
it, West Coast pressures forced MacDonald "to accept the
principle of immigration restriction, although he would
not enforce it until the railway's end was in sight." 70
After years of acrimonious debates, the federal
government in Canada promulgated the 1902 Immigration
Act in the midst of growing concerns about epidemics
purportedly transmitted by immigrants. The statute
divided all immigrants into three categories: the unfit;
the fit; and the curable sick who were otherwise fit. 71
Further, the broad authority to make distinctions within
and among these classifications was given to medical
officers appointed by the federal government to regulate
immigration at all ports of entry. In short, the
68Ward, 38.
69 Ibid., 40-41.
70 Ibid., 38.
Barbara Roberts, "Doctors and Deports: The Role
of the Medical Profession in Canadian Deportation, 1900-
1920," Canadian Ethnic Studies 18 (1986): 18.
-anting immigration problem ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
the century was conceptualized as a medical one and
doctors were seen as having the appropriate expertise to
protect the general welfare. The doctors' job was not
si-nply to limit the number Qf entrants ^ ^
among them.
The !903 report of the Bryce investigation into the
new immigration system articulated a scientific
rationale for exclusion and deportation of unwanted
immigrants,
..based on the latest ideas of eugenics and
medical professionalism v>^„- ix x .
. . . Racial notions concerning
desirable sending countries were linked to scientific
investigation" of social problems." Doctors argued
that race was a more important criteria than disease in
determining immigration policies, since many diseases
were curable and there was "no point in excluding from
Canada someone of otherwise sound stock."" Those who
were inherently incapable of becoming good Canadians,
who would transfer their "foreign customs and morals,"
should be rejected. It was generally accepted that
"medical reasons were an unimpeachable professional and
scientific justification for racially based
exclusion. " 74
72 Ibid.: 20.
73Ibid.
74Ibid.: 21.
In addition to disease and race n», the concept of the
"continuous journey' was n^rf ;„ r.y used in Canadian immigration
law to ban unwanted newcomers. New restrictions were
legislated i„ 1908 that prohibited immigrants from
entering Canada
..unless they came from the country of
their birth or citizenship by ^a continuous journey and
on through tickets'" purchased in their home
country.- while these restrictions appear to be
nondiscriminatory, they were legislated with Asians,
particularly South Asians, in mind
. since there^ ^
direct routes from India to Canada at the time, the
legislation eliminated virtually all South Asian
immigration.
While Canada used what were prima facie neutral
means of discriminating among immigrants by requiring a
Continuous journey', political pressures in the United
States focused on other means such as the literacy test.
The ideas of a literacy test and a poll tax were also
proposed and, in some cases, tested in Canada, but
received less emphasis.
This language was later entrenched in Canadian
w^H
Cana<?a, Statutes, 7-8 Ed. VII, c. 33, cited inard, 183, n. 66.
76Ward, 76
in the united States a Boston-based group kno„„ as
the lotion Restriction League" began in the 1890s
to pressure Congress for tighter control of immigrate,
through such »ea„s as the imposition of higher head
taxes and a literacy test. Advocates of the literacy-
test idea argued that the test would be an objective
device which would have the desired effect of ethnic
discrimination. A literacy test "would cut in half the
influx from southern and eastern Europe, without
seriously interfering with the older immigration from
the more literate areas of Europe.- The League's
stated objective was to prevent the immigration "of
large numbers of aliens of low intelligence, poor
Physique, deficient in energy, ability and thrift." its
spokespersons argued that the use of ethnically neutral
policies-e.g. further tests for immigrants, such as a
literacy test and a requirement that, upon arrival, each
immigrant possess a minimum amount of money for self-
support until employed-would accomplish the goal of
excluding undesirable immigrants, for "experience shows
that poverty, ignorance, and incapacity in general go
together." They argued that, "from a eugenic
standpoint" restrictions against the immigrant from
"The League was founded in 1894 with the expresspurpose to warn of the social and economic dangersinherent in the s new' immigration.
"Higham, 41.
southeastern Europe and Asia were justified. By 1911
the immigration Restriction League claimed before the
House Immigration Commission that
"[rjecent
investigations in biology show that heredity is a far
-re important factor in the progress of any species
than environment. Education can develop what is in an
immigrant, but cannot supply what is not there.-
Congress passed a League-sponsored literacy bill as
early as the 1896-97 legislative session but President
Grover Cleveland vetoed the bill.- The Immigration
Restriction League continued its antiforeign agitation
into the twentieth century as the composition of the new
immigration changed and "more and more remote cultures
were drawn into the current.
.
. . [For tne first^
a considerable number of Russian peasants, Greeks,
Syrians and Armenians appeared" among the immigrant
population.- As Higham notes, the elaboration of
difference which began at least as early as the 1890s
with the literacy-test campaign, came to fruition in the
early twentieth century, for it was then that "the major
theoretical effort of restrictionists " consisted in the
transformation of relative cultural differences into an
"Congress, House, Commission on Immigration,
.
Statements and Recommendations by Societies. 61st Conq3rd sess., 1910-1911, 106 ' 9 '
80Higham, 42.
81 Ibid. f 43.
absolute line of cleavage, which was then used to
explain the present danger of Migration "in terms of
the change in its sources." 82
A three-year study of the consequences of
immigration from new Wees' was commissioned by the
United States Congress as a result of continued
pressures on the part of restrictionists for the
introduction of a literacy test. By calling for an
investigation of the entire immigration problem,
opponents of restriction hoped to block, or at least
postpone, the legislation of such a test.- But the
outcome of the study frustrated the aims of those who
opposed the restrictionists and underscored the eugenics
arguments of the day. The United States Immigration
Commission, known as the Dillingham Commission,
investigated immigration problems from 1907 to 1910 and
issued a forty-two volume report, which attested to the
"unfavorable contrast between the northwestern and
southeastern Europeans in the United States" that
restrictionists had struggled to articulate. 84 The
Commission's report served to reinforce rather than
dispel eugenics beliefs. Part of the report was a
Dictionary of Races which distinguished among immigrants
82Ibid., 44.
83Handlin, 78.
8-1Higham, 45.
on the basis of physical features and linguistic
differences, creating fixed categories of Migrants.-
Moreover, the report had a direct impact on subsequent
legislation; it was widely cited in the congressional
debates which produced the Johnson Act of 1921, the
immigration act which put in place a national quotas
system. 86
Opponents of restrictionist measures argued that
heterogeneity of ^race' is actually better than
homogeneity because racial mixture contributes to the
genetic strengthening, rather than weakening, of a
people. m its recommendation to Congress the
Immigration Restriction League responds to this line of
reasoning and turns it to their own use:
Assuming what is by no means proved, that amixed race is a better race, we should do aswe do in breeding any other species than thehuman, viz., secure the best specimens to
oreed from. The same arguments which induceUS
^ ?u
SSgregate criminals and feeble-minded
and thus prevent their breeding apply to
excluding from our borders individuals whose
multiplying here is likely to lower the
average of our people. We should exercise atleast as much care in admitting human beings
as we exercise in relation to animals orinsect pests or disease germs.
. . .
We should see to it that the breeding ofthe human race in this country receives the
attention which it so surely deserves. We
should see to it that we are protected, not
85rThere were five distinct classifications. For adiscussion of the Dictionary of Races and the entire
report, see Handlin, 80-110.
6Handlin, 77-78.
from what Georgelm^ SStS'SuS'lth?watering of the nation's lifeblood - 1 ^results from their breeding after 1Chadmission. 87 y L
The League was successful in marshaling the support
of influential citizens in its struggle to secure
legislation of tighter restrictions.- Letters of
support were solicited and submitted to Congress along
with the League's recommendation. m one such letter
John Pomeroy, a prominent San Francisco attorney, favors
the "extension of the Chinese-exclusion act to embrace
all Asiatics, including subjects of the Turkish Empire."
He asserts that the "fundamental objection to the
immigration we wish to exclude is racial." He objects
to "the racial character of three-fifths of the present
immigration," which he illustrates by reference to a
"Hindoo" (i.e. someone from South Asia) and an Arab. 89
Samuel G. W. Benjamin, the first U.S. Ambassador to
Congress, House, Commission on Immigration,Statements and Recommendation a by Society
r 61st Conq3rd sess., 1910-1911, 106-107. ^ g.,
88Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, prominentproponent of isolationism in American foreign policy
was among the first and most influential congressional
advocates of immigration restriction.
Congress, House, Commission on Immigration,
Statements and Recommendations by Societies . 61st Conq.3rd sess., 1910-1911, 127.
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Persia, also provided a letter of support. He avers,
based on his long experience living abroad, that
As for the Asiatic races, however brilliantthey may be in certain directions, they havenever had any clear notion of self-governmentas understood by many of the Caucasian people'
L rJ. EUr0pe ' a matter of bl°°d ratherthan education in its origin. 90
Fear of racial deterioration was added to arguments
in favor of greater restriction. Alabama Representative
John L. Burnett, a member of the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization during the nineteen-
teens, advocated the restriction of immigration on the
basis that southern and eastern European as well as
Asian peoples were not assimilable with the ^old stock'
of America, descendants of northwestern Europeans. In
stating his case he makes reference to Syrians among
others
:
The people against whom my principal objectionis aimed are of a different race and of adifferent color from those of America and
northwestern Europe, and in my judgment they
can never be perfectly assimilated. They maybe amalgamated. History shows than whenever a
superior race has been amalgamated with aninferior the superior has been pulled down and
the inferior not lifted up.
We have evidence of this in some of the
very people about whom I have spoken. Who can
detect the courage, the intelligence, or the
honor of the ancient Greek in the people who
now dwell amid the ruins of that splendid
empire? Who can detect the culture and the
learning of the ancient Phoenician in the
dirty Syrian to-day? who can see a trace of
Caesar's triumphant legions among the beggars
90Ibid., 130-131
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of Naples as they wallow to-day in filthgrime? [Emphasis added.] 91
Rep. Burnett argues that miscegenation is disastrous and
results in the degeneration of civilizations. He
illustrates this point in the following:
It seems to me that when you can contrast thonorth Italian with the south It 1 we findonly one cause for the difference [in
ParuS tlT ^V 116 Same kin*' the —
north" of tl*
S
f
me laWS; and Yet the ^nth the mountains is of the Caucasian,white race, and the other is of mixed
race.
... The Greeks are the same way; theSyrians are
_bhe same way . mixed up with thT^
^eop^e; anTthey are not ihe kind oT^Sfrom which those who settled this country
sprang. [Emphasis added.] 92
This negative attitude toward immigrants from the
Ottoman Empire was also reflected in the American press.
For example, in the July 11, 1890, issue of the Mail and
Express, Maronites (Roman Catholics from the territories
of modern-day Lebanon) who had emigrated from Cyprus are
described as:
a fierce, war-like body of people but denselyignorant and imbruted by long battles againstthe Moslems. They are nominal
Christians
. . . [and] the movement for
transporting them to the United States has the
sanction and the support of the Roman Catholic
Church. By nature, by training, by heritary
instinct, these predatory, half
-savage
9 1Congress, House, Hearing on Immigration Bills(Statement of Hon. John L. Burnett, Rep. from State of
Alabama, in support of literacy test), 61st Cong., 2d.
sess., 29 March 1910, 393.
92Ibid., 386.
among us would add *tili greyer welgh^tTthe
whtih w
rdSn of
1
fo«ign-born ignorance withic e are already afflicted I i
number of Armenians^ave made preparationsTremigrating to the United States. ? Al of
citTzen:."
tterlY UnfittSd t0 beCOme ^erlcan
Clearly by the turn of the century, if not before,
the idea that the mixing of blood results in the
degeneracy of a people had captured "both the scholarly
mind and the public imagination." 94 Moreover, the
concept that ^blood' and ^culture' were intimately
related became powerful and influenced the legislation
of immigration and naturalization restrictions. The
attitude that culture is an expression of v race'; that
some ^races' are more highly endowed than others, and
that superficial and striking physical characteristics,
such as differences in skin color, were visual signs
denoting ability, intelligence, and morality (or the
absence thereof), became operative in the laws of the
land.
Polygamy
The question of moral character was one which
influenced ideas about the acceptability of many of the
"Cited in Kemal H. Karpat, "The Ottoman Emigration
to America, 1860-1914," International Journal of Middle
East Studies 17 (1985): 186.
94Gilman: 27.
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^new' Migrants, and the issue of polygamy had a
Particular effect for Migrants from the Muslim world.
As a consequence of the anti-Mormon campaign of the late
nineteenth century, immigration statutes added
polygamists to the list of classes excluded from
admission into the United States. Although directed
primarily against Mormons, this stipulation created a
legal means by which immigrants from the Muslim world
were held suspect because what many Americans Ww'
about Islam is that it allowed men to take many wives.
The Mormon experience in nineteenth-century United
States reveals certain parallels with, and was
influential in shaping, the experience of immigrants
from the Muslim world. it has been noted that
Outsiders saw the Mormons as the antithesis inalmost every respect of what patriotic
Americans should be and viewed the Mormon
system as more akin to oriental despotism thanto American democracy. This exotic image wasenhanced by Mormon polygamy, practiced
1852
e
»
ly Sin°e 18408 and
°penlY after
While it is clear that many adherents of the Mormon
faith are of Northwestern European origins, and that the
religion originated in the United States, it is equally
clear that from the perspective of the larger society at
the turn of the century Mormons were distinctive.
Thernstrom, ed. Harvard Encyclopedia of American
Ethnic Groups (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press,
1980), s.v. "Mormons," by Dean L. May: 727.
101
Further, "ethnicity is an intensely complex phenomenon'
and to equate "ethnic" with "foreign" is a mistake."
Thus sociologist Thomas F. O'Dea asserts that the
Mormons "represent the clearest example to be found in
our national history of the evolution of a native and
indigenously developed ethnic minority. [Emphasis
added.]"" while the concern here is not with
ethnicity per se, the point is that while Mormons did
not differ from the dominant society in terms of
national origins they were viewed as a distinctive and
inferior subculture. In the connotations of the lay
meanings of such widely-used terms as ^blood' and Wal
character', nineteenth-century practices sanctioned by
the Mormon church were perceived as threatening the
cultural homogeneity and Anglo-conformity of North
America. With respect to the practice of polygamy the
Mormon experience conditioned the North American
reception of arrivals from the Muslim world.
In 1882 the U.S. House of Representatives appointed
a committee, known as the Ford Committee, to investigate
the state of immigration. The committee submitted a
report to Congress the following year in which it
"praised the immigrant of the past, but said that it
could not praise the immigrant then coming;" it
96Thernstrom, vi.
"Cited in Thernstrom, "Mormons:" 720.
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recommended that Congress amend immigration laws in
order to exclude from admission idiots, paupers,
lunatics and convicts, polygamists, anarchists and
persons having a "loathsome or dangerous contagious
disease." Congress did not act upon the recommendations
of the Ford Committee at that time, and pressure for
immigration reforms continued.- Eight years later, in
an immigration statute enacted on March 3, 1891,
polygamists were added alongside persons guilty of
crimes of "moral turpitude" as aliens to be denied
admission into the United States."
The eugenics arguments of the day, especially the
notion that "blood" and "moral character" were
interrelated, were persuasive in matters other than
immigration as well. This is evident in the following
case involving anti-Mormon sentiment, presented before
the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary.
In a 1902 congressional hearing considering a proposal
to adopt a constitutional amendment prohibiting
polygamy, a witness, Mrs. Fanny Hallock Carpenter,
testified that a state, like a living organism, can
suffer from "degeneration." The description she
provides is analogous to the descriptions of degeneracy
98/Congress, House, Commission on Immigration,
Abstracts of Report s, Vol. II . 61st Cong., 3rd sess.
1910-1911, 569-70.
99Immigration Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1084.
She war„ s against the harboring ^ ^
evxl,» inherent in polygamy fche MQrmon ^
will deplete the moral forces of the country. ..Evil ha
a wonderful capacity for growth," she avers. ..„hatever
appeals to the baser side of mankind seems to fae ^
Powerful. Evil is catching in the way that goodness
never is.- Mrs
. Carpenter urges ^ ^ ^
proposed anti-polygamy amendment, saying that
In this brief statement various points are made: (1,
Americans of strong moral character, i.e. those who
constitute the "great mass of the nation," oppose
polygamy; (2) in some states (those in which Mormons
live) polygamy is practiced, the moral character is
weakened, and the power of law is needed to enforce
morality (i.e. monogamy); (3) to give them "practical
power," we must reaffirm existing notions of morality in
'""Congress, House, Committee on the JudiciaryHearrnq on Polygamy, 25 February 1902, 8.
10IIbid., 9.
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written form; and (4) the Constitution is analogous to
the American "moral character," reflects the American
"nobility of soul" and is the repository of American
principles and the cultural heritage ("traditions") of
"our blood." This last point connects the Constitution,
representing "moral character," with "our blood,"
through which traditions and principles are transmitted.
It is this final point that is most directly
related to our inquiry. If the Constitution is our
"moral character" containing our principles and the
"traditions of our blood," then presumably people not of
"our blood" could not be included in the community
giving its allegiance to the Constitution. The
possibility of others acquiring an understanding of and
loyalty to democratic institutions is foreclosed when
"tradition" is tied to genetics. While Mrs. Carpenter
does not define whom she means it seems from the context
and the meaning of "our blood" in the discourse of the
day that by "our blood" she refers to Americans
descending from northwestern Europeans. To take the
point a bit further: Since it is plural marriage she
objects to, it seems that Mrs. Carpenter connects the
"immorality" polygamy embodies to people of another
"blood" not represented by the moral character of the
Constitution. Although she developed her argument with
Mormons in mind, Mrs. Carpenter could as easily have
105
directed it at Muslims. In the context of immigration
and naturalization, the potential for exclusion of
immigrants from the Muslim world, where polygamy is
acceptable under certain circumstances, lies in the
repudiation of Mormon practices.
Even without an anti-polygamy amendment, the
loyalty of Mormons to the nation and, by association the
Constitution, was suspect in the late nineteenth
century. 102 As Sanford Levinson has pointed out in
Constitutional Faith
, the Mormons were required to defer
to the civil religion of the United States over the
demands of their religious faith. For instance, voters
in the Territory of Idaho had to take an oath declaring
that I am not a bigamist or
polygamist
. . . [and] I do regard the
Constitution of the United States and the laws
thereof
. . . , as interpreted by the courts,
as the supreme laws of the land, the teachings
of any order, organization or association to
the contrary notwithstanding. . . . 103
Thus "one's devotion to the civil religion [was viewed]
as a predicate condition" for the ability to vote in
102From 1862 to 1887 Congress passed a series of
anti-polygamy statutes. In the 1887 Edmunds-Tucker Act
Congress disincorporated the Mormon Church, and the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in
1890. In August 1890 Wilford Woodruff, the president of
the Mormon Church, officially denounced polygamy. See
Thernstrom, "Mormons:" 720-731.
103Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 55.
Is are
national, territorial, and local elections.- Mormons
essentially either had to disavow or amend their faith
to conform with African principles, as reflected in the
Constitution, and the failure to do so placed one
outside the political community. '° s
Fanny Carpenter's words did not refer to, nor even
oontemplated, the presence of Muslims, yet her word,
pertinent to them. The implications of the anti-
polygamy phenomenon for immigrants from the Muslim world
were not lost on the general public or public officials.
For instance a Congressman made the point in the context
of the following exchange. In a House hearing about
Near East refugees held in 1922, an Expert- invited to
speak to the Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization, Mr. Lothrop Stoddard, '»« opposed the
admission of refugees from Turkey-mostly Armenians
fleeing massacres at the hands of the Ottomans-because
of the "national character" of the refugees. They "are
""Ibid.
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The
°A\h WaS uPheld bY the Supreme Court in Davisv. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). S
106Lothrop Stoddard was a Harvard-educated
specialist of eugenics and racialist theories in theearly twentieth century. His best-known work, TheRising Tide of Color Against Wh i.te World Snprpm^, is alengthy tract defending the Anglo-Saxon ^race' againstthe overwhelming deluge of inferior v races' which calls
upon scientific evidence to support his case. Stoddard
also authored The New World of Islam (1921), which was
republished in London and translated in Arabic and
French.
a resuit of an extraordinary racial mixture which has
been going on for at least 2,500 years" and have
characteristics that make the» extremely undesirable:
For one thing, they are very laraelv »parasitic population, living by their wit- Kunproductive means of labor! by oet^v Yby araft anH k„ > . « P ty trading,
Whenever' thev S,
Slmlar
.
equivocal methods.
various destructive religious and oJher
'
The people of whom Mr. Stoddard spoke were not
necessarily Muslim but came from the Muslim world. When
asked by the Chairman of the House Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization whether there was "any
pressure from Mohammedans [i.e. Muslims] to enter the
United States," Mr. Stoddard replied, "Very few
Mohammedans come in.— The Chairman then stated that
the reason for this was
that the laws of the United States prevent theadmission of those who preach and practicepolygamy, and most true Mohammedans are unableto deny that when they are asked ... [andthat] Mohammedans can not very well come in
UI
]?-
ess they deny the faith to which they
adhere. [Emphasis added.] 109
„
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Here it is very clear that a "predicate condition"
for admission of Muslim immigrants into the United
States is the disavowal of Islam because the faith
allows for polygamy. Neither the possibility that one
nay embrace Islam without condoning the practice of
Plural marriage, nor the actual incidence of polygamy in
the Muslim world, nor the limited circumstances in „hioh
polygamy is sanctioned, enters into consideration.
Polygamists, and by extension Muslims, according to the
Chairman's thinking, simply are not allowed by law to be
members of the American political community.
Significantly from this statement another point
becomes clear. An element of non-recognition rings in
what the Chairman of the House Committee has said. In
other words, he has described a world and Muslims are
not in it. Muslims simply do not exist within the
boundaries of the American polity because their presence
would violate the law. Of course this description does
not fit well with reality, as we know from the records
that many Muslims actually were already here.
The opportunities for many potential immigrants
from the Muslim world to enter the United States were
severely restricted as a result of the Immigration Act
of 1917. Others who were not affected by the "Barred
Zone" provision, such as Syrians and Palestinians, were
Umrted by the Johnson Act Qf i92iuo wh . ch ^^^^
quota, for admission of .^.^ ^ ^ basis ^
nationality. The 1921 act allowed fM ^^
amission of immigrants not to exceed 3 ^ ^
-b~ of aliens of the same „ naUonai ^^^^
residing in the United States at the time of the 1910
census. This act was replaced by & ^^ ^ ^
1924 which designated 1890 as the census year of
reference and reduced the guota frora 3 to 2 percent-
Muslims as a religious group were adversely
affected by the quota scheme. „ost immigrants from the
Muslim world arrived in the United States between 1900
and 1914. Their numbers were exceedingly small i„ the
1890 census. Furthermore, the "national origins" of
many had not been classified in the immigration and
census records of 1890 because until 1899 Syrians,
Greeks, Armenians, Palestinians, Turks, and others from
Western Asia were all considered together to be from
that part of the Ottoman Empire known as "Turkey in
Asia." The quotas were not lifted until 1965, after
which Muslim immigration reached unprecedented heights.
Together, exclusion on the basis of race and
culture enabled Americans and Canadians to delineate
their own identity—to affirm the virtues of self-
I1042 Stat. 5.
m43 Stat. 153.
110
control and a republican form of government, set apart
from the presumed libidinous and despotio qualities of
other oultures. The oampaign for mlmUm refiected
notions of raoial superiority which were ubiquitous by
mid-nineteenth century. Law, in its proscriptions and
prescriptions, symboli.es dominant social relations.
Beliefs about the ideological and moral character of
persons from distant places, which are at variance with
the prevailing conceptions of who we are and what
constitutes our character, became embodied in law.
Despotism, monarchism, and licentiousness all were
anathema, and those whose origins lay in the lands where
such vices presumably went unchecked were, by
association, tainted. 112
As Takaki points out, many studies of race
relations in America fail to recognize "how the
oppression of different groups served common needs of
white men," and have "tended to focus on the outgroups
rather than those responsible for the plight of the
112rThe origins of fears about these v isms' inAmerican political thought date back to the eighteenth
century when Thomas Jefferson warned that the new
republic had to protect itself from monarchical
principles by keeping out immigrants "potentially
capable of corrupting government in America" (Takaki,
39). Jefferson identified British corruption,
monarchical ideas, the passions, etc., as threats to
republican society which had to be purged. See Takaki,
65
.
oppressed.- However, while this is t^ ^ _
-asure, it can also be argued that a dominant groUp
never completely determines the actions of a subordinate
9rouP; rather, it is the process of interaction that
determines the result.- it is with this in mind ^
we turn our attention next to the actions taken by
immigrants from the Muslim world in response to
standards of citizenship.
113Takaki, 136.
114Joan M. Jensen, Passage from India: Asian Indianimmigrants in North America (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1988), 55. *
CHAPTER 3
tuu™ 'OTHER ASIAN':IMMIGRANTS FROM THE MUSLIM WORLD
interwoven into the general Asian experienoe in
North America is the partioular experience of ilranigrants
from the Muslim world. The collateral effects of racial
exclusion, as it was operationally via immigration and
naturalization policies at the end of the nineteenth and
well into the twentieth centuries, has had important
implications for the development of the Muslim community
in North America. Muslim immigrants in North America
have come from more than sixty countries, most of which
are in Asia.' Subject to restriction as "Turks,"
"Syrians," and "Other Asians" at the turn of the
century, they were hindered in the process of setting
down roots in North America. As we shall see in what
follows, restriction was critical in the formation of
North American Islam.
The purpose of this chapter is to place the
responses of immigrants from the Muslim world at the
center of the analysis of citizenship debates.
Specifically it looks at the connections between what
^any Muslim immigrants are from Pakistan, Iran,Afghanistan, Turkey, and the Arab world in general.Thermstrom's Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic
^rou£s has essays on various Muslim groups includingArabs, Afghans, Albanians, Azerbai janis
, Bangladeshis,Bosnians, Fi]ians, Indonesians, Iranians, Kurds,
Pakistanis, Tatars, North Caucasians, Polish andLithuanian Tatars, Turkestanis, and Turks. Stephen
Thermstrom, ed., Harvard Encyclopedia of American EthnicGrouP s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
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the courts said about citizenship, as well as the
enforcement of ilra„igration and naturalization^ ^
what the affected community, reactively, has done. An
attempt is made to show that at least part of this
community followed the courts' lead in adopting
racialist and eugenicist criteria to construct a
national identity which in effect denied equal access to
citizenship to "Asiatics." By such actions the
immigrants have taken part in the mediation of social
consciousness along lines that made racialist
distinctions central in the self
-definition of the
American and Canadian peoples.
Description Qf the Community
The first of the five "waves" of Muslim migration
to North America, identified by Haddad and Lummis,
arrived from 1875 to 1912. Most of these immigrants
came from the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman
Empire: Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon. During
the same period a small number of South Asian
immigrants, mistakenly called "Hindus," were Muslims. 2
Before World War II Muslim immigrants were attracted
Karen Leonard, "The Pakhar Singh Murders: APunjabi Response to California's Alien Land Law,"
Amerasia 11 (1984): 76.
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primarily for economic reasons. 3 Both the * pull , of
the promise of jobs and prosperity with the
industrialization of North America, and the ^push'
factor of socioeconomic deterioration at home affected
outward migration.' i„ any event
, according ^^
Muhammad, "the first immigrants were more concerned with
finding a comfortable economic niche in America than
with propagating their faith.- Similarly the first
Muslim arrivals to Canada were "mostly young men from
farming communities with little formal education" who
came in search of work.' For the sake of economic
survival, many of the more traditional Islamic
observances of the old world were neglected in the new
world. Yvonne Haddad found that the first generations
of immigrants "were less likely to be actively involved
in organized religious activities. Congregational
States^lt Elkho1/' ?he Arab Moslems in the rm^-Htates, Religion and Assimilation (New Haven! Collegeand University Press, 1966), 81-84. 9
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5Akbar Muhammad, "Muslims in the United States: AnOverview of Organizations, Doctrines, and Problems," inThe Islanuc Impact
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ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Byron
Press,' 1984)^96? (SyraCUSe: Syracuse University
6Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Muslims in Canada: A
Preliminary Study," in Religion and Ethnicity
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ed. H.Coward and L. Kawamura (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid
Laurier University, 1978), 71.
Prayer, if practiced at ^ _^ ^ ^^ ^
small mosques.
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The initial migratory pattern from the Arabic-
speaking part of the Muslim world to North America was
overwhelmingly a Christian phenomenon. The ratio of
Christians to Muslims in pre-Second World War Canada was
believed to have been more than two to one/ By using
Ottoman emigration records as well as U.S. immigration
statistics, Kemal Karpat judges that fifteen to twenty
percent of immigration of this type was Muslim.
However, Philip Hitti gives a lower figure, estimating
that, in 1924, more than ninety-five percent of all
"Syrian" immigrants to the United States were Christian.
"Their Muslim counterparts, as several historians have
pointed out, faced psychological, religious, and
cultural obstacles, and hence initially displayed
considerable reluctance to immigrate to the West." 9
'^on
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Paradoxically the very of
factors „hich discouraged further im„igration from parts
of the Muslim world
. Anecdotal evidence . B
retold about Muslims who were informed, once aboard
American-bound ships, that there were no mosques in the
United states or that "America was bilsd bjfr, a land o£
unbelief," and changed their minds about immigr.ting
.
According to the biography of one Muslim immigrant, in a
shipboard conversation he "was told that Muslims were
not allowed to enter America. • m response he changed
his name from Mohammed to two names easily recognized
from a Judeo-Christian perspective: Abraham and
Joseph. 11
Albeit slowly at first, Muslims overcame these
obstacles and joined their Christian counterparts in
growing numbers. For this analysis, however, the focus
10Orfalea (94) and Naff (84) rely on the follow. nnpassage from Elkholy:
-In 1885 ' says an elder y MosL
f
ather Panned to accompany some Christian
the boat 5!?n
r
M
a\ 2* b°Ught the tiGket and boarded
tht+h*r ; • uY.
bef°re sailin9 he asked the captain
feared tn^T* mo8^?- Told that it had none, hehat America was bilad kufr [a land of unbelief].He immediately got off the boat.'" (17) since Elkholy Jrelates this from one of the interviews he conductedamong Arab-American Muslims in Toldeo, Ohio and Detroit,Michigan it seems that either the woman relating the
11° ?f P
arent ( s ) eventually chose to immigrate tothe United States despite her father's initial
T~f*t~ 1 nonnore ice ce
.
nSweeney, 18.
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is not on the actual numbers of Muslims but the beliefs
North Americans held about life in the Muslim world that
became operative in debates about immigration and
naturalization. Regardless of religious affiliation,
immigrants from the Muslim world were suspect in part
because of the Western image of the Orient, including
Islam, and were the object of efforts to restrict their
entry and exclude them from access to citizenship. This
chapter will show how Muslims re-formed themselves and
their lives around the (mis ) conceptions other people
held about them and were influenced by those beliefs.
Legal Standing of Immigrants from tha Muslim WorlH
How did immigrants from the Muslim world fare in
the midst of these racialist and eugenics arguments? In
the United States the question whether many could become
naturalized citizens remained to be settled at the turn
of the century. Post-Civil War legislation and
amendments, designed to extend protection of the law to
all those of African descent including freed slaves,
influenced efforts to resolve this question as well.
How the question was answered—through the application
of law to a slightly different context, presented by
v
new' immigrants—was crucial because, as John Brigham
notes, "small changes in the inclusiveness of categories
or their application can have a tremendous effect on
118
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political life.- In the record exam . ned
will see the impact of the judicial answer to th
question whether particular aliens were acceptable
citizens. In essence it produced a political struggle
to invoke the rights of citizenship for another category
of people.
The governing statute, the 1790 Naturalization
Act," provided „ that any aUen ^.^ a
person may be admitted to become a citizen" of the
United States, provided that she was of good moral
character, pledged an oath to support the Constitution,
and had resided in the United States for two years
before applying for citizenship by naturalization. In
1870 "aliens of African nativity and . . . persons of
African descent" were added by amendment of the original
statute. 14 When the statute was enacted in 1790, most
immigration came from Europe and the courts,
interpreting the act more than one hundred years later,
decided on an ad hoc basis whether the "new" immigrants
applying for naturalization fell within the meaning of
the term "white persons" ostensibly as the framers of
the statute would have intended.
John Brigham, "Judicial Impact Upon Social
Practices: A Perspective on Ideology," Legal Studie sForum 9 ( 1985): 55. — —
13
1 Stat. 103.
14 18 Stat. 318.
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When Congress tended the statute in 1870 to extend
full citizenship specifically to persons of African
origin, an element of confusion was added to the debat
affecting the legal status of Migrants from the Musi
world. under the revised law
..Arabs and Hindus from
Africa, but not necessarily Asia," theoretically could
qualify for naturalization. This measure "laid the
basis for future problems by mixing geographic with
ethnic or racial qualifications for citizenship," as
shown in the court records discussed below."
Further, in their efforts to include a new category
of eligibility for citizenship, the lawmakers made a
crucial omission. By identifying Whites' and persons
of African provenance as suitable for naturalization,
they did not provide for the possibility that persons
who did not fit within the limits of the construction,
who were neither ^white' nor from Africa, might apply.
Thus the courts, unable to deduce satisfactorily from
the literal terminology of an earlier statute what the
lawmakers meant precisely by ^white', tended to rely on
popular opinion and other, often contradictory, criteria
such as anthropological evidence to decide which ethnic
groups qualified for naturalization. Immigrants from
Stephen Thernstrom, ed. Harvard Encyclopedia ofAmerican Ethnic Groups (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard
University Press, 1980), s.v. "Naturalization andCitizenship, " by Reed Ueda, 739.
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the Mrddle East were quUe literaUy ^ interstit . ai
group, since geographically the region straddles the
three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa; as such
they were "subjected to close scrutiny and in several
cases were denied citizenship.- After a directive
was issued from the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization in 1911 telling court clerks to reject
declarations from applicants for naturalization who were
neither >hite' nor of African descent or nativity, some
immigrants from the Middle East "encountered difficulty
in securing citizenship." 17
The two groups of immigrants from the Muslim world
whose presence raised questions about the desirability
of their admission were the Syrians and the South
Asians. It should be noted that, although the terms are
used here for the sake of convenience, these
designations are not very accurate and are easily
misconstrued. Syrians included those who came from the
territories of modern-day Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan,
as well as Syria, 18 and South Asians, also known as
Asian Indians, were popularly but mistakenly called
16Ibid., 741.
17Ibid.
18iKarpat shows that Ottoman emigrants from areas
outside of Syria under Ottoman rule were sometimes also
mistakenly included in immigration and census figures asSyrians. Well-kept statistics about immigration at theturn of the century are lacking (Karpat: 176).
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•'Hindus" both in popular discourse and in official
records. As one scholar recently ^
(mis, construction of South Asians was adopted by the
affected community itself:
"Punjabis and other Indians
xn Canada were called Hindus by the host community; and
they not only accepted the tern, but used it themselves
until the 1960s, even though the majority were
Sikhs.
Syrians
Until 1899 many immigrants from the Arab Muslim
world were recorded in American immigration and census
statistics as "Turks from Asia."- But because the
numbers of immigrants arriving from "Turkey in Asia-
began to rise steadily in 189S i-hi«=y ± t s category became too
broad and imprecise for accurate recordkeeping. This
factor, coupled with the growing domestic political
pressures for classification of immigration by Source'
discussed earlier, led the U.S. Bureau of Immigration to
compile data by ^race' as well as country of origin.
Thus immigrants hailing from the Ottoman Empire were
classified as Syrians, Palestinians, Armenians, etc.,
under the general category of "Turkey in Asia."
19Hugh Johnston, "The Development of the PuniabiCommunity in Vancouver Since 1961," Canadian EthnicStudies 20 (1988): 2. "
20 miTurkey in Asia"~Syria, Anatolia, and northernIraq—is distinguished from "Turkey in Europe"—theBalkans, Crimea, and the Mediterranean islands.
According to Bureau statistics, Syria„ s arrived in
unprecedented numbers during the fifteen years prec
World „ar I: "A total of 86,in Syrians
, recorded
between X899 and !914, joined those who had ccne
previously and uncountable hundreds of their unrecorded
countrymen." 21 Bv 1910 ^,rr^ noy isio Syrians accounted for nearly
one-third of all th^ n c ^ 1 . .1 ne u ' s
* Population born in Asia. 22
Syrian immigration was at its peak between 1900 and
1914.
«
But when travel was restricted during the
Years of World War I
,
the number of Syrian entries into
the United States on record dropped to only
approximately 3/ 700. After the war ended 12,288
arrivals were recorded in the four-year period between
1920 and 1924. With the imposition of the Quota Act in
1924, 24 the number of Syrians allowed to enter the
United States annually was reduced to 100.
The appearance of the Syrian immigrant community in
Canada, although of smaller size, roughly paralleled
Al
tX* Na"' Beco™inq American: The Earl v ArabImmigrant Experience (Carbondale and EdwardsvilleIllinois: Southern Illinois University Press! 1985),
of .ho n^'f fc? r°n ' N°tes on Migration Statistst e United States," American Statistical AssgciatiJournal 53 (1958): 963, cited in Karpat: 181.
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e9orY °rfalea, Before the Flames. A Quest f™-the History of Arab-Amer leans (Austin, Texas: Universityof Texas Press, 1988), 73. y
2443 Stat. 153.
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that of the United States. Syrian immigration in Canada
reached an estimated 2,000 at the turn of the century,
and was at its pre-„orld war peak between 1900 and
1911."
Popular representations of Syrians as something
other than white abounded. Philip Hitti cites the
example of a 1920 election campaign in Birmingham,
Alabama, in which the candidate for coroner billed
himself as "the white man's candidate." "They have
disqualified the negro, an American citizen, from voting
in the white primary," the campaign flier read. "The
Greek and Syrian should also be disqualified. I DON'T
WANT THEIR VOTE. If X oan ,t be elected by ^^
men, I don't want the office." 26
In 1909 the U.S. District Court of St. Louis held
that Syrians could not be naturalized because they are
not white. This decision was reversed at the appeals
court level," but the lower-court decision and others
like it had a ripple effect within the Syrian community.
The fact that the law did not easily recognize the
rights of Syrians as aspirants to full citizenship
generated a political struggle. The decision that
25Abu-Laban, 21.
"Philip K. Hitti, The Syrians in America (New
York: George H. Doran Co., 1924), 89.
27Ibid., 88.
Syrians were not "white-, even though repudiated, shaped
the subsequent actions taken by the Syrian community
As Michael Suleiman notes, "the problem of racial
identification and citi Ze„ship traumatized the Arabic-
speaking community for several years early in the
century. " 28
Many Syrians were naturalized but some courts
denied them citizenship. Syrians collectively took an
interest in the fate of those who were rejected based on
an interpretation of the 1790 Naturalization statute
that held that the term "white persons" really meant
people of European descent. The subject of Syrian
eligibility for American citizenship was taken up in
several articles appearing in the Arabic-language press
in the early twentieth century. Many authors reiterated
the racialist arguments of the day. An effort was made
to place Syrians closer to Europeans than Africans on a
phrenological chart depicting the shape of the head and
facial angles of different "races'.
Syrians had a special stake in claiming citizenship
in their new home, for at the turn of the century they
had no other firm basis for identity. The Ottoman
Empire was deteriorating. Many immigrants felt no
"Michael W. Suleiman, "Early Arab-Americans: TheSearch for Identity," Crossing the Waters. Arabic-Speaking Immigrant s To the United States Before 1940
ed. Eric J. Hooglund (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1987), 44.
affection for the Ottoman Turks and held ambivalent
attitudes toward the nascent Arab nationalist feelings
that were just beginning to stir in places like Damascu
and Beirut." In a state of ^ .^.^
the Syrian immigrant's homeland provided little but a
sense of alienation.- Thus the Syrian immigrant
seeking recognition in North America was especially
susceptible to the influence of Drevan^r p iling conceptions
of what it is to be an American or Canadian.
The Arabic-language press in North America, which
first appeared during the closing years of the
nineteenth century, yields evidence of these feelings.
As George Tumeh points out in his 1965 study, A2-
Mughtaribun al-Arab fi j^rika al-Shanaliyyah (The_Arab
Immiarants3i in_North_Ameri^ this press, consisting
29Arab nationalist feelings at the turn of the
circi^.
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Uterary and intellectualcles, as not widespread among the lower socio-economic class that made up the bulk of emigrants?
30For an historical account of this see Naff.
"Although this is the Library of Congress
translate? tS^l*' Lt W°Uld be more accurate to\ fl-mughtaribun" as "emigrants" rather thanimmigrants" since, according to Hans Wehr, the verbfrom which it is derived, ightaraba (Form VIII), means
f.Lg° ? \ r?lgn count^y; emigrate; to be (far) awayrom one's homeland." Furthermore, etymologicallv
speaking, for our purposes it is interesting to notethat this verb is closely related to two other verbsderived from the same root: tagharaba (Form V) andistaghraba (Form X), which mean "to assimilate o.s. tothe Western way of life" (Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of
Modern Written Arabic, Arabic-Eng lish. j. Milton Cowan,
ed. Third Printing. [Beirut: Librairie du Liban; and
of newspapers, magazines, books and poetry, « in its
origins and development, reflected the development of
the immigrants' life itself.- Its first stage
the immigrant community's preoccupation with and longing
for the homeland. m its second phase, at the beginning
of this century, the output of the Arabic-language press
reflected "what characterized [the community] in terms
of parochial or confessionalist feelings, family
loyalties, and particularistic, regional affiliations,
all of which led to bitter [internecine] feuds and
fanned the flames of discord within the immigrant
community." m order to illustrate his point Tumeh,
without providing details, refers to an altercation
among some immigrants in New York in 1904 that "resulted
in a number of injuries and the intervention of the
American police and reports in the big New York City
newspapers." He suggests that the discord this incident
London: MacDonald & Evans Ltd., 1980], 668)
mil n--
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payin
? closer attention to etymology and themultiple meanings of this word, we get a better
understanding of the nature of Tumeh 's work: namely, as
nr-oof
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.°5 ^ WayS in Which the "Americanization-p ocess affected the Arabic-speaking community in NorthAmerica. It is noteworthy that he did not choose to usemuhajirun, which also means ^emigrant' but without theimplied Westernization. Muhajirun also has a religious
connotation since it is derived from the same root as
?
2J£
a
^-
emi9ration of the prophet Mohammed from Meccato Medina, or the event which marks the beginning of theMuslim era.
127
illustrated was reflected in funec m the pages of the immigrant
press 32
On a more sanguine note, however, Tumeh emphasizes
the potential of the Arabic-language press to have a
salubrious effect in dispelling factionalism. m the
same period, he argues, the press strengthened ties
among Syrian immigrants in the United States, Canada,
and South America, and encouraged readers to rise above
ancient divisions and narrow affiliations."
A Syrian immigrant named Kalil A. Bishara was
prompted by court decisions denying American citizenship
to Syrian applicants on the grounds of "race" to
research his background and, "discovering" that Syrians
were Arabs, argued that as Arabs they were the "purest
type of Semitic race," and had a "better claim upon the
White Race than that of any modern nation of Europe.""
Thus, he contends, Syrians were "white persons" within
the meaning of the 1790 Naturalization statute. in
support of the "fitness" of Syrians for American
citizenship, Bishara wrote in the English-language
edition of his study, Origin of the Modern Syrian:
I most emphatically declare that our[American] national character needs the
Semitic element in it. That "pliability
32Tumeh, 66-67.
"Ibid., 68-69.
34Suleiman, 44.
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combined with iron fivit-^ ~*
has developed ato.
1
BU^Tr!^an Amos, a Paul, a Pet^r Z Mi ' Hannibal »
to enumerate thit large host of
t0 begin
Prophets and Apostles??5 Fathers,
Noticeably missing from the list is the "name of one
major prophet, namely Muhammad," the Prophet of
islam.- As Suleiman points out, this omission seems
to have been intentional, for the Arabic-language
edition of the same study includes Muhammad's name.
While we lack hard evidence to prove this supposition,
it is possible that Bishara omitted mention of Muhammad
in the English edition because he was apprehensive about
North American prejudice against Muslims and felt it was
necessary to distance Syrians from Islam.
Syrian activity in researching their background and
asserting their fitness for citizenship was spurred
principally by court cases involving Syrians applying
for naturalization. The Syrian American Associations of
the United States argued their position in court cases
interpreting the 1790 Naturalization statute, both where
Syrians were applicants for citizenship and where other,
non-Syrian applicants faced the same legal challenges.
Syrians went to the courts, chiefly as interveners or
amici curiae, in cases involving Armenians— for instance
"Cited in Suleiman, 45.
36Ibid.
in lB^e_HaUadaian3,..and involving ^
eligibility of Parsees for citizenship, Unit^ist^s^
Balsara. 38
The court records of Syrian applicants for
naturalization include the cases of E3ePart^Shahid3,
and liuua," heard on appeal as Dow_v^u
!1ited
States." These cases are reviewed bT^
Ex Parte ShahiH
District Court Judge Henry A. M. Smith of
Charleston, South Carolina, considered in Ex_Parte
Shahid whether the applicant, Mr. Faras Shahid, was "a
fit subject to be naturalized." Mr. Shahid's
circumstances presented Judge Smith with the opportunity
to speak to two issues: polygamy and the meaning of the
term "white person."
At the outset, Smith describes Mr. Shahid. He
comes from "Zahle, in Asia Minor, in Syria" and is a
Christian. He writes in Arabic but cannot read or write
1909) 1
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,
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Circurt
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40213 Fed. 355 (District Court, E.D. SouthCarolina, 1914).
41226 Fed. 145 (Circuit Court of Appeals, FourthCircuit, 1915).
Bnglish, and understands EngUsh „ very imperfectiy n ^
failed to understand questions put to him- in EngUsh__
about
-the manner and method of ^^
and of the responsibilities of a citizen .„ ^^
-
English if he were a
-disbeliever in organized
9°VerMent
"
hS
—ed in the affirmative. He also
admitted (probably falsely, to being „
This portrayal of Mr. Shahid casts him as an alien
without, presumably, the Mettle to make a suitable
citizen of the United States. „e neither understands
questions regarding the American government and the
responsibilities of a citizen, nor believes in any form
of organized government. The likelihood that Mr. Shahid
simply misunderstood the questions put to him because of
the language barrier and, as a result, was mistaken in
his replies does not detract from the credibility of his
answers. He is taken at his word because his very word
leads to his inadmissability
.
Despite the answers he gave in his naturalization
hearings, it is highly unlikely that Mr. Shahid was a
polygamist himself or even believed in the practice of
polygamy. Mr. Shahid was a Christian who emigrated from
Zahle, a town in the Beka'a Valley that historically has
been a Christian enclave in what was then v Syria', a
province under Ottoman (Muslim) rule. Yet his
4?205 Fed. at 812.
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e
affiliation with the larger ,Muslim)
, rather than th
smaller (Christian, political ana social co^unity in
hrs homeland determined the court officials perception
of Mr. Shahid.
in holding this perception Judge Smith was not
alone. it appears that the U.S. Attorney's office,
representing the federal government, objected to the
naturalization of Syrians in many cases in the early
years of this century because it attached "some
importance to the fact that the applicant was born
within the dominions of Turkey [aka ottoman Empire], and
was heretofore a subject of the Sultan of Turkey. »«
On the point of Mr. Shahid 's positive response to
the question about polygamy, and the fact that Judge
Smith found it to be noteworthy, we have what is
probably a more accurate indicator of the American
understanding of Islam and life in "the Orient" than of
Mr. Shahid 's personal situation. Polygamy is a (in this
case, Muslim) practice that had been repudiated by
American society. The Supreme Court had reinforced the
belief that polygamy was outside the realm of acceptable
practice less than a generation before in the so-called
43In re Najour, 174 Fed. at 736.
V or,4- • w 1 3*anti
-Mormon' cases 44 wv^kWhether or not Mr. Shahid
himself was
. polygamist was not reievant;
the migration laws Qf ^ unued ^^^^^
that polygamists were among fche exciuded ciasses ^
the judge a legal device w . th wh . ch ^ couid^ ^
Shahid 's petition for naturalization."
The court's interpretation of the tern, "white
Person" reinforoed the inciination to exclude Mr. Shahid
fro* the American citizenry on the grounds of polygamy.
Judge Smith ruied that, even though the language of the
1790 Naturalization statute is ambiguous and other
courts treating similar cases reached different
decisions, a "modern Syrian of Asiatic birth and
descent" was not eligible for citizenship. Smith
narrowly construed "white person" to mean exclusively
someone of European descent and provided the following
interpretation of the statutory language:
It would mean such persons as were in 179(1known as white Europeans, with their
°
descendants including as their descendantstheir descendants in other countries to which
<187Rw™ h^"?"8 V - United "ates, 98 U.S. 145
Chn^h (£0h.lbltlon ?f Polygamy applies to Mormons >•
States °136
e
u
U
S
S
^"np.nf ^S" ^ Saints v- United
333 (18901 i« <1890) ; and Davis v. Season, 133 U.S.H ). After these decisions Mormon leaders
practice lit t° remOVe V*1™ as an accepted. Also immigra ion officers had to be satisfiedthat immigrants from the Muslim world did not practicepolygamy before letting them enter. P
«,„
"The Immigration Act of 1891 (26 Stat. 1084)specifically excluded polygamists.
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the French and Germans LdV"3 • "Ua ' or of
countries." " an Russ«ns in other
Smith admits that this is not,
"ethnologically or
physiologically speaking," a very clearly-defined group
He acknowledges that too much mixing among populations
had already gone on and that his definition
"includes
many peoples containing many of them blood of very mixed
races, but the governing or controlling element or
strain in all is supposed to be that of a fair-
complexioned people of European descent „ (Eniphas . s
added. ] 47
While he attempts to base his definition on a
(pseudo) scientific genetic concept- "blood"-Smith does
not give up the idea of skin color, although he protests
"the uncertainties of shades of color" and the futility
of drawing "the dividing line between white and
colored."- Further, his standard for citizenship is
connected not simply to color-fair-complexioned-but to
cultural origin-European descent. Smith merges the
notions of "blood" and "culture" by relying on
complexion as an outward expression, and European
descent as a cultivated expression, of "race." He
46205 Fed. at 814.
47
2 0 5 Fed. at 814-15.
48
2 0 5 Fed. at 816, 813.
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assumes that cultnro ;^ 15 °ne --^station of bXood, anddeferences in blood paral le l differences in cuiture
Therefore one is European by virtue of^ ^ ^
Chlnaman
'" eVe
" " b°- " ^^and or Prance, is not
European." Moreover, the concept of Vewish, Turkish,
or Greek blood" renins central to his argent."
Excluded from citizenship are not only Syrians but -all
^habitants of Asia, Australia, the South Seas, the
Malaysian Islands and territories a„H „f a ^j- icor , nd o South America"
who are not, by blood or culture, of European
provenance.
In re Dow
in this case the court denied naturalization to Mr.
George Dow, a Syrian, on the grounds that he was not a
"white person" within the meaning of the 1790
Naturalization statute. South Carolina District Court
Judge Smith, the same judge who denied citizenship to
Mr. Shahid in Ex Parte Shah id
, initially rejected Dow's
application for citizenship but later granted a
rehearing of the matter at the request of "other Syrians
interested."" At the rehearing the attorneys for the
Syrian American Associations of the United States stated
"205 Fed. at 815.
50205 Fed. at 816.
5,213 Fed. at 356.
thelr argument alongside the argent of Mr. Do„- s
counsel
.
In his opinion Judge Smith took note of the
Syrians' position, writing that
^tKhiohythey SS5S SSSiSTthey do not belong to the "white" race."
Judge Smith rejects Dew's application again, not because
Mr. Dow definitely falls outside of the "Caucasian" or
"white" race, but because Smith interprets the term
"white persons" in the 1790 Naturalization statute to
mean only persons of European descent. Asiatics, by
definition non-Europeans, do not qualify for
citizenship. Rather than contest the statute, the
Syrians offer an alternative interpretation and argue
that the decision ought to be reversed because (1) the
term "white persons" means Caucasians and not persons
white in color; (2) Mr. Dow is a Semite; (3) all Semites
are Caucasians; (4) the courts had already decided in
their favor by admitting European Jews under the terms
of the statute, and Jews are Semites (thereby creating a
precedent for their acceptance as well); and (5) "the
history and position of the Syrians, their connection
through all time with the peoples to whom the Jewish and
52 Ibid.
Christian people owe their religion, makes
inconceivable that the statute could have intended to
exclude them." 53
By this line of reasoning the Syrians distanoe
themselves from Mongolians, or the
-yellow" race of Asia
a* it was commonly called, and emphasize their Caucasian
origin. They also affirm the authority of the courts in
making naturalization rulings on the basis of a racial
scheme by proving that they are "white" and by pointing
to the precedents of the naturalization of Jews. They
-gue on that basis that Syrians, who, like Jews, are
Semites, should be included as citizens. Finally, by
inference the Syrians' argument serves to distance them
from Muslims by asserting their connection instead to
Jewish and Christian history and omitting any mention of
Islam.
Judge Smith does not find their argument persuasive
although he gives lengthy consideration to the validity
of its tenets. In an attempt to shed some light on the
claims about Syrian racial origins Smith cites the works
of several ethnologists and geneticists of the day and
discusses the bases of racial classifications. After a
long and confused account, in which he avers that "a
Syrian not only would not appear to be of a Caucasian
race, but it does not appear that he is of a Semitic
53213 Fed. at 357.
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race,
- Smith rejects the Syrians claims and returns
to his original position that "white persons" for the
purposes of naturalization means only European
descendants. Thus Mr. Dow
, as "an Asiatic, whether
Chinese, Japanese, Hindoo, Parsee, Persian, Mongol
Malay, or Syrian is not entitled ^ ^
of naturalization, no matter what his fitness otherwise
may be . 1,55
Judge Smith's decision was overturned at the
Appeals Court level on September 14, 1915, in Dpw.v.
Hnited_States. circuit Judge Woods based his decision
not on racial distinctions draped with "scientific-
evidence although he does cite many of the specialists
of ethnology and genetics referred to in the In re Dow
decision; instead he relies on the popular understanding
of the term "white persons." At the time of the most
recent amendment of the Naturalization statute, in 1870,
it was the "generally received opinion
. . . that the
inhabitants of a portion of Asia, including Syria, were
to be classed as white persons." 56 The consensus of
opinion was that Syrians "were so closely related to
their neighbors on the European side of the
54213 Fed. at 360.
55213 Fed. at 366.
56 2 2 6 Fed. at 148.
Mediterranean that they should be classed as white
and thus, according to a more liberal interpretation of
the statute based on the date of amendment rather than
adoption, were held to fall within the Meaning of the
term "white persons" eligible for citi Zenship.
The crucial factor in Judge Woods , Qpinion ^ ^
Syrians resembled closely "their European neighbors."
For this reason they are admissible as members of the
American polity, as distinct from others-e.g. the
Chinese-who perhaps differ more strikingly in terms of
such visible signs as complexion and body type. Also
Woods notes briefly that many Syrians had already been
naturalized bv the mnrtc 5 f» . , ,y n cour s, some without question, and
sees no reason why this should not continue.
South Asians
South Asians-or "Hindus," as they were called
regardless of religion-began to migrate to the United
States in the first decade of the twentieth century."
A small number of Muslims were among the earliest South
Asian arrivals to the United States. Karen Leonard, in
57 Ibid,
m n r *
r
fnno :
°Ur
'
174 F
'
ReP* 735 (Circuit Court,N D. Georgra, 1909); and In re Mudarri, 176 F. Rep. 465(Circuit Court, D. Massachusetts, 1910) for furtherdiscussion whether Syrians are "white persons."
59Gary R. Hess, "The v Hindu' in America:
Immigration and Naturalization Policies and India, 1917-1946," Pacific Historical Review 38 (1969): 60.
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her article on the effect of the 1 913 California^
Land Law on immigrants from^^ ^^ ^
Percent of the South Asian population in California , s
agricultural valleys in the early twentieth century were
Muslim.^ According tQ jQan ^^^^ ^^^^
earned a reputation as keen competitors in California
agriculture during the early years of this century.
White workers and landowners alike made their
-pressions of South Asians explicit. E . E . Chandler, a
chemistry professor at Occidental College in the
nineteen-teens who owned a ranch near Brawley, Ca.,
which he leased to tenant farmers, had this to say: "The
Hindu resembles us except he is black-and we are
shocked to see a black white man.- Prior to the Land
Law, Muslim South Asians were especially successful in
becoming land tenants and leasing land to grow rice in
Butte, Sutter, and Colusa Counties in Northern
California. One California (white) farm woman, who
t> • l°^en Leonard ' " The Pakhar Singh Murders: APunjabi Response to California's Alien Land Law,
»
Amerasia 11 (1984): 76. '
61Joan M. Jensen, Passage from India. Asian IndianImmigrants in North America (New Haven: Yale University
If): The Process of "Negroization", whichRonald Takaki describes happening to Chinese laborers atthe close of the nineteenth century ( Iron Cages. Rang
and Culture in Nineteenth-Century America [New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1979], 216-219), is at work in this
statement about South Asians.
attested to the skiiio 4-ulls of these Muslims in growing r . ce
sard they lived in what she oalled „ Hindu
The first trickle of South Asian Migrants in the
United states ca,e indirectly by way of Canada; many
farmers and laborers from the Punjab, the northwestern
province of India, were attracted by the economic
opportunities advertised by Canadian companies seeking
to import contract labor. In Canada, an estimated
ninety-five percent of South Asian immigrants at the
turn of the century were Sikhs while the remainder were
Muslim and Hindu." In the four years ^^ ^
official records of •Hindu" immigration were first kept,
to 1908, more than 5,000 South Asians entered Canada,
almost all through British Columbia." Once in Canada,
however, Indian nationals were subjected to racial
prejudice and harassment and the Canadian government
ended Indian immigration in 1909." Many Indians in
Canada returned home, but some migrated south to the
United States. Their numbers were quite small—
"Jensen, 38.
6 3,
lahai
"9
ThfTFang ' • 0riental immigration in Canada(bnangh : e Commercial Press, Inc., 1931), 140.
64Ibid., 139.
"According to Hess, "Fear of labor competition,the seeming impossibility of assimilation, and racial
antagonism led to demands for exclusion" of South Asianimmigrants on the part of Canadians. (Hess: 60) Similarnativist sentiments existed in Canada and the UnitedStates simultaneously.
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then two hundred fifty annnally from 19 04 to 1906—but
as Canadian persecution increased so did the volume of
indran migration to the U.S., reaching nearly 2,000 per
year by 1908> The flow Qf South^ ^
the United States was unsteady thereafter-dropping to
less than 200 per year between 1911 and 1913-until the
Immigration Act of 1917 barred further immigration
altogether. 67
While the situation of Syrians who wanted to become
naturalized American citizens was generally favorable,
if somewhat uncertain, the situation for South Asians
was clearly less so. The arrival of South Asian
immigrants met with opposition in the United States just
as it had in Canada. The so-called "Hindus" suffered
from the general anti-Asian bias prevalent in the
Pacific coast states at the close of the nineteenth and
the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Popular
magazines and leading newspapers decried the arrival of
South Asians and characterized it as a "Hindu invasion"
and a "tide of turbans." One journal warned its readers
that the United States was about to be inundated
66Hess: 61.
The total number of South Asians in the Unitedf^f/ concentrated on the Pacific Coast, was under6,000 before 1950 (Hess: 62; Leonard: 75).
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With »Hi„du8 . because the vedas< scriptures ^^
enjoins them to "cover the earth. "«•
Evidence of organized and official efforts toward
exclusion of South Asians is ample. Under the influence
of nativist argents of the day, Migration officials
began to turn away many South Asian immigrants
ostensibly because of illness and the supposition ^
they would become public charges. The Japanese and
Korean Exclusion League, an association whose goal was
to press for greater restrictions on immigration,
widened its scope to meet the challenge of increased
South Asian immigration and, accordingly, changed its
name to the Asiatic Exclusion League. m 1910 the
League called for the resignation of Hart H. North, the
Immigration Commissioner in San Francisco, because he
allegedly encouraged ••Hindu" immigration." The League
and its prominent supporters were quoted in San
Francisco newspapers, charging that North allowed the
admission of South Asians having communicable diseases.
According to Gary R. Hess, "these pressures resulted in
North's resignation and rigid enforcement of immigration
regulations
.
" 70
68Hess: 62.
69 Ibid.
70Ibid.
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H.A. Millis, chief investigator for the Immigration
Co™iss ion on the Pacific Coast, conducted a study of
the growing South Asian community in 1910. m his
findings he claimed that the South Asian was "the most
undesirable of all Asiatics and the peoples of the
Pacific states were unanimous in their desires for
exclusion.- Similarly in Canada, despite the fact
that South Asians were British subjects and argued that
they were members of the Aryan "race," they "created as
much, if not more, opposition as the Chinese and
Japanese on the West Coast."- m i 90 7, they were the
object of riots in parts of the state of Washington
where they worked in the lumber industry. The Asiatic
Exclusion League claimed that the South Asians
themselves were responsible for causing the riots
because they were willing to work for low wages and kept
"filthy and immodest habits," presumably offensive
enough to invite reprisals. 73 In the same year,
California farmers began to agitate for legislation
excluding Asians from agriculture. By 1913 their
demands were met; the California legislature enacted the
Alien Land Law which prevented the leasing and owning of
agricultural land by "aliens ineligible for
71 Ibid.
72Tien-Fang, 141.
73Ibid.
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-tizenship,.. a term first introduced ^ ^ ^the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. While the law was
directed primarily at the Japanese it raised questions
about the status of South Asian immigrant farmers.
Until 1922 it was not clear whether South Asians were
"ineligible for citizenship" and, in spite of popular
resentment and discrimination, South Asians continued to
farm. By 1919 they had some 100,000 acres of California
land under cultivation and "were among the pioneers who
developed [California's Imperial Valley]
. . .
, growing
cantaloupe, cotton, and lettuce." 74
In 1907 U.S. Attorney General Charles Bonaparte
advised the courts that South Asian applicants for
citizenship were ineligible since naturalization was
restricted to "free white persons" and persons of
African nativity or descent.- Many courts, however,
continued to allow South Asians to be naturalized on the
basis that the applicants had proved that they were of
the same "racial" origins as Europeans (i.e. Aryan) and
were members of the Caucasian "race." 76 The U.S.
74Leonard: 76.
"Hess: 61.
76
'
Konvitz: 88
•
One scholar notes thatbetween 1908 and 1923 at least sixty-nine "natives ofIndia acquired citizenship by action of no less thanthirty-two courts in seventeen different states. How
many applications were denied during this same period is
not known--and probably there were a great many—
• . . . " ( Jacoby : 1
)
District Court in New Orleans adopted this line of
reasoning in 1908 and granted citizenship to two South
Asian Muslim, Abdul Hamid and ^ ^
objection of the Attorney General's office."
The enactment of new immigration restrictions in
1917 adversely affected the situation of South Asians in
the U.S. by serving as an effective barrier to further
immigration from virtually all Asian countries.- The
consequences for South Asians already in the U.S. were
profound. Shortly after the passage of the Immigration
Act, the federal government began to challenge all of
the naturalizations of persons from India, arguing that
former Aliens' of a class now barred from entry were
not acceptable as citizens.
As a result of the government's renewed efforts to
exclude South Asians, the citizenship of Mr. Baghat
Singh Thind, granted by an Oregon court, was rescinded.
The case reached the Supreme Court which held in 1922
that Mr. Thind 's naturalization was illegal. In United
States v. Baghat Singh TM nH the Court ruled that
"Hindus" were ineligible for citizenship because
Congress had meant the words "white persons," used in
77Jacoby: 1.
* ^ * J
1
*,,
Barred Zone " Provision of the ImmigrationAct of 1917 (39 Stat. 874) prohibited immigration fromIndia, Siam, Arabia, Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula,Afghanistan, New Guinea, Borneo, Java, Ceylon, Sumatra,Celebes, and parts of Russian Turkestan and Siberia.
the Naturalization statutes of 1790 and 1870 and the
Migration Law of 1917
, to mean only ^ ^
"Hindus," whose desoendants
"would retain indefinitely
the clear evidence of their ancestry.- while the
Court accepted Mr. Thind's contention that South Asians
were members of the Caucasian race, they were not, by
vxrtue of their dark complexions,
"white persons" i„ the
popular understanding of the term. The Court held that,
by comparison, immigrants from eastern, southern and
central Europe who arrived in the United States after
Thind, though "dark-eyed and swarthy," were perceived at
the popular level as "white persons," and thus were
eligible for citizenship. In this the Court affirmed
the idea that popular notions of acceptability and
racial distinctions should decide who is eligible for
citizenship; that the question of "assimilability" was
crucial; and that through the "Barred Zone" provision of
the Immigration Act of 1917, Congress opposed
immigration from Asia and, by extension, the
naturalization of Asians. 80
19261 U.S. at 204.
c -,
8°F
^
r d
?-scussion °f the Thind case see also Hess:65-67; Konvitz: 88-97; and Lesser: 88-89.
The Japanese exclusion case, Ozawa v. UnitedStates, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), was decided by the Supreme
court in the same term as the Thind case. The Ozawa
case turned on the issue of race rather than color.
in the rMM decision the Court quoted the "Barred
Zone" provision of the l917 IIranigration flcfc as
that Congress was opposed to extending oiti 2enship to
Asians
:
It is not without significance in + hiconnection that Cong ess by ? ." ^ Barred
fission into t ? s c^try^fnarive
. of
a
n
ccepr
k
:s
y
c^
at
^"•^'bTSIliSg'to
re^ts^s^^g^nrs?.1.335 ° f Wh°» "*
The Thind ease had certain ramifications in
California, the state with the highest concentration of
South Asian residents. Editoriais in many newspapers in
California
"praised the ruling and most noted that the
Alien Land Law could be enforced more readily against
Indians.-" The California Attorney General, a leader
in the anti-Asian movement, promised to take swift
action to stem "the menacing spread of Hindus holding
our lands." 83
Criticism also issued forth. A pamphlet entitled
"An Examination of the Opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States Deciding Against the Eligibility of
81 261 U.S. at 215.
82Hess: 66.
"Ibid.
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H,ndus for citizenship," written by ^^ &^
Asian x^igrant, and Raymond ^
attorney, focused on the claim that Congress did not
consider
..Hindus., to be "white persons" at the tine of
enaot-nent of the Naturalization Acts of 1790 and 1870.
in response the authors refuted the Court's clain, and
cited textbooks and popular literature frora the periods
in question which did characterize South Asians as
"white. " 84
Many naturalization certificates granted to South
Asians before the Thind decision were rescinded.
Between 1923 and 1926 an estimated sixty to seventy
South Asian-Americans lost their U.S. citizenship."
in effect the Thind decision triggered a litigation
campaign attacking the citizenship of a class of people
previously admitted under the provisions of the 1790
Naturalization Act, amended in 1870. According to Hess,
the restriction of Asian immigration provided for in the
Immigration Act of 1917 was "accepted with less protest
than the denial of American citizenship" to aliens from
South Asia. 86 Many in the South Asian community
residing in the United States were mobilized by the
effects of the Thind decision, and a long struggle
84Ibid.: 67.
85Ibid.: 69.
86 Ibid.: 65.
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become naturalized citizens and to resume immigration.
Eventually their effort, prevailed; Congress enaoted
legislation in 1946 that specifically ^^
immigration and naturalization to resume.
The lower oourts soon came to regard the Thind
decision as the guiding precedent in deciding the
naturalization cases of many other Asians as well,
including Syrians, Afghanis, Arabs
, and Pe„iaM/ ^
the consequences of the Thind decision were widespread.
The immigration of many of the Islamic faith was
adversely affected during the first five decades of this
century to a large extent because of the legislated
restraints, judicially affirmed, placed on virtually all
Asian immigration and naturalization.
For instance in United States v. ai i » the
District Court of Michigan canceled the certificate of
naturalization of John Mohammed All, an Arab Muslim who
was born in the northwestern province of Punjab, India,
and came to the United States on June 2, 1900. Ali had
been naturalized on May 26, 1921. After the Supreme
Court ruled against the naturalization of "Hindus" in
the Thind decision, the court that issued Ali's
citizenship certificate rescinded it at the government's
7
7 F.2d 728 (D. Michigan, 1925)
request, on the grounds that it was "illegally
procured.
"
At issue in All's oase was whether he was a "Hindu"
or an "Arabian." In flli , s naturalizafc . Qn
the distriot oourt held that the words "white persons"
in the Naturalization statute inoluded all persons of
the Caucasian raoe and that "high-caste Hindus" belonged
to the Caucasian race. Because he "was considered and
referred to by all parties on the record as a high-caste
Hindu
--a definition in which he "appeared to
acquiesce»~Ali was admitted to citizenship."
„hen
the U.S. Supreme Court decided in the Thind case that
the words "white persons" were to be interpreted "in
accordance with the understanding of the common man,
from whose vocabulary they were taken, and were not to
be converted into words of scientific terminology,""
and that "Hindus" were not included in the common man's
understanding of the term "white persons," the U.S.
attorney in Detroit asked the district court to
reconsider All's fitness as an American citizen.
When Ali applied for and was admitted to
citizenship, he did not make any objection to the
court's description of him as a "high-caste Hindu."
However, in the 1925 action to cancel his citizenship.
"7 F.2d at 731.
"Cited in Ibid.
1
°
laimed
*** ^ not apply to him
because he was not a "Hindu" but was "an Fabian of full
Arabian blood.- Although au was native ^ ^.^
and his family had lived in India for several
generations, he asserted that his ancestors were Arab
and that they had been careful not to intermingle with
"the native stock of India" and had "kept their Arabian
blood line clear and pure by intermarr . age w . th . n
family.- District Judge Tuttlej . n hear . ng this
case, claims to be "unable to follow the argument" that
Ali attempts to make. The question is not one of purity
of blood, as Tuttle understands it, but whether or not
Ali is a "white person." To determine this Tuttle
relies on visual clues: "[All's] skin is certainly not
white, but unmistakably dark, like that of other members
of his race."" Further, All's argument merely proves
that, "by reason of Arabian ancestry," he is a member of
the Caucasian race, a fact which the Thind decision
makes clear is not a sufficient basis for
naturalization. For purposes of citizenship, it is
possible to be Caucasian but not a "white person."
Judge Tuttle ruled that Ali, although Caucasian, was not
a "white person" and canceled his citizenship.
so
7 F.2d at 732.
"Ibid.
92 Ibid.
The District court of San Francisco denied the
petition for naturalization of Mr. Fero2 Din
, an
Afghani, in a 1928 decision, In^e^eroz_Din.»3
District Judge Bourquin held that Feroz Din was "a
typical Afghan
.
. . readily distinguishable from
"white" persons of this country, and approximates to
Hindus." Based on the Thiod precedent, Bourguin held
that Feroz Din was not eligible for citizenship.
Bourquin rules that "much of the comment in that case
[Thind] is applicable to this." Further, Bourquin
curtly dismisses the use of scientific evidence as a
basis for considering the validity of racialist
distinctions, as other courts had done, and claims to
base his decision solely on the interpretation of
statutes
:
so called scientists may speculate and
connective in respect to races and origins mayinterest the curious and convince the Y
credulous, but is of no moment in arriving atthe intent of Congress in the statute
aforesaid. 94
In this the judge emphasizes the exclusive authority of
statutory language and the principle of stare decisis—
adherence to past judicial decisions to guide present
"27 F. 2d. 568 (1928)
.
9427 F. 2d. 568.
interpretations--^ determining the outcome of legal
^
issues. 95
The preceding court decisions turned on the
question of v rare' r*r Bv: ,c
,
or skin color, and geographic
origins. What of religion? in the case of Mufti
Muhammad Sadiq,^ reviewed below, we have an instance
where entry in^the U.S. was denied-and the denial later
overturned-strictly on the basis of the legal
prohibition against polygamy, a social custom associated
with Islam.
In January 1920 Mr. Sadiq , a Muslim of South Asian
extraction, set sail from England, bound for the United
States on the S.S. Haverford. Mr. Sadiq was a devoted
member of the Ahmadiya movement, a largely middle class
reformist Islamic sect which originated in the Punjab,
India, in the late nineteenth century. The movement
remained loyal to the British government in India and
advocated accommodation of British rule. Initially its
purpose was to rejuvenate Islam in the Punjab. However
by 1901 its agenda had expanded to include a worldwide
95As Goldman and Jahnige note, stare decisis "was
emphasized as the legal norm [Emphasis in original]" atthat time, and Supreme Court decisions were vehicles by
which lower court judges— "and other interested persons,tor that matter"--
-could know what the law was (SheldonGoldman and Thomas P. Jahnige, The Federal Courts as aPolitical System [New York: Harper and Row, 1985], 193)
.
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missionary outreach program "to propagate
islam ... (and to promote] ^ ^ ^
to Islam in Europe and America .„ ss ^ ^
began to train missionaries for outreach work i„ England
and North America and to translate Islamic religious
materials into English. By 1908 the official Ahmadiya
publication, Tb^Reyies^ReUgions, reported that
approximately 2,000 people in England had been converted
to Islam over the preceding twenty years."
Mr. Sadiq, a philologist with a degree from the
University of London, set out for the United States to
propagate Islam and establish an Ahmadiya mission there.
While crossing the Atlantic he won six new converts to
Islam among the ship's passengers.' 8 When the S.S.
Haverford docked in Philadelphia U.S. Immigration
authorities refused to allow Sadiq to enter the country
and tried to send him back to England on the same ship.
The officials rejected Sadiq 's effort to enter the
country because he was a "representative of a religious
in (- hr
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Snt Turner
'
Islam in the United Statest e 1920s: The Quest for a New Vision in Afro-
t^ffit
03
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eliqi "" (PhD diss., Princeton University,
97Ibid., 133.
The Review of Religions 19 (July 1920): 240.
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group that practiced polvqamv »»» io cxyy y- As Sadiq relates the
story, he told the immigration officer that
I have not come hprp t-^ +^-. u
wives, if a Moslem „m ever preach^7 ° fpractice polygamy in £££ ge wiU becommitting a sin against his reUgW°»
He bases this argument on a distinction between what is
mandatory in Islam and what is permitted. The
commandments of Islam-e.g. the belief in one God-must
be obeyed even when secular authority prohibits this,
but the permissions of Islam-e.g. polygamy-can be
avoided and, in fact, must be eschewed when they
contradict the laws of the ruling government of the
countries in which Muslims live. All Muslims must
follow the commandments of their religion but can
abstain from what is permitted. Further, according to
Sadiq, islam commands that a Muslim obey the laws of the
country in which he lives. Thus in countries where
polygamy is prohibited by law, Muslim men who marry more
than one wife not only violate the laws of their
countries but also a commandment of the faith which
urges moderation. Islam
PROHIBITS polygamy for the Mohammadans inEurope and America. No Moslem [man] can everthink of plurality of wives here. His
"Turner, 142.
""The Moslem Sunrise 1 (July 1921): 9.
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original r?*
"0t aU°W U
- [Emphasis in
Unable to convince the Migration officers of his
ardent, after several hours of interrogation Sadig
nevertheless prevailed upon them not to return hi™ to
England. He was granted permission to appeal the
decision to the Migration Secretariat in Washington,
D.C. However, pending the decision of the appeal, Sadig
was detained first in a Philadelphia and then a New
Jersey jail for two months. During that time he wrote
treatises in his own defense and hired lawyers to
present his case in the capital, arguing that he could
preach Islam in the United States without preaching
polygamy. He won his appeal and was finally allowed to
enter the United States in April 1920 on the condition
that he would not preach polygamy. 103
Being detained in jail did not entirely frustrate
Sadiq's purpose. While confined Sadig won his first
converts to Islam on American soil; he reports success
in gaining twenty converts among his fellow detainees
during his two-month confinement. 10) In addition he
attracted the attention of the press. Interviews with
101 Ibid.
102rThe Review of Religions 19 (July 1920): 240-241-The Review of Religions 19 (April/May 1920): 158.
103rTurner, 142. He reports that the converts werefrom Jamaica, British Guiana, Poland, Russia, Germany,
the Azores, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and France.
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him from inside the jail appeared in African newspapers
with accounts of his message. 104
Upon his release from jail Sadiq settled in New
York City and began publishing a quarterly journal, The.
^i^LSu^, in 1921
. The a . ms Qf th . s publication
were to dispel misrepresentations of Islam which
appeared in the American press and to propagate the
faith. "The cover of each issue pictured a sunrise over
North America which symbolized the rising sun of Islam
in the United States."- Copies of the first issue
were mailed to masonic lodges and major libraries. 1-
While Sadiq argues in the pages of The Moslem
Sunrise against the practice of polygamy in North
America because it violates the law, in the same essay
he also maintains that the laws of Islam are superior to
the North American civil laws that prohibit polygamy.
The permission of polygamy, he contends, was allowed for
practical reasons, for the protection of women.
Historically Muslim men were encouraged to marry more
than one woman when women and children outnumbered men
in a society, e.g. in times of war. Since "a Moslem
Headlines included: "Picturesque Sadiq," "Hopesto Convert U.S.," "Speaks Seven Tongues," "Optimistic inDetention," and "East Indian Here With New Religion,"
The Review of Religions 19 (July 1920): 242.
105Turner, 150.
106 Ibid., 152.
does not do anything in vain," the practice of polygamy
is limited even in Muslin, countries where men are
permitted to marry up to four women only under certain
conditions
:
In cases of emergencies and for the nmf 0,rof women, when necessary and 1X 1MGovernment of the country as exnl-Hnorf k
a man is permitted (anfJ^'oSiSS) to™'
th^Y
m°r* th™ °™> Provided that he can keepem equally and justly in love, provision Pand protection. But if he cannot be jus? 'then only one, says the Holy Quran. Sis'Restrrctron of "Justice" works in the majorityof cases as an utter prohibition of more ?hanYone wrfe. Only those who are strong-minded
P1ous and with means enough to fulfil? the
'
pri:u
S
ege.^
Stice *** Can have "he
Sadiq offers this argument in part to refute the
mistaken belief held by Americans that "every Muhammadan
in the East marries more than one girl." 108
A second purpose soon becomes apparent, however;
Sadiq demonstrates his message—the practicability of
polygamy even in the United States—by pointing to
evidence that it is already practiced. Immediately
following his essay in The Moslem Sunrise , a reprint
appears of an Akron, Ohio, newspaper account of a case
of polygamy allowed in the United States under the
heading, "Polygamy Sanctioned." With this account Sadiq
expresses his views:
107iMufti Mohammad Sadiq, "No Polygamy," The MoslemSunrise 1 (July 1920): 9-10.
108Ibid.: 9.
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aS^ssaw *help ^l^JS^i^S^^ -t
KEEP " BOTH
;
*COP^LET IT S^'^,!^! ^
The story is about an Italian immigrant. when reunited
with his Italian wife after the First World War, the
immigrant in question was allowed to remain married both
to her and his second wife whom he had married in Ohio
when the war prevented his first wife from joining him
in the United States. Sadiq avers that "there might
have been other cases like that as well," and argues
that this demonstrates the "desirability of the Law of
Polygamy made by Islam in cases of emergency »»°
because it allows for just such exceptional
circumstances and is designed to promote morality.
While the juxtaposition of this news account and
his essay on polygamy at least implies an injustice-the
American government prohibiting him from preaching
polygamy while sanctioning its practice in the case of
an Italian—Sadiq never explicitly charges that
discrimination has occurred. But such restraint is not
shown by Sadiq's co-religionist and defender, Sher Ali,
who writes of Sadiq's circumstances in The Review of
Religions
.
In an essay entitled "America's Intolerance,
109 Ibid.: 10.
110Ibid.
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Our Missionary in the Detention House," sher Ali write
from England about "the treatment our brother ha
received at the hands of the United States authoriti
[which] is highly intolerant and inequitable." Sher Ali
is quite indignant about the hypocrisy of the •children
of the Pilgrin, fathers (who] ^ ^ ^^
should have held sacred the freedom of thought and
speech." He exhorts, "you [i.e. Americans] have passed
a law forbidding people who believe in the validity of
polygamy admission into your country." Sadiq's
missionary work in America, preaching Islam without
"making any reference to polygamy," is
, according to
Sher Ali, "a concession to the intolerance of the
American Government and will remain as a blot on the
fair name of America." 111
The Ahmadiya movement, established in the United
States by Indian missionaries in the 1920s, had a
special appeal for African Americans who at that time
were looking for a new vision to lift them out of their
demoralizing circumstances. It connected them to a
worldwide, "non-white" religion, an attractive
alternative to what were seen as the European religions
of Judaism and Christianity. 112 The Ahmadiyas tapped
in,Sher All, "America's Intolerance, Our Missionaryin the Detention House," The Review of Religions 19(April/May 1920): 158-160.
112Turner, 2.
16
mto the growing groundswell of black nationalism, a
social phenomenon discussed in the next chapter.
Consequpnr-PQ
Small Muslim groups were founded to preserve the
faith and to maintain social and cultural ties within
the fledgling Muslim community: in Ross, North Dakota,
as early as 1900; and in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in the
early 1920s. Islamic associations were established in
Highland Park, Michigan, in 1919, and Detroit in 1922.
A Young Men's Muslim Association was founded in
Brooklyn, New York, in 1923.^ Mosques were
constructed for communal prayer in Highland Park,
Michigan, in 1919 (but was dismantled within five
years); in Ross, North Dakota, in 1920; in Michigan
City, Indiana, where "a dome was put atop a rented
building in 1924"; and in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in
1934 . 114 The first Canadian mosque was built in
Edmonton, Alberta in 1938. However many of these
organs of collective life vanished as the individuals
involved became integrated into the dominant society or
Insi-ii-nH^-^n1360^ Haddad ' "Arab Muslims and Islamicstitutio s in America, Adaptations and Reform," inArabs in the New World: Studio on Arab AmericanCommunities
,
ed. Sameer Y. Abraham and Nabeel Abraham(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983), 67-8.
114Orfalea, 94-95.
115Haddad, "Muslims in Canada," 73.
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returned home and the Pari,, m„ i •n e ly Muslim communities
dissipated. 116
Whether because of their small un n, numbers or because
of the felt need to *fit in - with the surroundings
_
Muslim adapted their practices and institutions guickly
and substituted
^Americanized- symbols of collective
life for the
.ore familiar Islamic ones , ln ^^^^
Sunri^ the Ahmadiyas borrowed an image from the legends
of the nineteenth century pioneer movement westward by
oomparing their missionary work in North America to that
of the pioneers who Settled' the western frontier.
They characterized themselves as "pioneers in the
spiritual colonization of the western world." 1"
Two things happened as a result of the low profile
of the early Muslim immigrant communities. First, the
early generations of Muslims in the United States and
Canada remained relatively invisible and showed little
potential for influencing American and Canadian
116i
It !n°^9n
Stan<;%in wROS ;' N°rth Dakota ' a mosque wasbuil in 1920, only to be abandoned by 1948 as theMuslims of Ross became integrated, adopted Christian
names, and married Christians (Haddad, "Arab Muslims andIslamic Institutions," 68). According to Karpat
membership of the first Muslim communities dwindledbecause of conversion, death, and return to their home
countries (Karpat: 183).
117The Moslem Sunrise 1 (July 1921): 1; cited inTurner, p. 150, n. 81.
society.- Evidence guggests that some Qf these
C°nCealed their
affiliation to be less
conspicuous and gain easier acceptance i„ North
America- Second, potential infant, from the
Muslin, world were unaware of the presence and level of
organization, such as it was, of their co-religionists
observes, religion regained an important factor in
delaying their immigration. Centuries of
accumulated misunderstanding and mistrust between
Muslims and the West, dating from the Crusades,- have
had to be jettisoned somewhat before Muslim migration
westward increased.
With respect to immigration and naturalization laws
at the turn of the century, the increasing influx of
newcomers generated a political struggle at the center
of which was the question whether persons judged to be
neither ^white- nor ^black' made acceptable members of
the political community. A related question was whether
the law, having extended recognition of citizenship
/"Larry Allan Poston, Islamic na-wa h in NorthAmerica and the Dynamics o| Conversion £
"
l988T
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56?"' ~ ' PhD dlSS" N°rthw°stern University,
"'See Karpat: 182-183.
120Elkholy, 17.
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Orientalism (New York: VintaqeBooks, 1978 ) . a
rights to those of flfrican origl„ f^^ ^
same recognition to others, notably of flsian origin
.
Legal exclusion on tht* hao4«e b sls primarily of skin color and
geography, but also the issue of ™iie polygamy, enforced the
prevailing beliefs nf ^9 net o the day about moral character and
public values. These standards governed the rules of
crtizenship well into the first half of the twentieth
century.
It is necessary to keep in mind that „hUe ^ ^look upon the experiences discussed in this chapter as
having involved a simple problem of public policy-
namely, one of determining how to define standards for
citizenship in the face of a changing immigrant
population-it was clearly understood as a major crisis
at the turn of the century. Fears of being inundated by
outsiders, of facial' deterioration and the threats of
disease and physical and moral degeneracy provoked not
only by Syrian and South flsian, but also Japanese,
Italian, and other suspect types of immigration, were
rampant. The effort socially and politically to erect
defensive barriers simply found in the - state of the
art' of natural science what seemed like an effective,
clinical tool to do so. Racial classifications
legitimated exclusionary impulses by lending them a
shroud of scientific expertise.
The role of the oourts in refining the language q(
Politios by linking empirical scienoe fche ^^^^^
of the state begins to become clear i„ the context of
Asian applicants for citizenship. Although the courts
are inconsistent in their application of scientific
standards, relying on anthropological evidence in some
Places and resorting to the popular understanding of the
C"°n ^ at °therS ' dra™ -to the discourse was the
use of differing sources of authority.
„hile popular
opinion might be suspect and mutable, science appeared
as an unimpugnable source. Many of the decisions
discussed here provoked responses from the affected
communities that were conditioned in particular ways by
the courts. Syrians and South Asians both tailored
their responses in terms of the language and issues
enunciated by the courts and called upon the legal
system to extend recognition and rights to them.
In the political struggle that ensued the Asian
world was determined to be an unsuitable source of
immigration. This was reflected in the laws governing
admission of immigrants. The interaction between the
early generations of Muslims in the United States and
the constitutive debates that redefined the rules for
citizenship at the turn of the century worked a profound
impact on the shape of Islam in North America—its
identity, institutions, doctrines and practices. Where
166
Muslim stood collectively
„is < vis thege
along with the fact that they came equipped with their
own (Xslandc) legal culture that had to be compromised
xf not abandoned in the process of assimilation, has had
a lot to do with the way the issues of the Muslim-
American community are framed today. 122
The rules for citizenship in the United States,
found in immigration and naturalization policies and
judicial interpretation, express a peculiarly American
consciousness, identity, and future. The rhetoric and
outcome of the process of defining acceptable levels of
immigration and the rules for citizenship provide the
substance and texture of the self
-definition of a
people. As Weiner notes, "The question of who should be
admitted has much to do with the self-definition that a
people (and their government) have of themselves, a
definition that is not immutable." 123
Today some writers make the case for iitihad the
tenets
C
to°
f lndi
r
idual interpretation of IsltmCTgal
apply to contemporary concerns. Iitihad .allowed in early Islamic history, it is argued, could berevived and used as a strategy to reconcile Islamicnorms with the North American context and as an adaptivemechanism (see Waugh, et al.). Essentially Muslimstoday are concerned about the free exercise of religion:whether the demands of the workplace and secularinstitutions, such as schools, hospitals, prisons, andthe military, will allow Muslims to observe religiousdietary laws, dress code, Friday sabbath and holidays,
and daily prayers.
123Myron Weiner, "Immigration: Prespectives fromReceiving Countries," Third World Quarterly 12 (1990):
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The question whether Islan, is a religion wortny of
constitutional protection arose in the federal courts in
cases brought by African-American Muslin, inmates
confined in correotional institutions. The
responsiveness of the courts, as well as the Muslims'
use of law, were shaped by a variety of factors which
impinged not only on the changing role of the courts but
also on the developing Muslim identity in North America.
Specifically the multiple historical contexts of the
prisoners' and civil rights movements, evolving race
relations, and the rise of black nationalism had a
bearing on the legal status of Islam and Muslims. These
factors also conditioned the way that particular legal
subjects-i.e. Muslims-came to accept law as a
legitimate social control mechanism and its utility in
creating
-order' in everyday existence both inside
prison walls and beyond.
Three concurrent historical developments are
central to, and inform, the analysis in this chapter:
the prisoners' rights movement; black nationalism and
the Nation of Islam; and the legal treatment of
religion. While, as Malcolm Feeley and Roger Hanson
point out, the federal courts have become one of the
"principal agents of change in the nation's jails and
Prisons the impetus behind ^
reform began with the inmates themselves. Thus the
purpose of this chapter is to provide an illustrative
example of the transformation not only of legal oonoepts
and the role of the judiciary, but, more importantly, of
the very subjects themselves who have relied on the
courts to maximize their religious freedom. We begin by
reviewing the three historical developments mentioned
above-the prisoners' rights movement, the Black
Muslims, and the legal treatment of religion-before
examining the court record.
Prisoners
' Rights
While prisoners in the United States have gained
recognition of their constitutional rights through court
action, until the 1960s the judiciary, with few
exceptions, followed a "hands-off" doctrine, refusing to
intervene in matters of prison administration. 2 During
of Judi^Tl^Tn^
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'
" The ImPacticia Intervention on Prisons and Jails: A
in
a
rnnr?« ^Y^ 8 and a Revi*" of the Literature,"Cou ts, Corrections, and th« Cnnstitut j on
r John J.Dilulio, Jr., ed. (New York and Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1990), 12.
io C „/See Bannin9 v - Looney, 213 F. 2d 771 (10th Cir.,
H V'n °er1t denied > 348 u ' s - 266 (1954), which statesthat courts are without power to supervise prison
administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison
rules or regulations." See also Note, "Beyond the Ken
of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Reviewthe Complaints of Convicts," Yale Law Journal 72 (1963).The federal courts adhered to the "hands-off" policy
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the nineteenth century prisoners rarely ^^
to challenge the conditions of their confinement, m
many states persons convicted of a crime suffered "civil
death,
»
and became temporarily "the slave of the
state,- effectively stripped of Constitutional
protection. Prisoners' claims were denied by the courts
well into the twentieth century on the grounds that the
judiciary had no jurisdiction over the internal
management of correctional institutions. 4
Throughout much of its two-hundred year history,
the prison reform movement understood the status of
prisoners and their conditions of confinement as a
religious or utilitarian problem. 5 Reformers held a
generally "out of concern for federalism and separationof powers and a fear that judicial review of
SS l
administrative decisions would undermine prison securitv
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where he cites the following fromtypical decisions illustrating the "hands-off"doctrine: "The problem is moreover one which involves
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which as an independentnd abstract question is not within the jurisdiction ofthis court" [1948, citation omitted]; "It is not the
??QlinCe .° f ^he courts to supervise prison discipline"[1948, citation omitted]; "Courts do not have the power
and it is not their function or responsibility to
supervise prisons [1954, citation omitted]" ( Prisons inTurmoil [Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980], 102).
5See David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience,
The Asylum and its Alternatives in Progressive America(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1980).
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as well
on
benevolent regard for the sake of the ordinal,
as the protection of society, and, like pris
administrators, focused on the correctional
institution's ability to rehabilitate the criminal. In
the post-Civil War era until well into this century, the
goal of the penal system was the "moral regeneration" of
the criminal through incarceration . « Religion was
believed to have a qreat re>h*hi l i iy c nab tat ve potential and
religious services in prisons and jails were often
mandated. However in most instances free speech, with
the opportunity to discuss religious ideas among
themselves, was forbidden to prisoners. 7
Yet the conditions of incarceration were never
examined from the perspective of the kept, only of the
keeper. A distinctive feature of the period from 1900
to the mid-1960s was its positivist approach to the
treatment of the incarcerated; confidence was placed in
the discretionary authority of public officials to
understand and cure each Meviant', and to respond to
the needs presented by each, on a case-by-case approach.
'ibid., 31.
See Ibid., which describes the "Auburn system",named for a nineteenth century penitentiary in Auburn,Massachusetts, where absolute silence was maintainedduring the regular day and prisoners spent their nightsin solitary cells with nothing to read but the Bible.Mandatory religious services were held with a prisonguard standing next to a loaded cannon pointing towardthp inma-Hoe
Thus prisoners were isolated ^ ^^^^ ^
virtue of incarceration, and prison programs and
practices were developed by prison officials who were
given a great deal of latitude in corrections.
A reversal of this position was not clearly
enunciated until 1961 when, i„ Monroe^v^Paee,. the
Supreme Court resurrected nineteenth-century civil
rights law to rule that plaintiffs could seek damages in
federal court for state violations of their civil
rights.' This legal development was applied soon
thereafter to prisoners- cases. As Jim Thomas notes,
the stimulus for this shift can be traced to the
"changing social and political attitudes" of the New
Deal era.- As early as "1941 the Supreme Court
recognized that some Constitutional protections followed
prisoners to prison ( ex parte H„ll
,
312 U.S. 546,
"365 U.S. 167 (1961)
.
of lo'-^*;
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Section 1983, the Civil Rights Act
"civUUl-nJ thl-" Ka K iUX Klan Aot ">< allows forcivil cause of action enforceable in federal courtsagainst any state official found to be violating rights
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Change evolved slowly and
spasmodically, however
, and the judioiai stance tward
prrsoners was not fully metamorphosed until the 1960s
Many other court decisions continued to defend the
discretion of prison authorities frQm ^
erosion of the »hands-of f doctrine. Collectively the
courts were neither consistent nor enthusiastic about
the overall drift toward an interventionist role
Through 1951 »most federal judges ^ ^
^oision in Stroud_v^ope (187 F. 2d 820, 9th Cir.,
1951,, which explicitly rejected federal review of the
discipline and treatment of prisoners."" In a 1953
case a federal district court in Illinois ruled against
an African-American prisoner who "alleged racially
motivated policies in restricting free speech," stating
that prisoners cannot use the courts to challenge prison
policies that they do not like."
According to Thomas, the shift away from the
official judicial »hands-of f •• policy toward a more
activist stance was precipitated by the advent of the
Warren Court and the incipient civil rights struggles in
the 1950s. Generally the courts became more receptive
"Ibid.
"Ibid., 85.
13.
io?of
el ^ris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F. 2d105 (1953), cited in Thomas, 85.
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to the rights of minorities anH16S
'
d thls openness extended
to the rights of criminal defendants as well. m
essence the social activism beginning in the 1950s,
which became widespread in the 1960s and 1970s,
effectively expanded the concept of "civil rights" to
include the protection of the incarcerated against
substandard conditions. The growth of prisoners'
rights, based on post-Civil War legislation, emerged
slowly at first but expanded dramatically during the
1960s "impelled largely by social attitudes towards
rights in general and the efforts of prisoners to
translate these attitudes into legal action.- This
shift resulted in the expansion of prisoners' access to
legal resources and effectively placed policies and
actions of prison authorities under the purview of
federal courts.
The 1960s are recognized as a watershed decade in
the development of prisoners' rights which, like the
civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the
student movement, was "part of a larger mosaic of social
change." 15 The issues raised by prisoners and their
14 Ibid., 92.
Jacobs, 35. See also Irwin; Feeley; Dilulio;Note, "Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique ofJudicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts,"Yale Law Journal 72 (1963); and Comment, "The ReligiousRights of the Incarcerated," University of Pennsylvania
Law Review . 125 (1977).
advocates were timely and coincided with significant
changes in the level of involvement by the federal
judiciary in policy matters, the extension of rights to
an increasing number of marginal groups, and the
recognition of the legitimacy of group grievances,
especially the demands by African-Americans for egual
protection under the law in other contexts.
Also, as James Jacobs notes, "the preconditions for
the emergence of a prisoners' rights movement in the
United States was the recognition by the federal courts
that prisoners were persons with cognizable
constitutional rights."- This recognition of
prisoners as legal subjects created the opportunity to
bring the movement into the courts and led key actors,
including prisoners, to concentrate their efforts at
affecting change through legal remedies. Conversely it
brought the federal courts into the prisons, where court
officials became deeply involved in defining and
applying certain standards in disputes over prison
practices, policies, and conditions. in effect the
Monroe v. Pape decision opened access to the courts
where prisoners could challenge their treatment by
prison officials and demand that the courts intervene in
setting standards for the conditions of their
confinement. This ushered in a new era of judicial
16Jacobs, 36.
intervention in prison administration which
, as part of
a general pattern of an expanded judicial role, resulted
xn modest systemio change. Certain aspects of the
closed world of prisons-especially the prison
officials' absolute custodial power and the prisoners-
isolation from the larger society-were brought under
public scrutiny through the attention given to the legal
status of individual prisoners. The litigation itself
in turn "heightened prisoners' consciousness and
politicized them." 17
The fact that the courts, by the 1960s, no longer
precluded prisoners from using legal procedures
available to others both shaped their struggle for basic
rights and gave to the judiciary an expanded supervisory
role. These developments were consequential as they
were "perhaps second in breadth and detail only to the
courts' earlier role in dismantling segregation in the
nation's public schools" following the 1954 ruling in
Brown v. Board of Education
.
18 The Supreme Court's
first modern prisoners' rights case, Cooper v. pa f»
( 1964 ), 19 which involved Muslim inmates, recognized
17Ibid.
18Feeley and Hanson, 13.
Civil Rights Act of 1871.
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that prisoners have constitutional rights that prison
officials cannot violate, and that the federal courts
are obligated to hear prisoners' allegations of
religious discrimination. Jacobs asserts that "many
legal victories followed after Cooper^
2ate
.
. .
[and] each contributed to the strength, self-
confidence, and momentum of the prisoners' rights
movement.- In 1974 the Supreme Court ^ ^ ^
landmark prisoners' rights case, Wolf^JIcDor^
that prisoners are entitled to certain minimal due
process standards at disciplinary proceedings. Writing
for the Court, Justice Byron White declared that
though [the prisoner's] rights may be
fn^?^ed ^ the . needs ^d exigencies of theinstrtutronal environment, a prisoner is notwholly stripped of constitutional
protections.
. . . There is no iron curtainS^S~^ Constitution and the prions
This case established a balancing test to weigh the
merits of prisoners' claims against the institutional
needs and objectives of the prisons.
While Supreme Court decisions have been influential
in defining the contours of the law in the area of
20Jacobs, 41.
418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff the Court also
addressed some right-to-counsel issues. Although thisis not a case directly involving Muslim inmates, several
cases that do are cited as legal precedents.
22Ibid., 556.
prisoners' riaht-c +-v,~ghts, the oases reaching the Supreme Court
are far fewer than the numbers reaching the lower
federal courts. Federal district courts ^ only^
as the forum for hearing prisoners- legal complaints,
they also oversee the enforcement of judicial decrees
stemming from court decisions in prisoners- litigation.
During the !970s the federal courts proved generally to
be somewhat sympathetic to the need to bring prison
conditions up to constitutional standards. „a„y courts
appointed
.'special masters" or "compliance officers" to
aid correctional officials in developing institutional
remedies in compliance with court orders." Lawsuits
by prisoners increased at an unprecedented rate over the
1970s and !980s ; the total number of prisoner petitions
in federal district courts increased from 15,997 in 1970
to 41,390 in 1989. 24
In response to the volume of prisoners' litigation
and the resulting increase in public attention given to
prison conditions and policies, "an amalgam of statutes,
regulations, and guidelines" has emerged which has
fostered dramatic changes in prison administration."
Many of these changes have placed prisons and prison
officials under universal standards of accountability
"Feeley and Hanson: 36.
"Annual Report, U.S. Courts, 1970 and 1989.
"Feeley and Hanson: 26.
and have served as an impetus for the enhanced
professionalization of COrrections . por ^
American Correctional Association (ACA)
, the
professional organization of correctional officials
with the support of the U.S. Department of Justice, has
created an accreditation system of state prisons.
Federal legislation of the Civil Rights of
institutionalized Persons Act (CKIPA) of 1980 authorizes
the U.S. attorney general to sue state institutions that
violate the Constitutionally-protected rights of inmates
held in state correctional facilities, and to develop
standards to evaluate state prison inmate grievance
procedures." Also, state legislatures have authored
statutes which incorporate protections of prisoners
'
constitutional rights into state administrative law."
The overall impact of this trend has been the
transformation of the nation's correctional institutions
and how they are run. A more general trend toward
increased bureaucratization, legality, and attentiveness
to "constitutional values as they affect public
institutions," evident since 1960, has altered the
operational life of prisons." The emphasis has been
on the professionalization of correctional officials "so
"Ibid.: 31-32.
"Ibid.: 27.
"Ibid.: 15.
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that constitutional values are more fuH„t lly appreciated"
in the management of prisons and jails."
However the analysis in this chapter is not
concerned primarily with the impact of prisoners'
litigation, but with the influence of social trends and
rdeas about
..rights" on the litigants themselves.
Although I have not tried to analy 2e the litigation's
impact in detail, it is clo* r fha*
,
-lc ea that significant prison
reform has resulted. Just as societal and institutional
changes have altered the expectations and norms of
prison staff, they have altered the expectations and
norms of the prisoners as well.
Prisoners' litigation is but a recent development
within the broader context of prison reform efforts
which, in effect, redefines the status of the
incarcerated by focusing on its legal, rather than moral
or economic, dimensions. it has cast the discussion of
issues of prison management in constitutional terms, and
has created expectations about rights and entitlements
for prisoners as well as the oversight role of the
federal judiciary.
As Stuart Scheingold notes in his classic work, The
Politics of Rights (1974), "a declaration of rights
tends to politicize need by changing the way people
29Ibid.
thin, about their discontent.- The opportunity fc<>
pursue group grievances in the courts, and the
encouragement of success ir^i, influenced the ideas of the
Prisoners who litigated. In what follows we^
_
how Musli, inmates adopted constitutional norms and
language to change their environment and, ultimately
how this contributed to an overall transformation of
their self-identification.
^^^^^
"Although very few references explain how ideas
about Islam became available in the black community,-
a variety of American scholars have proffered possible
explanations as to the origins and appeal of islam
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The Politics of Right* (Newave : Yale University Press, 1974), 131.
"Beverly Thomas McCloud, "African-American Muslim
^
merV ^ Muslims of America, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 177.
within the African Ugaey> R . chard Brent
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Turner suggests that:
Libert 38k 1866 ' EdWard Wil»>°t Blyden
Presbyterian mini^r' ?ht^
°U9h a
£2 2 a^mo i -i^HTS^he^od"*
The Reverend Blyden felt that Christianity, by and
large, had become a white European religion, racist in
content, which debased African Americans and stripped
them of their racial heritage. In contrast Islam could
unify "the darker races of the world" and serve as the
basis for an internationalist sense of black identity
and solidarity. 34
M . .f
ee K1Y> "The African-American MuslimMinority: 1776-1900, - Journal Institute of_S£nMinority Affairs 10 (1989): 152-160; Allan DAuftin
Thf I
Ga^lana Publishing, 1984); Beverlee Turner Mehdie Arabs in America 149?-19 7 7 (New York: Oceana
'
Publications, Inc., 1978); E. U. Essien-Udom, Black
n'nTu"1 ,: Searc h fnr Identity in ^ericj (Se^Tor*Dell Publishing, 1962); Richard Brent Turner," Is" am inthe United States in the 1920s: tHp Qn.c T^rf—
Vision in Afro-American Relig ion ,Phn dlsl
, p r j-University, 1986); and C. Eric Lincoln, The Black
1973}
mS ^ Amer ' ra ' rev ' ed ' (Boston: Beacon Press,
33Turner, 11.
34Ibid., 12.
The internationalist perspective slowly gained
moment™ throughout the Reconstruction era as African
Americans witnessed both the traveling of post-Civil-
War gains in civil rights and the European partition of
Afrxca. Then, between 1900 and 1930, the total black
population in the northern and midwestern urban centers
of the United States increased fourfold as approximately
2.5 million African Americans left the south to escape
overt racism (the Ku Klux Klan and Jim Crow laws, and to
look for higher wages in industrial jobs." Many
blacks were discouraged, however, when they encountered
perhaps more Subtle' forms of discrimination in the
north, especially in employment and housing. The
limited freedom and color prejudice they experienced in
the north, combined with the impact of visits to their
former homes in the south, raised their awareness of the
extreme subordination of blacks in the south and
sharpened their frustration with the white power
structure in America generally." Thus, during the
years between the two world wars, the ideological
leadership provided by such black intellectuals as W. E.
B. Dubois, George Washington Williams, and other Pan-
Africanists, coincided with the mounting pressures of a
"Lincoln, xxiv, 23.
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Haywood Burns, "The BlackMuslims in America: a Reinterpretation, - Race 5 (1963):
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disillusioned, recently „^
, urbanized mass of black working
people who sought a panacea.
It was in this context that black nationalism found
fertxle ground in twentieth century America. In the
first quarter of this century various leaders
articulated strategies ranging from accommodation to
separation. Christianity increasingly came under fire
as a racist ^cla„< religion of the white people and such
crrtxcrsm exacerbated the religious needs of blacks ^
a new vision and eschatology. Marcus Garvey, the major
proponent of separatism, founded the first extensive
international ^Back to Africa' movement, called the
United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), on the
principles of reconciliation with Africa-black
independence, black culture, and black power. The UNIA
movement, identified as "the quintessence of the
internationalist identity which had been growing among
black Americans since the late nineteenth century,""
reached its height of popularity during the 1920s, when
its message of black pride and self-help offered an
attractive alternative and survival strategy for
oppressed blacks.
"The conversion of African-Americans to Islam is a
twentieth century phenomenon"" and must be understood,
"Turner, 16-17.
3eMcCloud, 177.
at one level, as a reaction to African racism. it is
Part of a larger effort to cohere in a new cultural
vxsron seeking to define a viable alternative to
Christianity. Some black Americans perceived
Christianity
"as the root of their oppression in its
glorification of suffering and promise of redemption in
the hereafter, - a re ligion belonging ^^
and the proximate cause of their continued
subordination. They sought ameliorative belief systems,
which might offer a better understanding of, if not
solutions to, the problems stemming from the
dislocations of the northward migration. Many of the
alternative belief systems which arose wholly negated
the message of white supremacy seen as inherent to
Christianity, and rendered their distinctiveness-!. e .
their ^blackness '-a virtue rather than evidence of
their inferiority.
Alongside Garveyism another black nationalist
movement arose to offer an alternative faith—the
Moorish Science Temple established by Noble Drew Ali in
Newark, New Jersey, in 1913. Noble Drew Ali, the
v Prophet', stressed the s oriental' identity of black
Americans, calling them ^Asiatic' or vMoorish\ and
claimed that Islam, the dominant religion in Morocco, is
the original religion of the black v race'. The Moorish
39 Ibid., 178.
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movent provided an aberrant or nominal variety of
Islamic faith based more on Drew All's eclectic
understanding of eastern philosophies than a Native-
or orthodox interpretation of Islam. what u
however, is not the Kent's failure to confer, to the
basic doctrines of Islam, but the funcUon^^
as the negation of Christianity and the focal point for
the development of a new identity.
in essence Drew All's movement was a religious
nationalism that maintained an accommodationist
position, unlike Garveyism, the main objective of the
Moorish movement was to provide a source of racial
pride, destroying the dominant culture's claims about
black inferiority while emphasizing obedience to, and
membership in, the United States. The Moorish movement
spread to several northern cities, including
Philadelphia and Detroit, as well as to a few in the
south. It survives today in some east coast locations.
By far the largest organization to generate mass
appeal based on its identification with Islam and black
nationalism, emerging out of the Depression of the
1930s, is the Nation of Islam. Its founder and
spiritual leader, Elijah Muhammad, born Elijah Poole in
Georgia in 1876, was influenced by the current of black
nationalism represented by Garveyism and the Moorish
movement. A follower of a rather mysterious figure in
186
ace
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s
Detroit, called variously „. D. Fard
, Wall Fard, Wall
Fard,
„. F. „uhalra„ad, and Fard Muha^ad, EUjah Muharamad
e-roed by 1934 as the leader of a movement known as
"The Lost-Found Nation of Islam i„ the Wilderness of
North toerica" (a . k .a. the Nation of lalam)
. Elijah
Muharonad expounded the "unique body of myths and
doctrines" associated with the Nation of Isl™ until hi
death in 1975." Under Muha^ad's leadership, Fard „a
deified and became identified ^ ^n au,r a as Allah'
f and Muhammad
became his Prophet' or ^the Messenger of Allah'."
islam was declared the natural religion of the Black
Man; due to slavery African Americans were separated
from their true Muslim identity. They have been kept in
Cental slavery' by the white man, estranged from their
heritage and from each other. 42 Muhammad's role, then,
was to reveal the truth about white men, called blue-
eyed devils, to expose their * tricknology ' by which the
Black Man continues to be subjugated, and to
reconstitute the Black Nation. Blackness became the
ideal; self-respect, economic independence, and ethical
integrity were vaunted as essential goals and necessary
preconditions for freedom.
"Lincoln, 70.
41Ibid., 18.
42Ibid., 81.
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The Nation of Islam was never a ^Back to Africa'
movement although Muhammad preached that "the white
man's home is in Europe" and that "there will be no
peace until every man is in his own country."- The
Black Muslims under Muhammad's leadership sought self-
determination in North America, not Africa. A sense of
entitlement to a Nation within a nation', ceded from
white America and the authority of the white man, earned
through slavery, is evident. In every issue of the
community's official newspaper, "Muhammad Speaks," it
was stated that the Black Muslims "want our people in
America, whose parents or grandparents were descendants
from slaves, to be allowed to establish a separate state
or territory of their own
. . .
.«« Accordingly,
justice would be served only when there is a Black
Nation in America "on some of the land our fathers and
mothers paid for in 300 years of slavery
. . . right
here in America." 45 The goal of a Black Nation was of
consuming importance and, until that was achieved, Black
Muslims would oppose political discourse with the white
man. Initially, at least, they opposed integration and
excluded themselves from participation in a political
system which they perceived to have denied them the
43Ibid., xxvii, 74.
44Cited in Ibid.
45Cited in Ibid., 74.
political values they sought- justice, equality, and
^
liberty.
Elijah Muhammad was successful in creating a
tightly-knit organization with established rituals and
worship. The ritual requirements were defined as:
prayer five times daily; before prayer, proper
ablutions; total abstinence from the consumption of
tobacco, alcohol, and pork; and attendance at temple
twice a week." Over the next few decades the Nation
of islam spread to all the major cities of the United
States and found its greatest numbers in urban black
ghettoes. Its growth coincided with the increased
popularity of black nationalism as a whole in an era of
African independence and civil rights struggles at home.
Its success has been attributed to its promise of »a new
identity, a feeling of ^somebodiness ' denied by the
dominant culture
. . .
.»« In Lincoln , s wordS;
ultimate appeal of the movement ... is in the chance
to become identified with a power strong enough to
overcome the domination of the white man-and perhaps
even to subordinate him in return."" 8
"Ibid., 83-85.
"McCloud, 178.
"Lincoln, 29.
Elijah Muhammad had ,. an ambitious program Qf
recruitment. He preached to the disaffected black
masses and sought even "the most unregenerate and then
set about to rehabUitate them.- A good deal of
recruiting was done in jails and prisons and the
movement grew there throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Malcolm X, perhaps the most famous Black Muslim prison
convert, describes the appeal of Muhammad's message in
prison:
?h?«i
?t th
^u
ca9ed~uP black man startt inking the same way I did when I firstheard Elijah Muhammad's teachings, l^himstart thinking how with better breaks when hewas young and ambitious he might have been alawyer, a doctor, a scientist, anything? Youlet this caged-up black man start realizingas I did, how from the first landing of £he'first slave ship, the millions of black men inAmerica have been like sheep in a den ofwolves. That's why black prisoners becomeMuslims so fast when Elijah Muhammad'steaching filter into their cages by way of
H^n ,. Musllm c°nvicts. "The white man is thedevil" is a perfect echo of that black
convict's lifelong experience. 51
The Nation of Islam movement found ready-made and
receptive audiences in penal institutions, "for the
racial character of the law enforcement agencies, the
courts, and the custodial personnel is a key factor in
189
49 Ibid., 116.
50Ibid., 31.
51Malcolm Little and Alex Haley, The Autobiography
of Malcolm X (New York: Ballantine Press, 1964), 183.
sharpening the black prisoner's resentments and his
sense of persecution." 52
While Black Muslim ministers fQund wiu . ng cQnverts
among restive prisoners, the rehabilitative effect on
the convicts who became Muslim was remarkable. Muslims
»ho joined the Nation of Islam while in prison were
subject to stringent rules of conduct, devised by the
movent's leadership, and "invariably improve^] in
behavior and outlook.- The move-nent's
"emphasis upon
courtesy, cleanliness, and morality challenges the early
Puritans in its austerity and unrelenting
enforcement.- The Nation of Islam operated "on the
premise that knowledge of the self and of the ^truth
about the white man '-when tied in with a constructive
program, such as building the Black Nation—is
sufficient to reclaim the most corrigible."" Many
Muslims, both inside prison walls and out, came into the
movement from "various levels of extra-legal activity,"
but those who stayed were rehabilitated and put to work,
in keeping with the movement's emphasis on
Lincoln, xxvii.
"Ibid., 119.
"Burns: 34.
"Lincoln, 120.
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industriousness and the creation of black economic
independence
.
56
Connected with the outside organization, Black
Muslim prisoners recruited other black prisoners into
the movement and the growing Muslim population alarmed
prison administrators. Prison wardens observed that
Muslim inmates shaved their heads closely, kept a
cleancut appearance, wore medallions, and sometimes
marked their foreheads with the ^seal of Islam'."
They observed strict dietary rules excluding pork, and
tended to "segregate themselves in prison dining halls
and exercise yards."- Muslims were seen by prison
wardens and chaplains alike as striving for separate
status within the prison population based on the belief
in black racial supremacy. From the point of view of
these officials, Muslim activities in prison, especially
in proselytizing other black prisoners, amounted to
56 Ibid., 26.
"Wallace F. Caldwell, "A Survey of Attitudes
Toward Black Muslims in Prison," Journal of Human
Relations 16 (1968): 223. The v seal of Islam' is a
symbol of piety, ostensibly the result of frequent
prostrations in prayer, placing head to ground
repeatedly. Black Muslim converts are reported to have
made the mark by various means, including cigarettes and
caustic soap, to signify their newfound faith.
58Ibid.
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"agitation" which threatened to lead to outbreaks of
violence and riots. 59
Despite the Nation of Islam's separatist doctrines
and prison administrators' apprehensions, very little
evidence exists which links prison violence to Muslims'
presence.- Nevertheless in some prisons rules were
adopted which prohibited prisoners from belonging to the
Nation of Islam. Muslims "clashed with the
administrations only over restrictions on their
religious practices- when they tried to subscribe to
the Nation's newspaper, "Muhammad Speaks," obtain copies
of the Qur'an, hold meetings, meet with outside
representatives of the movement, and receive pork-free
diets. in many instances prison officials, seeing
prison Muslims as a threat to prison peace and their
legitimacy, tried to suppress Muslim activities in
prison and denied their requests to be treated as a
religious group, declaring that they are a ^sham-
religion. By the early 1960s the Muslims turned to the
judicial system to ask the courts to intervene on their
behalf, and to recognize the Nation of Islam as a bona
fide religious organization.
"Ibid.
60Irwin,
61 Irwin,
69.
68.
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Several cases from Muslim prisoners' litigation
will be examined below. First
, though, it is worth
pointing out two things. One, not all legal challenges
to prison rules herein discussed were raised by members
of the Nation of islam. A few were raised by Black
Muslims of differing orientations. While the Nation was
the largest such organization, other smaller Islamic
groups have emerged in the black American community.
The Hanafi movement, the Ansaru Allah movement, and the
Islamic Party of North America are just three such
groups which have also reached into the prison
system." Also presented here is a case raised by a
member of the Nation's antecedent which still exists,
the Moorish Science Temple movement. Together all of
these Black Muslim groups presented the courts with
essentially the same difficult issues: whether and how
to treat grievances, raised by adherents to a
provocative mix of religious and racist doctrines,
against prison administrators who refuse to grant
recognition to Muslim inmates as a legitimate religious
group.
The second noteworthy point, closely related,
regards the timeliness of the issues. The Muslims asked
the courts to depart from their v hands off policy to
See Haddad's description of these movements in "A
Century of Islam in America," 5.
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intervene in prisons, in matters conventionally under
the supervision of prison administrators, to recognize
Muslim inmates as a legitimate religious entity, and
protect these inmates from the abuses of their keepers.
By framing their grievances as a matter of ^free
exercise', the Muslim petitioners placed themselves
within the larger context of the contemporary civil
rights struggle. At this point, then, it is useful to
examine briefly the relevance of the constitution and
the definition of religion recognized by the courts when
the Muslims raised their legal claims.
Legal Treatment of Relig ion
Within the American judicial tradition the courts
have struggled to construct a broad, "functional" 63
definition of religion which does not reflect any a
priori judgment of the content of the beliefs in
question. As a result, the courts have variously
interpreted the meaning of ^religion' to bring under the
See Lawrence Tribe, American Constitutional Law(Mmeola, New York: The Foundation Press, 1978), 830.Also the Court states in Thomas v. Review Board of
Indiana Employment Security Division (450 U.S. 707,
1981): "The resolution of that question [what
constitutes religion] is not to turn upon a judicial
perception of the particular belief or practice in
question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent or comprehensible to others in order
to merit first amendment protection."
protection of the First Amendment- a variety of
religious belief systems, many of which range far beyond
any common understanding of a ^ Judeo-Christian < norm.
From the ^anti-Mormon' cases of the late nineteenth
century- to cases involving the Jehovah's Witnesses
(in general in the 1940s,," Seventh Day Adventists"
and Native Americans (both especially during the
1960s)/ 8 the Amish ( 1970s and 1980s)/ 9 and most
recently the Rastafarians , " the Krishna
64U.S. Constitution amendment I: "Conares«? «;h*nmake no law respecting an establishment of religion orprohibiting the free exercise thereof."
il9l /
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u^°lds V * Unite<* States, 98 U.S. 145 (1818)jES^SSs of rirami appiied to m°™ >S ofJesus Chri t Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136
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(18 ?°)
.
Davis v
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Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890 .e term religion' has reference to one's view or hisrelations to his Creator, and to the obligations ?hevimpose of reverence for his being and character" "ofobedience to his will" (Reynolds at 342).
66Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 f 1940 ^ • Pnv
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Prince v.
'
Rn^H ?
Sf^' 321 U ; S * 158 (1944 >'* Thomas v « ^view
707 (198 1)
lana EmPloYment Security division, 450 U.S.
68
1964) .
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Consciousness,- MOVE," and others,- the courts have
consented to review the adherents' claims to
constitutional protection. While not all claims have
been accommodated, the courts by and large have been
most willing to protect the preferred' freedom of
religious exercise when presented in cases involving
minority religious groups.
As David Rothman concludes: "When Black Muslims in
1961 pressed the cause of religious freedom in prison,
judges found the right too traditional, the request too
reasonable, and the implications of intervention
ostensibly so limited that they had to act." 74 Yet
Tn
"International Society for Krishna ConsciousnessInc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981).
1n9 , 7?f
r
^
a v
-
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d1025 (3d dr. 1981), cert, denied 456 U.S. 908 (1982)
MoVe wLTr^he . A?eeals Court rejected the claim thitO E as a religious organization because "it is notstructurally analogous to those s traditional
'
organizations that have been recognized as religionsunder the first amendment" (Africa at 1036). This
conclusion was reached after the court found that MOVEconducts no regular services, observes no religiousholidays of its own, and has nothing which passes for
scripture. r
* .u
Se
^
Geofqe C. Freeman, III, "The Misguided Searchtor the Constitutional Definition of v Religion' "
Georgetown Law Journal 71 (1983): 1519-1565, in'whichthe author cites seven cases and twelve articles thatdeal with the elusive definition of religion. See also
Note, "Soul Rebels: The Rastafarians and the Free
Exercise Clause," Georgetown Law Journal 72 (1984).
74David Rothman, "Decarcerating Prisoners and
Patients," Civil Liberties Review 1 (1973): 14-15; cited
in Jacobs, 67.
constitutional protection of Islam has not been
automatic. Muslim organizations such as the Nation of
islam have been treated as cults, or suspect and
dangerous groups, due in part to the perception that
Muslims teach racial hatred." it has been argued
before the courts, by prison administrators among
others,- that Muslim doctrine contains political
aspirations and economic goals as well as racial
prejudice, and presents a ^clear and present danger' of
imminent violence and, as such, should be suppressed in
the interest of society. Recognition of Muslims as a
bona fide religious group would present difficult
security problems for wardens who fear that such
acknowledgement
"would have a tendency to set off racial
hatred inside the walls" of prisons." More often than
not, however, the courts have found that Islam is
principally a religious faith and Muslims a religious
™™
W
*
Ha
yV°od Burns Points out, "much of thecomment upon and analysis of the Black Muslims in
7Tlt
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ln acad
?mic and Popular accounts has tended
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6 raGist asPect s of the movement" ("?he
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" A interpretation,
"
Race 5
n T?r J?f Prison administrators' point of view, seeCaldwell: 220-238, in which a random sample of seventy-one wardens and superintendents of Federal and State
correctional institutions and 142 prison chaplains isstudied. In some responses Muslims are depicted as "acult, not a religion;" "a militant organization;" and
/o?o
a le9ltimate religious denomination or group"(228) .
"Ibid.: 228.
198Canity despite any polUicai teach . ngs ^^
are protected by the ^free exercise , cla(Jse Qf ^^
Amendment
.
Judicial definitions of religion, developed at the
turn of the century for the purpose of determining when
to extend First Amendment protection, were theistic.
That is, the courts contemplated belief in a Supreme
Being as an indispensable characteristic of religion.
The view was that the term Religion' applied to any
belief system based on the recognition of a divine being
and a relation to that being which involved obligations
superior to those arising from any human relation. 78
By the middle of this century the Supreme Court began to
shift its position, moving away from theism as a
requisite feature and embracing what was, arguably, a
less Normative' definition of religion." The Court
adopted the position that religious freedom includes
"the right to maintain theories of life and death and of
the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the
orthodox faiths.
. . . [and that] it is no business of
courts to say that what is a religious practice or
activity for one group is not religion under the
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345-8 (1890);United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931).
79Freeman: 1525.
protection of the First Amendment.- In the weU.Wn Cantwell (1940, case involving Jehovah's
Witnesses, the Court also held that public officials
such as licensing authorities should not become involved
in the task of determining what is a religious cause
lest questions about equal treatment and a possible
violation of the Establishment' clause of the First
Amendment be raised. However, the Court did not make a
clean break with theism and its decisions continued to
reflect its roots in Western religious tradition. In
_
Zorach v. Hanson (1952) Justice Douglas wrote that »„e
are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being." 81
The judicial conception of religion expanded to
include doctrines that do not necessarily teach a belief
in the existence of God. The Supreme Court adopted a
position which scrutinized not the veracity of the
doctrine at issue but the nature of the adherent's
beliefs. As early as 1955 the Court held, in Witmer v.
United States, 82 that the principal issue in
87 (19°44)
ited Stat6S V
*
Ballard
'
322 U.S. 69-70, 78, 86-
81343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). What sociologists callthe civil religion'—Christian categories appropriatedby the secular world— is captured in American legalinstitutions. See Robert Bellah, The Broken Covenant:
American Civil Religion in Times of Trial (New York:Seabury Press, 1975).
82 75 S.Ct. 392 (1955)
.
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conscientious obiector ca<;p« i e ,lJ ses ls the sincerity of the
objector's beliefs, m a maj or draft-eXemptio„ case
call*d UlUied^StaMsj^eeger (1965), the Court
proposed a test for determining when a belief
constitutes a religious belief for purposes of
constitutional protection:
The test ... is whether a given belief th=t-
the^ifrof^t meanin <>ful occupies a'place^ne l e o its possessor parallel to thatfilled by the orthodox belief in God of onewho clearly qualifies for the [conscientiousobjector] exemption. 83
With this test, called the "ultimate concern" test,
there is no inquiry into the content of an individual's
beliefs. Rather, the courts are asked to focus on the
importance and place of the beliefs in the individual's
life. 84
Islam has been recognized by the courts as a
religion deserving First Amendment protection according
to both the theistic and the "ultimate concern"
standards. In Fulwood v. Clemmer
r the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia held that it is not
the function of the court to consider the
merits or fallacies of a religion or to praise
or condemn it.
. . . it is sufficient here to
say that one concept of religion calls for abelief in the existence of a supreme being
controlling the destiny of man. That concept
of religion is met by the Muslims in that theybelieve in Allah, as a supreme being and as
3380 U.S. 163 (1965) at 165-66.
4See Note, "Soul Rebels:" 1612.
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The federal district court found in this case that
islam is a theistic belief system and thus worthy of
constitutional protection. Yet there are other
instances where the courts have refused to base their
decisions on a review of islamic tenets but have
recognized Islam to be a religion because of the
function it serves in the lives of its adherents. These
cases will be reviewed below.
The Cases
Black Americans, as compared to immigrant groups,
have been active in pursuing legal claims to obtain
equal rights and access to the resources of society in
general.- The realm of prisoners' rights has been no
exception. African American Muslim inmates have been
responsible in large part for establishing prisoners'
constitutional rights to worship. 87 The responsiveness
of the courts to Muslim inmates' claims for religious
""Muslim faith is "religion' within the
constitutional provisions as to the freedom of religion"(Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F.Supp. 370 [1962] at 373).
86For a discussion of African-American Muslimslegal claims, see Oliver Jones, Jr., "The Black MuslimMovement and the American Constitutional System,"
Journal of Black Studies 13 (1983): 417-437.
87William Bennet Turner, "Establishing the Rule of
Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights
Litigation," Black Law Journal 1 (1971): 106.
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liberty has turned on a number of factors: the issue of
equality of treatment of religious groups in prisons;
the courts- reticence to reverse the decisions of prison
officials; the degree to which the inmates' challenges
would underline the fundamental interests of the state
(for example, prison security and administrative
security are often cited,; and the showing that Islam is
similar to the conventional Protestant, Catholic, and
Jewish faiths.
In many instances the courts have recognized
African American Muslim inmates as a religious group
entitled to First Amendment protection. 88 Cases
brought by Muslims have established that prisoners have
the right to assemble for religious services; 89 to
mi uW« lk?? V * Blackwe1^ 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969)(Black Muslims' religious interests recognized under the
err 1^o?
dTt); Barnett V * R°dC>erS ' 41 ° F.2d 985 (D?C?
?i ^?°P
er
u
v
*
Pate
'
38 2 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967)
nLtt
terminat
t
on
.
that beliefs of Black Muslims do notcons itute religion would require a comparative
evaluation of religions, which is beyond the powers of
ioL? S)? Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.
of ri a 1%t ' 1 ^enie^. 378 U.S. 892 (1964) (accommodationBl ck Muslim religious practices in prison settings);Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F.Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
it?* v
6
^
6
^ i°J
U - S
*
936 (1971 >'* Bryant v ' Wilkin^265 N.Y.S. 2d 995 ("Islamic group known as Muslims,followers of sect led by Elijah Muhammad constitutes a
religion'"); Banks v. Havener, 234 F.Supp. 27 (1964)("Black Muslim movement as here taught and followed is a
religion" )
.
89Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (1974);
Knuckles v. Prasse; and Walker v. Blackwell.
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consult a cleric of their faith-"r h, to possess religious
publications and to subscribe to religious
literature;- to wear unobtrusive religious symbols
such as medallions;- to have prepared a special diet
required by their religion;- and to correspond with
their spiritual leaders.
While several court decisions during the 1960s and
1970s extended civil rights protection to Muslims in
prison, judicial deference to prison officials'
authority and expertise in issues of prison management
never entirely disappeared. The struggle to define the
proper role of the federal judiciary in holding such
public institutions as prisons accountable to
constitutional principles is evident in many of the
cases discussed here. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
-Northern v. Nelson, 315 F.Supp. 687 (1970)- inthe Matter of Brown v. McGinnis, N.Y.S. 2d 497 119621
•
Finney v. Hutto, 57 L.Ed. 2d 522 (1976). '
'
v «„l?
0rth
Ki
rn v
*
Nelson
?
B^wn v. McGinnis; and Finney
p* ? 5 o^
S?' Co°Per v « Pate; Battle v. Anderson; andRowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821 (D. Neb.), aff'd.sub nom. Rowland v. Jones 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971).
"State ex rel. Tate v. Cubbage, 210 A. 2d 555 (Del.Super. Ct. 1965); and Fulwood v. Clemmer.
"The court decision in SaMarion v. McGinnis. 284
N
:
Y
;?*u
2d at 508
<
1967 )' reads in P^t: "Diet of inmates
shall be left to the discretion of the Wardens but where
reasonable and practicable and consistent with the
ability to do so, religious dietary habits should be
accommodated." See also Battle v. Anderson at 427;
Waddell v. Aldredge, 480 F.2d 1078 (1973); Long v.
Parker, 455 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1972); and Barnett v.
Rodgers
.
Fourth Circuit held in Se^v^elpw (1961) that
"maintenance of discipline in prison is an executive
function with which the judicial branch ordinarily will
not interfere.- However, the redefinition of prison
problems as ^free exercise' ones-e.g. interference with
religious freedom-cast the debate in terms of the First
Amendment, which, according to the district court in
^^^Yall^ (19 61, placed the "ordinary problems
of prison discipline
. . . into quite a different
category" with overt constitutional implications."
The courts have recognized that the state, in some
instances, may have an interest which is important
enough to outweigh the individual's interest in
religious expression. Not all burdens on religion are
unconstitutional and the state has a preeminent
obligation to promote security, order, and
rehabilitation in its penal system. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in Madvun v.
Franzen (1983), a case involving Muslim inmates, that:
"the balance between [the prisoner's] right to free
exercise and the state's interest in applying to him its
prison rules and regulations tips toward the state." 96
Moreover prison inmates, by virtue of incarceration,
94Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d at 196 (1961).
Pierce v. LaVallee, 203 F.2d 233 (1961).
Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954 (1983) at 958.
95
96
give up some of their constitutionally protected rijZ
Prisoners
"cannot expect the same freedom from
incidental infringement on the exercise
°f
• • .
religious practices that is enjoyed by those
not incarcerated." 97
This reasoning was used in Wright^j^i^ (1961)
where the Supreme Court of New York upheld Attica Prison
officials' denial of permission to a prisoner to take an
Arabic grammar, needed for the prisoner's religious
education, into the prison recreation yard. The court
held that "materials which prisoners were permitted to
take with them to [the] prison recreational yard or
elsewhere in prison was a matter of prison discipline
entrusted to the department of correction and warden of
[the] prison," and pertinent regulations did not violate
the prisoner's right to freedom of religion. 98
In Brown v. McGinn is ( 1962), where Muslim inmates
claimed the right to constitutional protection of their
religious activities, the New York Court of Appeals
noted that "freedom of exercise of religious worship in
prison is not absolute, but rather a preferred right,
which cannot interfere with laws enacted for [the]
97Ibid.
98rWright v. Wilkins, 26 Misc. 2d 1090, N.Y.S. 2d
309 (Sup. Ct. 1961)
.
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preservation, safety, and welfare of the state.
According to this ruling, the rights to religious
worship and expression are subject to reasonable rules
and regulations designed to promote disciplinary and
managerial interests of the penal system.
Similarly, in an oft-cited passage from a 1964
de°isi0n
' mwo^d^ciemmer, „hich den ied African.
American Muslim inmates access to controversial
religious literature, the court stated: "Ho romantic or
sentimental view of constitutional rights or of religion
should induce a court to interfere with the necessary
disciplinary regime established by officials."™ The
Supreme Court of California, relying on judicial
precedents set by prisoners' litigation making non-
religion First Amendment claims, held in In Re Ferc[uso|]
that "inmates of state prisons may not be allowed to
assert the usual constitutional rights guaranteed to
non-incarcerated citizens." 1" While the right to
believe is absolute, the right to act on those beliefs-
e.g. by assembling and discussing "inflammatory Muslim
doctrines in a prison situation" 102
—is not. 103
"Brown v. McGinnis at 497.
100Fulwood v. Clemmer at 370.
101In Re Ferguson, 361 P. 2d 417 (1961) at 421.
102Ibid. at 422.
When a highly preferred interest such as the free
exercise of religion is at issue, however, the courts
have made a general atte.pt to place the burden on the
state to prove a substantial governmental interest
related to the suppression of religious liberty.- In
^l^U^el^ the court held that
"prisoners lose
certain rights and privileges, but are not entirely
bereft of all civil rights or every protection of the
laW '" 105 In
New York wrote, "speculation as to the dangers inherent
in dissemination among prisoners of
beliefs
. . . of
. .
. Islamic faith
.
. . did not
warrant prison officials' alleged denial of [the] right
to exercise [the] Islamic faith." 106 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted in Brown v. Peyton
103For a discussion of the distinction between the
Cantw^?
ePtS
r free?°m t0 beli6Ve and freedom to act-seetwell v Connecticut at 296. While the Cantwell casedoes not address the issue of religious liberty inprisons it is often cited in easel that do
.Essentially it is argued that the right to practiceone's religious beliefs is subject only to regulationfor the protection of society.
c, .
104The recent Supreme Court decision in O'Lone v.Shabazz, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987), is a noteworthy
exception. The Court, Rehnquist writing, held that theappellate court erred in placing the burden on theprison officials to prove that no reasonable method
existed by which inmates' religious rights could be
accommodated without creating a bona fide securityproblem. 1
105Sewell v. Pegelow at 196.
106Brown v. McGinnis at 497.
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(1971, that « prisoner does not shed
_
_
_ p
.
rst
Amendment riqhts at Hogn the prison portals," and held that
the prisoner's desire to practice his religion could be
restricted by pris0n officials only upon "a convinci,
showing that paramount state interests so require.
In f^wood_v^Clemm^ the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia balanced the state's interest
in prison security and the Muslim inmates' First
Amendment claims in a decision which found in favor of
the prison officials in part and in favor of the Muslim
inmates in part. On the one hand, the court condoned
the prison officials' decision to discipline a Muslim
inmate for inflammatory remarks at a prayer meeting on a
baseball field where many non-Muslims were within
earshot. In doing so, the court invoked the "fighting
words" doctrine set out in Chaolinskv v. New HamBghire
(315 U.S. 568 [1942]), claiming that inflammatory words
are not protected by the First Amendment. Additionally,
the court held that the prison officials' refusal to
allow Muslim inmates to correspond with their spiritual
leader or to receive a newspaper containing a column
written by that leader was a proper exercise of prison
administrative discretion.
107iBrown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (1971). In this
case Black Muslim inmates alleged that prison officials'denial of permission to subscribe to Muhammad Speaks
,
to
order religious buttons, and to hold prayer meetings
violated their rights to free exercise of religion.
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On the other hand, the court found other
deprivations to be impermissible. The denial of rights
to wear religious medals and to conduct prayer services,
where the state not only allowed but encouraged and
supported religious services and the distribution of
medals of other religious faiths, was ascertained to be
discriminatory. Also, the disciplinary measures against
the inmate who spoke the allegedly inflammatory words
were judged to be too severe. The punishment was
determined to be excessive because it was imposed not
only for the offense but for the improper "purpose of
suppressing
... the Muslim religion in the
prison. " 108
Major Issues
Although judicial treatment of Muslim prisoners'
claims under the ^free exercise' clause has been far
from consistent, a general trend toward recognition of
these claims, when framed in the context of
discrimination, has been emerging gradually in the
courts since the 1960s. However the impact of the court
decisions on various prison religious groups has
differed, falling more harshly on Muslim inmates. A
review of the major issues of discrimination, diet,
Fulwood v. Clemmer at 379.
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grooming, and prayer will demonstrate the qualitative
differences in treatment.
.Discriminatory Treatmgnl-
In many cases the courts have had to address
allegations by Muslim inmates of religious persecution
and discriminatory treatment. islamic practices often
have been prohibited in prison settings while the
practices of other religious denominations have not.
instances of interference with religious freedom,
discriminatory treatment, and punishment inflicted as a
result of attempts to practice their religious faith"'
have sometimes been proven through the efforts of Muslim
inmates to claim their constitutional rights to free
expression and equal protection. Yet "Muslims have won
most of the opportunities for religious worship enjoyed
by members of conventional religions," 110 through
considerable struggle. When Muslim inmates have been
able to demonstrate convincingly that they have not
received the same treatment as other religious groups in
prison, the courts generally have been inclined to
protect their constitutional claims. Most courts have
ruled that suppression of religious liberty—for
instance, the prohibition of prayer meetings and other
109,See Note, "Beyond the Ken of the Courts:" 540-
544
.
noJacobs, 66.
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forms of discriminatory treatment-if applied unequally
at the expense of Muslim inmates, results in an
impermissible denial of the constitutional guarantee
contained in the First Amendment.- In Fulwood^
Clever Muslim inmates alleged, and the ^sT^rict
Court held, that the District of Columbia promoted and
underwrote the religious services and activities of
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews in its penal
institutions while denying the same rights to Muslim
inmates.
-
The court ordered prison officials to make
religious facilities available in a nondiscriminatory
manner
*
In Brown v. McGinnis, where Muslim inmates
alleged that prison authorities discriminated against
them by prohibiting Muslim religious services, the New
York Court of Appeals ordered the Commissioner of
Prisons to issue rules and regulations that would secure
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution in a
nondiscriminatory manner not severely compromising
considerations of prison security and discipline.
In Pierce v. LaVallee and Sewell v. Pegelow twofederal courts held that discriminatory treatment on thebasis of religion is prohibited by the Civil Rights Act
and cannot be justified merely for the sake of efficientprison administration. In Cooper v. Pate, the SupremeCourt held that claims of Black Muslims of religious
suppression and discrimination stated a federal cause of
action
.
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 373.
^*rlYf in S^i^^^ the Supreme Court Qf
New York held that prison rules and regulations:
e^rcTsTof^V00 *«***±v. and aenied free
SrSSllS'fjSSJS" t0 ProsP-tive members"*
In Brown v. McGirmis, an inmate of Green Haven
State Prison in New York alleged that he "is of the
Islamic faith by religious choice and profession and
seeks spiritual advice, ministration, and religious
services— from the local temple of Islam and from
its minister, Malcolm X. Further, inmate Brown charged
that prison officials discriminated against him and his
coreligionists by prohibiting religious services,
spiritual advice, and ministration from recognized
clergy of the Islamic faith. Specifically the New York
Commissioner of Correction did not allow Muslim inmates
to communicate with or be ministered to by Malcolm X
because of his criminal record. The court ruled that
the fact that the temple from which Brown sought
ministrations was headed by a person with a criminal
record did not warrant the denial of his right to
U3SaMarion v. McGinnis, 505.
114Brown v. McGinnis at 498.
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exercise the Islamic f a ;«-v, !i faith ln a manner similar to that
of inmates of other denominations.
In the landmark prisoners' rights case, Cooper v.
Pate, a Black Muslim prisoner in an Illinois state
prison brought federal charges against his prison
warden, alleging that he was being discriminated against
because he was denied permission to obtain religious
literature from the Nation of Islam, consult with
ministers of his faith, and attend Muslim religious
services and, further, was being punished because of the
warden's hostility toward the Black Muslim movement.
The counsel for the state sought to show that the
Muslims were a revolutionary movement not entitled to
s free exercise':
[The] Black Muslim movement despite itspretext of a religious facade, is an
organization that outside prison walls, hastor its object the overthrow of the white
race, and inside prison walls, has animpressive history of inciting riots and
violence. 115
The state's effort, however, was unsuccessful. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the prisoner's complaint stated
a "cause for action" in federal courts despite the lower
courts' reticence to intervene in matters of prison
discipline and regulations. When the case was remanded
to the district court for a hearing on the merits, the
Muslim inmate's request for relief was granted in part
115Cooper v. Pate at 518.
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because the court found that prison authorities mt ^
punish a prisoner or discriminate ^
of his religion. While the prison's rules regarding
receipt of religious publications were upheld by the
court on the basis that such materials were not
necessary for the practice of the inmate's religion,
rules regarding minister visitations and attendance at
religious services were applied in a discriminatory
fashion and were enjoined by the court.
In Walker v. Bj^ckwell Black Muslims sought to
extend their religious privileges in the following ways:
(1) to be served a specified restricted diet after
sunset during the month of December (observed as the
fast of Ramadan by the Nation of Islam as taught by
Elijah Muhammad); (2) to listen to the national weekly
radio broadcast of their spiritual leader; ( 3 ) to
receive the Nation of Islam's newspaper, Muhammad
Speaks; and (4) to correspond directly with Elijah
Muhammad. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
states that when claims of religious discrimination and
denial of religious liberty were at stake,
the government must show some substantial and
controlling interest which requires the
subordination or limitation of these important
constitutional rights, and which justifies
their infringement; and in the absence of such
compelling justification the government
215
Applying this rationale to the facts in this case, the
court then found that considerations of security and
administrative expense outweighed the Musli* inmates
-
claims regarding special meals, and that the omission of
Elijah Muhammad's radio broadcast from the prison radio
system was not a denial of equal protection since there
was no programming available for any religious
denomination. However, the appellate court found that
the Muslims were entitled to receive M^^affload^eaks and
to correspond with Elijah Muhammad because inmates of
other religious persuasions were permitted to receive
religious literature and correspond with their spiritual
leaders
.
The U.S. District Court, N. D. California, held in
Northern v. Nelson 1" that prison authorities were
required to pay a Muslim minister to perform religious
services in prison facilities at an hourly rate
comparable to that paid to chaplains of Catholic,
Jewish, and Protestant faiths. In Finnev v. Hutto118
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas held that Muslim inmates of an Arkansas state
116Walker v. Blackwell at 23
117315 F. Supp. 687 (1970) .
11857 L.Ed. 2d 522 (1976) .
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ng
prison were entitled to the same privileges of religious
worship as were granted to inmates of other faiths
When Arkansas prison authorities appealed they did not
contest the court decision on religious worship, but
chose to appeal only the part of the decision regard!
the treatment of Muslim inmates, inmates had alleged,
and the district court h^lH i-v^ i •e d, that solitary confinement,
daily meals of less than one thousand calories,
overcrowding, and inadequate toilet facilities Violated
the ban on cruel and unusual punishment contained in the
Eighth Amendment.
In a case rejecting a ^free exercise' claim when
combined with an equal protection claim, the Supreme
Court of California took the position that Muslim
religious practices could be prohibited. m In Re
Ferguson
,
119 Muslim inmates contended that their rights
to religious freedom had been violated by prison
officials. Unlike the Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and
Christian Science groups of Folsom State Prison, the
members of the Muslim Religious Society were not allowed
a place to worship. They were not allowed to discuss
their religious doctrines nor to possess "an adequate
amount" of their religious literature; their meetings
were disbanded, often by force; and prison visits by
their religious leaders were prohibited. The Muslim
119361 P. 2d 417 (1961)
.
mmates asked the court to intervene either to accord
the, the status of a religious group with religious
privileges equal to those allowed to other prison
religious groups, or deny religious privileges to all
prison religious groups across the board. Failing this,
the inmates asserted, they should be released from
prison so that they might practice the Islamic faith
unencumbered by discriminatory prison regulations. 12 "
The Supreme Court of California, however, held that
the Director of Corrections had not acted unreasonably
in refusing to allow Muslim convicts to pursue their
religious activities in prison. Due to the alleged
racist content of the Muslim Religious Society's
doctrine of black supremacy and its adherents' rejection
of the authority of whites, the court took the position
that Muslim activities may be prohibited:
JE-
119
!?^?? u
h
! P°tentially serious dangers tothe established prison society presented byMuslim beliefs and actions, it cannot be saidthat the present, suppressive approach by theDirector of Corrections is an abuse of hisdiscretionary power to manage our prison
system. 121
More recently, in Thompson v. Kentucky
,.
122 the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that prison
officials did not violate the v free exercise' of
120In Re Ferguson at 420.
121Ibid. at 422.
122 712 F.2d 1078 (1983) .
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religion or the equal proteotion clauses on the First
and Fourteenth Amendments by allocating six and one-half
hours of ohapel time per week to Muslim inInates while
allocating twenty-three and one-half hours per week to
Christian groups, or in failing to provide funds for a
Muslin, prison chaplain while providing for one part-time
and two full-time Christian chaplains. Although the
claims involved equality of treatment, the appellate
court found that the prison's policies were justified
because they reflected the different numbers of
Christian and Muslim inmates, and thus were not
discriminatory. Furthermore the court opinion held:
"The ^free exercise' clause guarantees a liberty
interest, a substantive right; that clause does not
insure that all sects will be treated alike in all
respects
.
" 123
Diet
Judicial responses to prisoners' deprivations with
respect to diet have dealt with the denial of inmates'
requests to be served a pork-free diet 124 and the
123Ibid. at 1081.
124For example, Moorish Science Temple of America.
Inc. v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987 (1982); Battle v. Anderson
Elam v. Anderson; Walker v. Blackwell (citing
administrative expense as the prevailing concern);
Knuckles v. Prasse; Barnett v. Rodgers; Waddell v.
Aldredge; Long v. Parker; Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393
F.2d 775 (1968). y
prisons' failure to accomodate the fast of Ramadan-
islam, like Orthodox Judaism, prohibits the consumption
of pork or pork derivatives. According to the testimony
of one Black Muslim minister, even "if our lives
depended on it ... we can't eat pork.— However,
because of the low cost of pork and pork by-products,
they are served frequently in prison dining facilities,
sometimes to the extent that abstaining inmates cannot
get adequate nourishment. Additionally, prison
regulations rarely permit inmates to keep food in their
cells, which prevents those who do not eat pork from
independently observing religious dietary restrictions.
Analogous claims made by Muslim and Jewish inmates
have resulted in dissimilar court rulings. 127 in
Moorish Science Temple
, Inc. v. Smith (1976) Muslim
inmate Smallwood-El alleged that although Jewish inmates
were provided with alternative diets consistent with
their religious beliefs, prison officials refused to
provide him with a suitable diet. The appellate court
remanded the case to the lower court for additional
125,
'For example, Cochran v. Sielaff, 405 F. Supp.
1126 (S.D. 111. 1976); Walker v. Blackwell; Barnett v.
Rodgers
.
126Barnett v. Rodgers at 998.
127<See Moorish Science Temple, Inc. v. Smith; Jihaad
v. Carlson, 410 F. Supp. 1132 (1976); United States v.
Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, aff'd sub. nom. Kahane v.
Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
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proceedings on Smallwood-El
< s claims. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in its 1975 term, upheld
Jewrsh Defense League leader Meir Kahane's claim that
the denial of kosher food in prison was a violation of
the First Amendment. The Kahan^v^arlson decision
noted that "the courts have properly recognized that
prison authorities must accommodate the rights of
prisoners to receive diets consistent with their
religious scruples,— and held that the denial of
kosher food to a Jewish inmate was not justified by an
important governmental objective and thus was
unconstitutional
.
The following year, in Jihaad v. son
,
Muslim
inmate Jihaad claimed that his religious beliefs require
him to wear a beard and that the prison's shaving
requirement violates his right to freely exercise his
religion. As punishment for his refusal to shave,
prison officials placed Jihaad in disciplinary
segregation and fed him nothing but pork sandwiches and
oranges while he was there. Since Islam prohibits the
consumption of pork, Jihaad was reduced to eating only
oranges. The same district court that had ruled in
favor of Kahane's claims in Kahane v. Carlson remanded
128iKahane v. Carlson at 495, citing Chapman v.
Kleindienst, 507 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1974) at 1251; Ross
v. Blackledge, 477 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1973); and Barnett
v. Rodger s.
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this case for an investigation of the competing
institutional and inmate interests.- The Jihaad
court held that "it is clearly within the power of
prison authorities to require appropriate attire and
grooming of prison inmates,— but also cited the
precedent set in another Muslim prisoner's case,
^}Oes_^r^: » The prisoners are not entitled to a
special dietary program. Of course they will not be
forced to eat pork products. »»» On the basis of the
facts before them, however, the court was unwilling to
declare the prison officials' decision to deny Jihaad a
Muslim diet while he was kept in disciplinary
segregation an unconstitutional deprivation.
In a case involving Rastafarian as well as Muslim
prisoners, Barnes v. Virgin Ts1*nrl g
|
i32 the federal
district court ordered prison authorities to provide the
inmates with food complying with their religious dietary
restrictions. In this decision the court relied on
Barnett v. Rodger
s
, where the D.C. Circuit Court, in
remanding the case to the lower courts to review the
merits, suggested that "a modest degree of official
129
'Jihaad v. Carlson at 1134.
130Ibid.
131 Ibid., citing Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. at
132415 F. Supp. 1218 (D.V.I. 1976).
deference to
.
. . religious obligations [was]
. .
.
constitutionally required.— A reasonable effort to
accomodate religiously sanctioned dietary needs was
urged on prison authorities but, unlike the outcome in
^^-^arlspn, was not required by the courts.
Members of the Nation of islam, while under Elijah
Muhammad's leadership, observed the fast of Ramadan
during December. »< The fast consists of restricting
the consumption of food to the period before sunrise to
after sunset. Special arrangements for the proper
celebration of the fast in prisons are rarely made.
Requests for special dining hours and foods have been
denied by prison administrators on the grounds of cost,
convenience, and security. 135
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Barnett v. Rodger s, however, was more accommodating to
Muslim inmates' claims. The court noted that the
inmates' request for one pork-free meal a day
"represents the bare minimum that jail
authorities ... are constitutionally required to do,
133Walker v. Blackwell at 23.
134However, after Muhammad's death in 1975 and the
subsequent Restoration' of the Nation of Islam, AfricanAmerican Muslims have observed Ramadan in accordance
with the world Islamic lunar calendar.
135See Cochran v. Sielaff; Elam v. Henderson, 472 F.
2d 582 (5th Cir. ) , cert, denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973);Walker v. Blackwell; and Barnett v. Rodgers.
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not only for Muslim, but indeed for a[)y group Qf
wxth religious restriotion on diet.-. In anotner
d
--i°", B^tUe^Andersofl,
. federal district^
held that there is no justification for failing to
identify foods prepared with pork in prison dining
facilities, and ordered Mediate implementation of such
a practice on behalf of Muslim inmates.'"
Grooming
Nearly all prisons have regulations concerning
inmate appearance and grooming. The justifications for
such regulations include hygiene and the fact that
beards, hair, and clothing can conceal contraband and
identity. Muslim inmates, on the other hand, have
claimed in various court cases that the enforcement of
prison regulations prohibiting facial hair and prayer
caps and robes interferes with their ^free exercise'
rights. They have testified, for instance, that their
religion requires them to "let their beards flow." 138
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, ruling
in Burgin v. Henderson
, where Muslim inmates alleged
that prison authorities were interfering with their free
exercise of religion by compelling them to shave their
facial hair, suggested that the personal appearance of a
136Barnett v. Rodgers at 1101.
137Battle v. Anderson at 402.
138Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 598 F.2d 345 (1979).
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prisoner is a legitimate concern of the state.« The
court states:
-
It may well be that the state's interest
in hygiene and identification of inmates outweighs the
prisoner's interest in growing a beard as required by
his religion,- but the evidence before the court did
not provide an adequate basis upon which to rule. m
this case the prison officials also prohibited the
wearing of prayer caps, in accordance with regulations
prohibiting hats, and the performance of prayers five
times a day because it conflicted with the prison
schedule. Rather than decide the case on the basis of
the evidence before the court, the judge remanded the
case to the district court for a factual hearing on the
state's justification for the prison regulations under
challenge as well as the sincerity of the religious
belief which required the wearing of facial hair and
prayer caps and extensive praying. m remanding the
case to the lower court, the appeals court judge
attempted to clarify a distinction he saw as important,
between the desire to wear a beard for reasons of
personal appearance versus religious reasons, and
139Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976).
140Ibid. at 504. Also, Black Muslims believed that
"it is against the nature of the creation of Allah, that
one should shave the hair off his face and thus resemble
women, defacing the nature of man" (M. Sayed Adly,
"About the Beard of Muslims 1 (sermon) (1976)," cited in
Comment, "The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated,"
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 125 (1977): 814.
225
indicated that the latter would merit constitutional
protection.
S^iaAfl-^-JisMerson has helped to guarantee the
right of a prisoner to wear a beard if done for
religious reasons. it has been cited as precedent in
several subsequent cases involving both Muslims and non-
MUSUmS
-
1
" In M-°nroe v. Bombard,-" a case citing
Surgin as precedent, the district court held that Sunni
Muslims had a constitutional right to grow beards as an
aspect of religious freedom and that no governmental
interest sufficient to overcome this had been shown. »>
Institutional requirements with respect to security and
prisoner identification could be satisfied by other
means less restrictive than a total ban on wearing
beards
.
Without scrutinizing the reasonableness of prison
shaving regulations, the Supreme Court of New York ruled
in People ex rel. Rockfiy Krueger"' that evidence of
discriminatory application of the rules in question
invalidated the requirement that a Muslim inmate shave
moo /io^ 4 eXa?ple See Wri9ht v - Raines, 457 F. Supp.1082 (1977) where Sikhs in prison filed a challenge toprison regulations that interfered with their s free
exercise' of religion.
142422 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
143Ibid. at 211.
144306 N.Y.S. 2d 359 (1969).
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off his beard. m this case, Muslin, inraate Rockey was
held in solitary confinement because of his refusal to
shave his beard on religious grounds. The jail
supervisory officer admitted in his testify that he
would not require an Orthodox Jew to shave, and that
while the Jewish inmate who did not shave would be
isolated from other prisoners, he would not be placed in
solitary confinement, since the regulation was applied
admittedly in a discriminatory manner, the court
required that the Muslim inmate be released from
solitary confinement.
In Shabazz v. Barnauskas" 5 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court had
erred in dismissing a Muslim prisoner's challenge to a
Florida state prison's ^no beard' regulation without
conducting a hearing into the plaintiff's religious
beliefs and the state's justification for its prison
regulations
.
An examination of the court records reveals that
Muslim inmates have contributed substantially to the
defense of a prisoner's right to wear facial hair for
reasons of religious belief in spite of the state's
claims of security, prisoner identification, and hygiene
interests. However, the courts have been more reluctant
to recognize Muslim prisoners' claims than the claims of
145598 F.2d 345 (1979)
.
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adherents to other faiths. while the right of African
Indians to wear their hair long has been protected
against prison regulations concerning hygiene,- and
the right of individuals who attach private religious
significance to their hair length has been
protected,- the right of Muslims to refuse to shave
off their facial hair in accordance with religious
prescriptions has not been upheld as readily. m cases
involving Muslim inmates, the courts have often conceded
that prison policies might be defensible, and have
called for further examination into both the sincerity
of beliefs of Muslim inmates and the legitimacy of the
prison regulations in question.
Prayers
Muslims are required by their faith to perform
prayers at prescribed hours five times a day. These are
accompanied by prescribed ablutions and prostration;
"without any one of these forms the prayers would be
incomplete." 148 Prison schedules sometimes interfere
146rTeterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (5th Cir.
147i
^
For example, Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652(5th Circ. 1970) (divine revelation commanded plaintiffinmate not to shave); Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1376(5th Cir. 1970) (prisoner alleged that he was "an
offspring of God and a mortal," and that moustache was agift from God). See also Comment, "The Religious Rights
of the Incarcerated," University of Pennsylvani a Law
Review 125 (1977): 812.
148Burgin v. Henderson at 501.
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with Muslim prayers. In Bethe^^^^.
where &
Muslim prisoner contended that the prison regime did not
Permit him to pray five times daily, the court held that
there was no impingement on religious liberty by the
prison schedule because it allowed ample opportunity for
prayer, although not at Islamically prescribed hours.
After a July 27, 1973, riot at the McAlester
facility of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, prison
officials imposed a total ban on group worship. m
^tle_v^Ander^pn a prisoner held in McAlester brought
suit on behalf of inmates, including Muslims, who
claimed that the ban on corporate religious services was
a violation of their First Amendment rights and was not
justified by any legitimate security concerns. The
federal district court averred that the prohibition:
appears to have had a greater impact on theMuslims, because [corporate] services providetor their only opportunity for religious
guidance. Protestants and Catholics at thepenitentiary have at least the services of a
civilian chaplain with whom individual
consultations may be arranged however brief or
unsatisfactory they may be. 150
In effect, the court suggested that the ban on gathering
for worship combined with the failure to provide a
Muslim chaplain placed a heavier burden on Muslims and
may be inherently discriminatory.
149
3 2 9 F. Supp. 796 (N.D.Ga. 1970).
150Battle v. Anderson at 419.
in a 1987 U.S. Supreme Court case, where Muslim
inmates challenged New Jersey prison policies which
prevented them from attending Friday services, the
Court, Justice Rehnguist writing for the majority, held
in part that "prison officials had acted in a reasonable
manner by precluding Islamic inmates from attending
weekly Friday religious services and prison regulations
to that effect thus did not violate the free exercise of
religion clause of the First Amendment."- 1 The Court
found that the reasonableness of the policies in
question was supported by the fact that, while some
Muslims are prevented from attending Friday services due
to work assignments, they do not deprive Muslim inmates
of all forms of religious exercise. All Muslims who
wish to may, at one time or another, participate in a
number of Muslim religious ceremonies. 152
Despite the fact that Friday prayer services are of
paramount importance to the Islamic faith, which the
Court acknowledged, it was still determined that "the
very stringent requirements as to the time at which
[Friday services] may be held may make it
extraordinarily difficult for prison officials to assure
that every Muslim prisoner is able to attend that
1510'Lone v. Shabazz, 107 S.Ct. 2400 ( 1987).
152 Ibid. at 2401-2402.
service.- since other means of religious worship
are available, the Court held that the Constitution does
not require prison officials to "sacrifice legitimate
penological objectives— to accomodate inconvenient
Muslim religious practices. Further, it was held that
prison officials need not demonstrate that the policies
in question are imperative to further such an important
interest as security, discipline, or rehabilitation, and
are not more restrictive of prisoners' constitutional
rights than is necessary to achieve prison objectives.
Even where First Amendment rights are concerned,
according to this decision the Supreme Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of prison
officials. 1" The Court essentially deferred to the
discretion of prison authorities in the execution of
their duties.
It is worth noting that in his dissent in this
case, Justice Brennan cited the brief for Imam Jamil
Abdullah Al-Amin et al., as amici curiae to illustrate
that attendance at Friday Muslim prayer services is
obligatory. 156 The Friday services, Brennan argued,
"cannot be regarded as one of several essentially
153Ibid. at 2406.
154Ibid.
155Ibid. at 2400.
156 Ibid. at 2410.
fungible religious practices.- The opportunity fcQ
Participate in other religious activities in prison doe
not compensate for the Muslims' forced absence at the
central service in Islam. Brennan compared the
situation of Muslims who were not allowed to attend
Friday services to that of a Catholic prisoner denied
the right to attend Mass on Sunday: "Few would regard
[the latter] deprivation as anything but absolute, even
if the prisoner were afforded other opportunities to
pray, to discuss the Catholic faith with others, and
even to avoid eating meat on Friday if that were a
preference.— The fact that other types of religious
worship are available in prison does not warrant the
deprivation of the opportunity to participate in the
central religious ceremony of one's faith, a time when
adherents "assert their identity as a community
covenanted to God." 159
Other Religious Issues
In Abdullah v. Kinnison, 160 inmates Abdullah and
Akbar challenged an Ohio state prison regulation
restricting prisoners' use of white Hanafi Muslim prayei
157Ibid.
158Ibid.
159-Ibid., citing Brief for Imam Jamil Abdullah Al-Amm et al., as amici curiae, at 32.
160769 F.2d 345 (1985)
.
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robes to the prison chapel only. The Muslim inmateg
asserted that under Islamic law, Hanafi Muslims should
wear white prayer robes at all times, if possible, and
must wear them while performing prayers five times a
day. 1" until November, 1977, Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility inmates of the Hanafi Muslim faith
were permitted to keep prayer robes in their cells. A
new directive restricted the use of white prayer robes
to the chapel only. Prison authorities imposed this
restriction in response to an incident in which a prison
guard took one of the white robes from a prisoner's cell
and used it to frighten another black inmate by
imitating a Ku Klux Klan member. The restriction was
thus justified as a "control mechanism" to prevent
similar incidents from occurring in the future.
Additionally the robes were described by prison
officials as a security risk, since they were loose-
fitting and could be used to conceal weapons,
contraband, and food, or to resemble civilian dress to
aid in escape. 162
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in
this case that the burden imposed on Muslim inmates'
right to v free exercise' was minimal, because the new
prison policy merely limits, and does not forbid, the
161Ibid. at 347.
162Ibid. at 346, 347, and 349.
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use o£ the Hanafi Muslims' white prayer ^ ^
that the ban on white prayer robes outside the chapel
impinges on the right to perform prayers in the
prescribed fashion outside the chapel appears to have
had no bearing on the court decision. Further, the
court accepted without question the prison officials"
assertion that their objectives in promulgating the
restrictive regulations were legitimate and justified an
abridgement of the Muslim inmates' First Amendment
rights
.
In Madyen v. FranzPn
,
a male Muslim inmate, held in
the Pontiac Correctional Center in Illinois, refused to
comply with a female security guard's order that he
submit to a limited frisk search 1" on the grounds that
the Islamic religion forbade such physical contact with
a woman other than his wife or mother. 164 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, although a
limited frisk search by a female security guard might be
incompatible with Islamic tenets, it would not
impermissibly violate a male Muslim inmate's First
Amendment right of v free exercise' since it is justified
by the important state interests in providing adequate
prison security and equal opportunity for women to serve
163rThe standard limited frisk search entails contact
along most of the body excluding the genital-anal area.
See Madyun v. Franzen at 956, n. 1 and 2.
164Ibid. at 956.
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as prison guards.- Equal opportunity for „o»e„ in
employment is cited by the oourt as a legal obligation
incumbent on the state.- To provide such opportunity
in state prisons, female guards must be able to perform
all the tasks associated with their positions, including
limited frisk searches. The court found the equal
opportunity on hiring interest to outweigh the Muslim
inmate's 'free exercise' interest.
Conclusi on
The general judicial approach has been deference to
the authority and expertise of prison administrators,
resulting often in the uncritical acceptance of stated
institutional need and apprehensions about Black Muslims
at the expense of Muslim prisoners' religious liberty.
The matter of incarceration and, more specifically, its
considerable diminution of the constitutional rights of
prisoners, complicates the issue of s free exercise'
guarantees. While many judicial decisions have
recognized prisoners' rights to religious worship and
expression, some rulings indicated that freedom of
religion may permissibly be curtailed by prison
authorities. Prisoners may suffer deprivations which
are a necessary result of confinement and the
165Ibid. at 954.
166Ibid. at 960.
institution structure of prisons. The stat<
-e can
justify an infringement on the prisoners' right to free
exercise of religion by showing that it is the least
restrictive means to attain a compelling interest. The
courts, when Activist', generally moved away from the
^hands off doctrine but they have not abandoned it.
Many decisions reviewed here marked the resurgence of
this doctrine. Courts no longer deny jurisdiction in
prison matters, or that the Constitution does not apply
to prisoners; however now they require only a showing
that prison policies are reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective before they can
justify certain deprivations on the basis of compelling
necessities of prison administration. Most often the
judicial approach has meant the refusal on the part of
the courts to substitute judicial supervision for the
expert judgment of prison officials in matters of prison
management, even when violations of constitutional
rights are at issue. They accept conclusions and
assessments made by prison officials as outweighing the
charges of interference with religious practices brought
by Muslim prisoners. Yet deference to prison officials,
who are not disinterested persons in the resolution of
prison problems, jeopardizes the v free exercise' rights
of adherents of nonconventional faiths which are
perceived to be threatening or subversive.
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The preceding court record demonstrates that
through their use of law to claim particular rights
asking the courts to intervene to resolve disputes with
prxson officials, Muslim inmates became engaged with a
political system they had condemned as a matter of
dogma. Essentially the separatist doctrines of the
Black Muslim movement eschewed integration and political
participation because such involvement was a validation
of the racially biased power structure of American
society. Yet, as a means to an end, the Black Muslims
in prison aspired to official recognition as a religious
group, with attendant rights and privileges in captive
society, so as to further their objectives in liberating
the Black Nation. Key concepts of religious liberty,
^free exercise' of religion, and minority group rights
initially enticed Muslim inmates to build a legal
strategy to gain legitimacy as a religious entity, an
already established status within the prison system.
The awareness of the availability of the courts as a
legal forum through which inmates could challenge prison
administration encouraged Muslim prisoners to
reconceptualize themselves and their situation. It
created the expectation that their grievances would be
redressed by the legal system and led many to initiate
litigation. While it is not clear that the expected
results were achieved, namely, that the courts and the
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law liberated' the Muslims from the despotic authority
of prison wardens and gave them room to disouss their
doctrines, the litigation did effectively mobilize
support for an interest <
-the prisoners' right to
religious liberty-which had previously been excluded to
Black Muslims in the allocation of values and rights in
prisons
.
Such a step must have been difficult to make, for
the use of law is not a reflex especially for those who
have run up against the criminal justice system already
and may consider themselves to be victimized,
marginalized, and/or powerless. But once the tensions
between prisoners and prison officials were framed as a
religious liberty controversy, and not simply an issue
of institutional management, then judicial intervention
on behalf of the Muslim inmates became not only possible
but necessary.
To a large degree Muslim prisoners' litigation was
meant to modify the conditions of their confinement and
to limit the absolute power of prison officials, not to
sue for release. 167 The challenge was directed at the
manner in which prison rules were used to structure
Black Muslims' lives and curtail their operations. By
asking for judicial intervention in the management of
prisons, the inmates sought not only a means to resist
167Thomas, 15-16.
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the unchecked authority of prison administrators, but,
mere importantly, to transform existing conditions. The
resort to law, then, was a form of self-help invoked by
prisoners who had changed the way they thought about
their "discontent," changes which then "politicized"
their need. 168
The result of moderate successes in litigation is
that the prisoners became attentive to the courts as
institutions which legitimately define and protect their
rights in prison, in organizing important relationships
within the captive community, with representatives of
outside organizations such as clerics, and with their
keepers. The Muslim inmates moved from total
disengagement from the political system as an ideal, to
calling upon law as a basis for their corporate rights.
Vindication of their claims against prison authorities
meant recognition of the ability of the courts and the
authority of the Constitution to do so. Prior to the
1960s the rule of law was not accessible to prisoners
who were, consequently, "left without enforceable
rights." 169 Once the courtroom became accessible, the
law worked a change in the mode of representation of the
inmate to the institutions of power— from black convict
168Scheingold, 131.
169Note, "Beyond the Ken of the Courts:" 508.
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to Black Muslim-and, ultimately, on the date's self-
identification.
Of course none of these changes transpired in a
vacuum. Already mentioned here is the confluence of the
civil rights movement and evolving race relations in the
larger society with the developing prisoners rights
movement. But coinciding with these events, and
extremely important in the redefinition of the Black
Muslim, were the momentous changes happening in the
Nation of Islam itself. Shortly after his expulsion
from the movement in 1963 for saying about the
assassination of John F. Kennedy that "the chickens have
come home to roost," Malcolm X travelled to Mecca to
perform the pilgrimage and found there "an Islam
markedly different from that preached by Elijah." 170
Reflecting on the multinational, multi-racial nature of
the brotherhood of believers he saw in Mecca, Malcolm X
reevaluated and ultimately contested the racist
doctrines of Elijah Muhammad's movement. In 1965 he was
assassinated himself, by members of the Nation of Islam,
ostensibly for his transformed religious beliefs. This
event, combined with revelations about sexual
indiscretions by Elijah Muhammad, had serious
repercussions within the Black Muslim community. Some
Haddad, "A Century of Islam in America," 4.
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Black Muslim broke away from the Nation of Islam, thus
damaging the unity of the movement.
When Elijah Muhammad died in 1975 one of his sons,
Warith Deen Muhammad, became the leader of the movement.
Under his leadership several changes were introduced
with the objective of bringing Black Muslims into the
"mainstream of Islam.— Racist doctrines were
eschewed in favor of orthodox Islamic teachings. Warith
Deen Muhammad had studied Arabic, the Qur'an and Islamic
law, and sought to ^renew' the faith in America. m
accordance with the practices of the Islamic world he
adopted Arabic-language terms for Islamic constructs;
ministers became imams, and temples became masjids or
mosques. 172 The history of the Nation of Islam was
revised so that the period of Elijah Muhammad's
leadership, characterized by doctrines of separatism and
black supremacy, became known as a necessary
transitional stage, the crucial period of the Nation's
establishment and growth when the African American was
liberated from the mentality of subjugation. The
influence of Malcolm X, who had been a close friend of
Warith Deen Muhammad, was evident in these changes. 173
171Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173Ibid.
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The name of the movement went through various
changes: from the Nation of Islam to the American
Bilalian Community, then the World Community of Islam in
the West, and the American Muslim Mission. By 1985 the
movement "was officially integrated into the general
Muslim community in the United States,""" and its
adherents are known no longer as Black Muslims, but
simply as Muslims.
Parallel changes were happening within the prison
Muslim community as well. The former militant dicta of
the organization were mitigated behind prison walls. By
1979 a survey conducted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons
indicated that while membership in Islamic groups was
growing in prisons at the close of the 1970s, the tenor
of the movement had changed. Norman A. Carlson, the
director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, said that
Muslims were "no longer considered a threat to prison
discipline" because they no longer taught racial hatred.
Moreover, he admitted that "the image of the Black
Muslims as a source of disruption was blown out of
proportion." 175 Although the Black Muslims before 1975
preached hostile rhetoric, vilifying white America, they
actually precipitated little violence.
174Ibid.
175,, Federal Prisons Giving Considerations to
Muslims," New York Times 18 November 1979, 57.
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Jacobs puts it this way:
were""dr^sef^h^M^i reli9io- grievances
and stabilizing rolcf^
11"8 a Ascent
began to be rocked bv n ^ Prisons ' which
ar,^ *a
x y ew cohorts of viol inl-nd disorganized ghetto youth. 176
e t
Few prisons hire Muslim chaplains in numbers
approaching the number of Catholic or Protestant
ministers. However, as an outcome of litigation, eight
prison chaplains who are trained as Muslim imams have
been hired to date to work in federal prisons.-
These chaplains, who serve the religious needs of the
entire inmate population regardless of affiliation, are
available to prisoners on a full-time basis. Some of
the hundreds of mosques in the United States exist
behind prison walls.
176Jacobs, 67.
Janet Rae-Dupree, "Sermons on the Island, MuslimChaplain Gives Guidance to All Faiths at Prison," Los
Angeles Times 13 December 1991, Sec. B, 1, 8.
CHAPTER 5
a*m m,
PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS PROPERTYAND THE UNITED STATES ^HATE CR^ME^^ISLATION
The number of mosques and Islamic centers in the
United States has been growing rapidly, increasing by
more than one-third in just the last five years. Over
950* mosques serve the needs of an estimated 4.6
million Muslims across the U.S.- This trend signals a
new stage in the assimilation and acculturation of the
North American Muslim community. By building mosques
Muslims are laying the foundations for their permanent
stay. Undertaken largely by first and second generation
American and Canadian Muslims, this can be seen as a
24 Januar^T99K
GrOWing F°rCe
'" ^m^Tim^ f
r,™,/
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timateS
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6 Si2e of the American Muslimpopulation vary considerably. The estimate used here isbased on Carol Stone, "Estimate of Muslims Living inAmerica," m The Muslims of America, ed. Yvonne ?Haddad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 25-38See also Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Muslims in America: A SelectBibliography,
"
The Muslin, WorlH 76, (April 1986)- 93-
and U.S. Representative Mervyn M. Dymally's remarks inCongress, House, "Religious Hate Violence TargetsIslamic Mosques." 100th Cong., 1st sess. Congressional
Record 133, no. 206 (22 December 1987), E4990T Howeverit should be noted that other estimates place the figurehigher. For instance, forty-four representatives of
various American Muslim organizations, assembled 14-16
December 1990 to discuss the Persian Gulf Crisis, statedin a letter to President Bush that American Muslims are
a significant minority of six to eight million citizens,
almost double the estimate used here (cited in Al-
Mashriq, Magazine of the Islamic Society of San
Francisco-East Bay, Jan. /Feb. 1991, 17). Also the
Boston Globe reported in "US Moslems say Crisis Distorts
Peaceful Faith" (22 September 1990) that the figure is
five million.
watershed in the thinking about identity and an active
-vestment in their future here, which is reflected in
the recent observation made by Ahmad Zaki Hammad,
president of the Islamic Society of North America: "Over
the last 30 years, the first instincts were self-
preservation and maintaining Muslim identity as much as
we could.
. . . The prevailing cUmate
Muslims now is that we cannot live in isolation.-
This study sets a framework for consideration of
the North American Muslim community's transformation
from isolation to active involvement. The purpose of
this chapter and the next is to view the setting in
which Muslims now attempt to establish a place for
themselves and their institutions in North America. The
security of the North American Muslim community and its
institutions is affected by three important factors: (1)
The immigrant status of a portion of the community,
which is generalized in the public mind to characterize
Islam as a ^foreign creed'. (2) The dramatic rise in
the incidence of ^hate crimes' 4 in the U.S. and Canada,
3Cited in "Muslims a Growing U.S. Force," LosAngeles Ttttips . '
* v Hate crime' is defined as any criminal act whichis motivated by prejudice based on race, religion,
atfectional or sexual orientation, or ethnicity. As a
result of recent legislation arson, theft, vandalism,
and any form of assault which has a bias motive is now
classified as v hate crime' with additional criminal
penalties attached.
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which often are directed against places of worship
including mosques.
( 3 ) The prevailing climate of
hostility toward Islam, fanned by American foreign
policy, which has made Muslim-bashing' and ^Arab-
bashing' a common form of discrimination and expression
of xenophobia.* The first two of these factors fit
within the general pattern of immigrant history in North
America and make the Muslim experience comprehensible
within that context. The third factor, antipathy toward
Islam, makes the situation of Muslims exceptional. 6 it
may, in fact, lead to a recurrence of nativism with the
Muslim community experiencing the legal and social
discrimination Japanese-Americans suffered during World
in *ho t • Pu-
raiS
-
Gd the sub^ct of "muslimphobia"t e west in his article in the National Reyjjw
, "TheMuslims are Coming 1 The Muslims are Cominq!"
(19 November 1990, 28-31). Rather than dispelpejorative myths about the threat Muslims and Islam
represent for the west, Pipes reaffirms deep anxietiesby arguing that "the fear of Islam has some basis in
I** tu'*' ' ; Muslim countries have the most terroristsana tne fewest democracies in the world" (29). FurtherMuslims have the highest birth rate in the world and areimmigrating in record numbers to Western Europe andNorth America where "Muslim immigrants bring with them a
chauvinism that augurs badly for their integration intothe mainstream.
. .
" (31). And, most importantly forPipes " [t]he key issue is whether the Muslims will
modernize" ( 31 )
.
6Several writers have addressed the centuries-old
enmity between the Christian West and the Muslim East.
See especially Norman Daniel, Islam and the West, the
Making of an Image (Edinburgh: University Press, I960);
and Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books,
1979). *
War II when they were interned ^ ^/-
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safety'
.
7
Mosques in North America are subject to two
parallel trends in the late twentieth century: the
domestic economic pressures that have led to the
increasing incidence of ^hate crimes'; and, on the
international front, a deepening divide between the
Western powers and the Muslim world. Consequently
mosques suffer under a Mouble burden' of vulnerability.
Along with churches and synagogues they share the costs
of vandalism, arson and bombing. Particular to mosques,
though, is the fact that they signal the presence of
what many consider a suspect and exotic faith.
Prejudice about Islam, fueled recently by such
7For example, one American Muslim exDres^oH hi<=
tnl
b
T ^t 119 ' "When the bodies of ^er?c?n
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g0ing t0 blame the Muslims" (quo^eSMuslrms a Growing U.S. Force," Los Ange]es
lolsltlt b^i maH i0n ab°Ut the M-li^^fe^^r*ap s ib e acklash, see "A Call to Prayer," Los Angeles
24 January 1991; and "Middle ELtern^F^cTa^
1991 Cnni
53
*E
U
;
S :'" Washington Post, 11 January
^ : ,
° cerns
.
about internment and other forms of war-related discrimination are reflected in "FBI QuestLeaves Many Arab-Americans Fearful," Los Angeles Times24 January 1991; "Inquiries on Arab-AmeTiciSbrFlP'Raise Concern," New York Times
r i 2 January 1991; "U.S.Moslems Say Crisis Distorts Peaceful Faith," BostonGlobe
. 22 September 1990. ~
On a related point, in the wake of the Persian Gulfwar many American Muslims are quick to point out thatbaddam Hussein did not represent Islam and that Muslimsdid not support his invasion of Kuwait. See MathisChazanov, "Mosque has a U.S. Flavor," Los Angeles Times .
25 January 1991; and al-Mashriq
.
(Dec. /Jan. 1991),(Jan. /Feb. 1991), and (Feb. /Mar. 1991).
international flashpoints as the 1979 Islamic Revolut . on
xn Iran with its attendant hostage-taking, and now the
1991 Persian Gulf War ha« 1=^ <-
'
n s led to some instances of
retaliation against Muslim institutions in North
America.. Mosgues have become the targets for animus
directed at Islam i„ general. Muslims sometimes find
themselves and their institutions misunderstood and fear
the backlash resulting from terrorism and conflagrations
abroad.
This chapter focuses on the phenomenon of ^hate
crimes', a category of criminal acts motivated by
prejudice. Then the following chapter will discuss the
politics of zoning in residential neighborhoods and how
apprehensions about Islam are expressed when
construction of a mosque is proposed. While the
emphasis lies on showing how institutional mechanisms
function in ways which produce a particular social and
political order, these chapters also demonstrate how
Muslims factor into the detailed processes of
regulation, of spatial organization, supervision and
surveillance which comparativist Timothy Mitchell posits
See, for example, "Anti-Iran Feelings Reach USMoslems," New York Times 25 November 1979, 18, whereherassment and vandalism are reported by Middle
Easterners and blacks who practice the Islamic faith inAmerica.
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An
are defining characteristics of the modern state •
important purpose is to trace the develops of a
response on the part of the affected Muslim community asthey work to build more mosques and Islamic centers
the comities in which they^ ^^
responded to the ohalie„ges they encounter. How have
thet come to particinat-o i « 4-u Processes of regulation?
in what follows an attest is made to answer these
questions and to describe the particular circumstances
of suburban life, including the thrgat ^
property and municipal Zoning ordinances, which
condition Muslims- efforts. In doing so this^^
show specifically how Muslims as religious individuals
seek to construct meaningful lives through a commitment
to regulative ends which, in effect, transform the "very
individuality of the Muslim participants involved."
Eal^ica] science Review 85 (March 1991, t ii-glr^r3*
statls
S
t
U
a
SSeS
^ """rtoomingi of sysrems" theory 'ana the
third »l?
PPr
°f-
h
*2 comParative politics and offers a
f"a*1Ve for the comparative study of state-society relatxons, based on a historical perspective.
Mit-chlTw
3 paF\ of . the analysis is indebted to
tnesis abou
p0
t
1heVn hi ?. brief "view of Foucault'st e disciplinary effects, and Mitchell'sown related point about the structural effect of
that^nhe aUthoritative' practices. Mitchell writes
the lii.it of t
pare
"
bOUndary of the state does not markn m he processes of regulation." Various
constraints^ ^T^' i'* CU?tUr6 < P-vide both thenstraints and inducements to action which are crucialto the maintenance of order in society. See Mitchellespecially 92-94; quotation on 90. See also Michel
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Sisto£isaL
_Gro«th nf
Li*e many Migrants, Muslims did not come to North
inUially t0 their faith or settle
permanently. Instead they came as
opportunity. Their primary ^ ^
economic success, and religious Qr ^^.^
were not instrumental to this pursuit. Some Muslim
rmmigrants stayed on but many returned to their home
countries. Oradually over generations
. pattern of
settles emerged and Muslims collectively bega„ to
create their own linguistic and socia l orga„izations and
places of worship. This was done primarilv f-„y to preserve
their faith by providing religious end cultural
instruction for their children whom they feared would be
absorbed into Western secularism. The emphasis of the
initial efforts was on the keeping of cultural
traditions and not necessarily on deepening the
spiritual commitment of those who were already Muslim or
son
Foucault Discipline and Punish: the Birth nf t-hQ Pric
ind^h;
^^p^ridan) (New York: Vintage Book, 1 f
1978^ and
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rY n
f ?
PT11 "my < New York: Vintage Books78); e writing of Jean Comaroff, an
A?^P? gi Tt Wh° studies h°w Europeans colonizedtrica (see Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution: ChH st- janitv. CojoHialismand Consciousness in South Africa [Chicago: UnTvjrjuyof Chicago Press, 1991]; and Jean Comaroff, Body and
!°r
r,
u ^
rit °f Resist^: the rnTture and~^7^ ^
Press 1985n
an Fe°Ple [ChiCag° ? UniversitY of Chicago
spreading the faith by gaining North
converts
.
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In recent years the objectives of i-u „ , ." u the Muslim
COm"Unity begU
"
to *«t as its constituents have
changed. Many of those who have arrived since the
^liberalization- of African and Canadian immigration
laws in the 1960s have faeen pro£essionais generauy
are better educated than the earlier Migrants. More
xmportantly, the latest arrivals have a different
orientation toward Islam, seeking a more active
religious leadership and guidance in ho„ to maintain an
Islamic lifestyle in a non-Muslim society.- Ialam is
Akbar;„
F
u^inafd°rm^sTim°sn l^l^T^T*
'
and AdairY Lu^ii s ! Isia^icIvlliel^in^he^U^
Ahmed,
"Huslim^rgaAi^ations-in^ne^nrt^^ ates^ i„
^^^^A ^versiry^N^^.
the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) currentlvthe central organization which, by 1982 evolved fr~om
Y
c£rEE£^ Ltbi'Mahdflhmed^soharacterizes the immigrants since the 1960s as "more
lltdlnl ^^^^^ted." He argues that the SuslimStu e t Association, founded in 1963, differed from
?*rii?r organizations in North America in that it
ttT* ? ISlam < rather than ethnic affiliations) ashe focal point: "Commitment to Islam overrode everyother affiliation.
. . . [Further] Islam was seen as anideology, a way of life, and a mission, and the
organization was not considered simply as a way to serve
seen as an ideology,
. complete „ay Qf^ ^ ^
™OSqUe fUnCti°nS
** * -rvice to the needs ofthe Muslim community but as a means Qf ^^^^ ^
create an ideal community. ^ ^
the point where the spiritual growth of the universal
Islamic community is of utmost importance. Thi s has
been manifested in part in an effort to build new
mosques in North America."
A comparison of the credo of the first umbrella
Muslim association formed in 1953, the Federation of
islamic Associations of the United States and Canada-
the Qur'anic injunction,
"Hold fast to the rope of God
all together and do not disperse»-to the credo of the
organization which in effect had succeeded it by 1982,
the islamic Society of North America-the Qur'anic
injunction, "You are the best community raised up for
humanity, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is
wrong»-illustrates the changing perception of the
appropriate role of Muslims and their institutions in
North American society, while the former reflects a
concern for cultural survival the latter prescribes an
the community but as a means to create an idealcommunity and serve Islam" (Ahmed, 14).
mosnnlT^H M
aS
i
*ee
"
3 S
!
:eady increase in the number ofsques and Muslim organizations since the early 1970swith the most rapid growth rate currently underway i„
III. t *
° f taencan nosgues/lslamic centers was598; oday it is over 950.
active role, promoting the Muslim community as an
exemplar. Henoe a mosque represents more than a newly-
developed sense of permanence; it also provides a basis
for oollective activity and representation to the non-
Muslim society. Apart from its priory functions of
offering religious and language instruction, regular
prayer services, and the performance of important
islamic celebrations, a mosgue creates a socio-political
structure that can facilitate group solidarity by
serving as a focal point for the Muslim community.
Further, in both a concrete, structural as well as a
conceptual sense, the mosque performs a boundary-
maintenance function, constructing a space within which
intra-communal activities take place and from which
inter-communal relations can be launched. This lends
coherence and helps to give further definition to the
community
.
Mosques also provide greater visibility, reminding
the faithful of their daily obligations according to
Islamic strictures as well as announcing the presence of
Muslims to the surrounding non-Muslim community.
Mosques are a place where Muslim leaders can mobilize
and instruct the laity regarding the responsibility of
each individual to be involved in da'wah . Da'wah . or
missionary activity, is a method of outreach to the non-
Muslim community for the purpose of converting
individuals to Islam, which is , prioriF-LJ-^ xty ot the current
lm
e more
on
activist leadership of the North American Musi
community, whether through proselytization or th
indirect approach of "lifestyle" evangelism-based
the belief that non-Muslims will convert onoe they^
observed the highly attractive lifestyle of pious
Muslims living i„ their midst-d^an relies on the
existence and proliferation of mosques." Social
contact is crucial to the establishment and growth of
islam in any environment, and mosques allow that contact
to happen. As Akbar Mohammad notes, in its formative
period it was largely "through social intercourse and
similarities in interest, especially in local areas,
which substantially account for the early spread and
reinforcement of Islam. »» a mosque is in many
respects a pivotal component in a strategy for outreach.
It provides both the focal point for what sociologists
call
-group feeling' among Muslims in a local community
"The proponents of the indirect "lifestvle"approach contend that the witness of the Muslim way of
in ^
fflc"ntlY Persuasive to win converts and is
Jho t£t, ' °" Y-
acc?Ptable method of conversion, given
religion
9
"
1
^
-2ifi?
C
^°n^ th?ro be "° c°™P^ion in. (2: 56) For discussion of different
v£'w*5!'
e?
^ HPP' ?6e Larry Allan p°ston, Islamicda wah m North America and th* dynamics of c^irTionto Islam in western societies (Ph.n ^ ee Northwester^University, 1988), especially 270-311. ^^western
15Akbar Mohammad, "Some Factors Which Promote andRestrict Islamization in America," American Journal ofIslamic Studies (August 1984), 41-43. Cited in Poston,
and a base from which t„^ ^^ ^^
relationship with the host society.
Religious eXpression is a valued aspect Qf^
mtercourse in North^ an(J ^ ^^
protected speech. a s narf ^-fP t of an adaptive strategy
Muslims have alr^H™ 4-~ready to some extent adopted the
discourse of religious libertv and « 1x o y equal protection in
North Africa to seek for „usliras the same status
wanted to other mainline religious adherents
_
°f this can be seen in the fact that Muslim have raised
statutory claims under Title VI! of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and have filed complaints of religious
discrimination in employment." As Chapter 4
demonstrates, Muslims in prison have raised •
constitutional claims to the ^free exercise- right and
equal protection." The language of legal practice has
conditioned the complexity of negotiations currently
underway between the Muslim community and the larger
society,
16See Gloria T. Beckley and Paul BursteinWeS^uKT'^ ??P-tunitT anTthe State,"
^_
esrern Political Quarterly 44 (March 1991): 185-208
^ ^S
1:^^;^'^ 811^ fil6d ^en^ercent
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rV ht ^l™* ° f Am-g^^ ed. Yvonne Yazbeck(Ne York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 136-
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This is no nore apparent than at the municipal
level where, promises of Uberty ^
notWithsta„ding , Muslims have &
their efforts to build mosques and perform
observances they have found themselves to be at odds
with their neighbors who have developed certain
Prejudices about Xslam and Muslims. This opposition has
been expressed through legal as well as extra-legal
means. A review of the rising incidence of ^hate
crimes', which can be seen as an extra-l^itra-legal means of
opposition, would be useful at this point.
Hate Crimes Leq .s1 aT-j^n
in March 1990 the oldest and largest mosque in New
England, located in Quincy, Massachusetts, a suburb of
Boston, was burned in a suspicious fire on the first
Friday of Ramadan. The fire prevented worshipers from
sharing the iftar, or breakfast meal which follows
evening prayer during the month of fasting. 18
The deliberate destruction of religious property is
a serious problem. Of all arson fires in the United
States investigated annually, nearly one-half involve
^ u
18
"^OS(3ue Damage Hinders Holy Observance," BostonGlobe
. 3 April 1990.
religious property." By the ^^ ^ ^
Congress passed legislatiQn which ^^^^
crimes, based on hatred, as a special category of crime
requrring Federal interdiction.
The problem of hate crinu* =iia me, also known as ^bias
crime', i s defined bv Concrp C =W g ess as crimes which
"manifest
Prejudice based on race, religion, affectional Qr^
orientation, or ethnicity,- According fcQ a 1987^
of hate crimes commissioned by the National Institute of
Justice (NIJ)
, words or acUons which _ ^
intimidate an individual k~x a a because of her rare v«i •c , religion,
national origin or sexual preference are "far more
serious than comparable crimes that do not involve
prejudice because they are intended to intimidate an
entire group. The fear they generate can therefore
victimize a whole class of people." 20
Organizations that monitor hate crimes- attribute
q„K
19C
???ress < House, Committee on the JudiciarvSubcommittee on Criminal Justice, Crimes AqainstT'Religions Practice Prooertv Qqtu r ^^
16 May and 1 9 June 1985.
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qin, C°TrSS ' Senate ' Con^ittee on the
q?^?i^Y ' ^committee on the Constitution, Hate Crimestatistics Act of IQftR mnfv, n - , ' aa«gs ^nm
Yg^p ioq ~r Z ? ' 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 21 June1988, 125. Records of the committee hearings include tLstudy authored by Peter Finn and Taylor McNeil of AbtAssociates, Inc., entitled "The Response of the CriminalJustice System to Bias Crime, An Explanatory Review "
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the increasing freguency and violence Qf ^ ^ ^
activity to aggravated economic condUions fche
-suiting radicalisation of ^^ ^
Portion o f these crimes." „onitoring organizafcions
report that membership i„ such groups as the Ku Klux
Kian end „eo-Na 2 i groups fluctuates in proportion to
swing, in the economy and, in regions that are
especially economically hard-pressed, they experience
increased acceptability, if not popularity."
Frustrations associated with economic decline surface
more and more frequently and, as a consequence, the
symbols of suburbia, as signs of material success, have
increasingly come under attack. Religious property has
not been exempt from this trend. So-called 'hate
crime', which can involve vandaUsm>^ ^ ^
religious property, is a growing problem."
B'rith, the Anti-Violence Proiect of tho r*„ j r •Task Force, and the SouthernXerty Law Center LeSbl£m
"Congress, House, Committee on the Judic.arv
Cgcp^^mpose cri.in.l r~nalt.^ fnr'^T^fP^
religious property iQQth Cong., 1st sess 2October 1987, 3. y ' ., z
,^\3lr id 'S 4; and " But Wh° ,s Counting? Violentcrial Incidents Add Up," Village VoiJ . l 4 July 1987,
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4Concern about the rise in violence against
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Sh^r,ty M the *ati°nal Council of Churchesw at it has reached "epidemic proportions." SeeNational Council of Churches, "They Don't All Wear
1980-86" (igSsH
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^
RaCiSt Far_Right Violence!
Vet a substantia! portion of crimes against
regions property is committed by^ ^ ^ ^identify with wnite supremacism
,
;5 Some observers
beiieve that an increasing number or these i„oidents arebeing perpetrated by individuals Qr^^
on their own. However the 19R7 mttn 1987 NIJ study suggests that
many of these offenders «,„ k„" may be encouraged by the lack of
an adequate response to the rhetoric of white
supremacists and bias crime on the part of police and
most community and national leaders. The assertion is
made that this failure to respond often reflects the
attitudes of local residents who do not want minorities
or "disliked groups" in their community."
The rising incidence of what are defined as ^hate
crimes' in the U.S. has led Congress to legislate
Federal criminal penalties for the destruction of
religious property and the obstruction of religious
practices." The first version of the bill was
introduced to the House of Representatives in January
25Ibid.
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in Marvl^nH ^ prohibitin9 h*te crime already existedy a d Pennsylvania, Illinois, Connecticut,Oklahoma and North Carolina. These states plus the LosAngeles County Human Relations Commission and the policedepartments of Chicago, New York and Boston have beencompiling data on hate crime since the early 1980s.
1985 but made specific „,reference only to churches,
synagogues and Buddhist temples as the types of
religious property the legislation was designed to
P-tect. In his testifflony before
suboommittee ^
criminal justice in Mav iqr* dn y 1985, Representative Dan
Glickman of Kansas pointed out that h.ta e crime targeted
not only synagogues and Je„ish cultural centers but
Christian churches and Buddhist temples as well
Nowhere in his testimony did Rep. Glickman mention
-sgues." This omission can be attributed in part to
the absence of reporting of statistics about crimes
against mosgues on the part of the government, the news
media, and the Muslims themselves. Until recently the
U.S. Justice Department has not compiled records of
crimes motivated specifically by hatred of religions and
religious adherents as such. These crimes have not been
differentiated from other forms of Malicious mischief-
and no systematic collection of data about them has
existed at the national level." However, the
legislation attaching particular criminal penalties to
such activity was followed by a bill that required the
"See Congress, House, Committee on the JudiciarvSubcommittee on Criminal Justice, Crimes gainstreligions practices ^ r—rrrtv WhL? >16 May and 19 June 1985 r°per y ' 99th Cong., 1st sess.,
™-„=„-
A 5?" sfcate governments and community
^ootnotes^rann^ in°idenCe °f haJ™ s - »~
Justice Department to begin recording hate^ ^ ^discrete category. >° As a result the ^
violence against mosques as well as other religious
institutions should begin to be evident .„
records
.
The hate crime bill was later revised ^
reference to mosques among the protected types of
religious property due to the testimony of
Representative Mervyn Dymally of California. Dymally
argued that the bill before the House and Senate was
"inadequate in addressing the problem in Los Angeles
County, and other parts of the United States" because
any mention of mosques was omitted. » He relied on a
Los Angeles County Conunission of Human Relations Report
of 1985 to show that about 17 percent of religiously
motivated violence in Los Angeles County was "directed
against Islamic mosques, centers or individuals of the
See Senate Bills 702 (to provide for thecollection of data about crimes motivated by racialreligious, or ethnic hatred) and 797 (to require"he
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General t0 COllect data and report annuallybout hate crimes) and 2000 (to provide for the
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10n and
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ubl i<=ation of data about crimes thata ifest prejudice based on race, religion, affectionalor sexual orientation, or ethnicity)
. One Hundredth
congress, Second Session (1988).
Dymally's remarks, Congress, House, "ReligiousHate Violence
. . . ", p. E4990.
2 6Islamic faith." 32 «p a i cnHe also referred to violence on a
national scale:
In Houston, Tx, on June 22 19RR i-ucelebration had to be Lnooi I I' the Eld al-Fitrdeath threats from aLnymous'ca^r1186 °f repeatedMuslim community at k w " against the11:30 p.m., on the slmt h° . ' Mosque. Atbombs were^hrown frofa ??uck
W
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of the mosque causinq $?0 onn •
r°u?h the window
mosques received SSatS?'£L 2 dama9es « Other
In June and Julv 1985 ^ three to <?0 -"
centers in San Francisco^ n
m°Sques and Islamic
asr.=wss.«iS =£>
In addition former Senator Abourezk testified
before the Senate Judiciary Committee considering
passage of the Hate Crime Statistics Act about the
rising incidence of anti-Arab hate crimes. m his
opinion Arab- and Muslim-Americans are being
scapegoated for events in the Middle East. Among the
evidence he presented to substantiate this was the
report of a menacing phone call on October 23, 1987, to
the Washington, D.C., office of Abourezk's organization,
the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC).
The caller said that "Arabs and Muslims are not covered
under the Constitution.
. . . Allah is a demon
spirit
.
. .
Mohammed is a false spirit." 34 This,
32Ibid.
"Ibid.
34
"Hate Crime Statistics Act," 33.
along with Dymally , s ^
Muslims and mosgues, i, now . part Qf ^ Congressionai
record.
The Hate Crime Bin was signed into ^ ^^
1988 with specific reference to mosques included as a
class of religious real property protected by the
criminal statute. m April 1990 the Hate Crime
Statistics Act became law, requiring the Justice
Department to collect and publish statistics on crimes
motivated by hate.
To date, however, reporting of such crimes and data
collection remain problematic. One of the hindrances is
a fear among those who are victimized that police and
community responses to the problem will not be adequate,
and that they will be Stigmatized' for reporting hate
crimes. Another is its novelty. Hate crime is a recent
legal construction. Arson, theft, vandalism, assault,
rape, murder and threat that manifest prejudice based on
race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity is a
newly defined category of offenses with particular
criminal penalties attached, only recently distinguished
from similar acts based on other (unexamined)
motivations. Having created a new category of crime
based on motive, the government has also to create a
method of gathering information about such crimes.
Where local incidences of such crimes were recorded only
sporadically before* r^4- •y re, a national accounting is undated.
Now law enforcement agencies mH «.and other institutions
concerned with public safety must encourage the
reporting of crimes apparently motivated by Hatred, and
-ctims of hate crimes to identify themselves as
such. 35
Since 1930 the FBI has been collecting data on a
wide variety of crimes on a nationwide basis via the
Unrform Crime Report <UCR, program. „ith the passage Qf
the hate crimes bills the* tipp ^v-~S cne UCR Program, recently
redesigned," has been called upon to identify, isolate
in U«ibS^^{ 1^fS 1Sli^^tl« guidelinespublic safety secretary said
°
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.«^istant
alleged hatecrimes, police department """^-tingto look for such >h „ { jT a rtments are instructed
of the victim^nd ^oSSSE^-^ "~
o°ccur^ ^ ^J^'^^^ known to
there'i^uffi^en? "
by bias, then the act win be classified a* ™°tivedas well as an assault it »Ti f l s a hate crime
abuse by local no. ice' 1 ,
alluS
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n to the potential for
to monitor ^osll^
t\\T*c^
reporting relatively high'numbers'of natfcrimes'
7
°Tlltmay merely indicate compliance with the
CrimeS
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law.
.
." ("Rules on v Hate Crime' Set for Police bvState," Boston Globe, 12 September 1991° p 51)!
that the^RT^n 1" Pro9ram was revised so
system idSSJl 5 "
Collect
<?
ata through a computerized
f H™ r9 approximately twenty-five categorieso crime. Implementation of the redesigned system beaanin the summer of 1988. Proponents of the HatTcrTme 9Statistics Act successfully argued that the FBI couldeasily add an additional category—hate crime—to itsdata collection instrument.
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- «— that idenUfication
of thxs type of crime is difficult ^
intentions of the perpetrators are not al„ays^
Further the causal relationship between preju<Jice ^ a
criminal act is not always poss . bie ^^^^^
Another criticism of the legislatio„ fooused on the
antioipated cost. Data collection
_ be^ ^ ^
rather imprecise estimate provided by the Generel
Accounting Office— from ™-n-y nic $2 million to $10 million
annually-weakened but failed to defeato r the measure. 37
Reporting qate rrimo .
The Community Relations Service, an agency of the
U.S. Department of Justice, recently established
.
national 800 number telephone hotline to receive reports
Views F^TSSZ. S„er6
.SS, r.SecobTe SS„ernti-Dannemeyer, and Mr. Smith to H.R 3193 ° »tU n •StatistiVc: anf mn^-u ^, ~ Hate Crimp
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fc c°nstitutes intimidation' must be
the cost tf
u»dy«ya9»?ne 8 8 in the law, and that
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fro, anyone witnessing incidences of hate crimed In
addition the agency set aside a modest sum of
approximately $ 400,000 for 1991 to fund what it calls
"collaborative efforts in the collection of data on hate
incidents and documentation of community response
models.- The money is available to organizations
which are "solely devoted to work in the area of
Prejudice and bigotry-related crime," with
"substantial
involvement of the Federal Government" in the funded
project.- E ligible organizations include those which
compile data relative to such crimes-
anTort
trainin9. to 1- enforcement officersd other community workers concerning howbest to respond to this kind of conduct-
or^6 °H tK6aCh and counseling to canities
f
ened ^ such activity; and must™conducting research related to variouscomponents of this activity. 41
The purpose of the funding is to "enhance the
results" achieved in the accounting of prejudice-related
crimes by enlisting such organizations to produce
uder TitL
C
xTr^ty ^ 1?1ti°ns Service "as establishedtle X of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U S C
individ\J?
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3Ssistance to communities 'and
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olvina disputes, disagreements, or
tn «S relatlna ^ discriminatory practiced basedo race, color, or national origin.
!
9See Federal Register 56 (June 13, 1991) for theDepartment of Justice, Community Relations Service,Notice of availability of funds re: Prejudice andBigotry Related Crimes, 27269-72; quote on 27270.
40Ibid., 27269.
41 Ibid.
a series of mat^r-i a i c, , *. • .
guidelines, videotanL ( l*t^n* curricula,
assist group^c^: S ia^n^raPhy^ etc ') thatrelations groups ntlntt t orcement, human
other civic groups and
gr°Ups
'
church and
the conununity-wide'imnfet ?
r°UpS
'
resPond to
identify] minimum colon data ^
G ln
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dent s; [and
agencies which collet data «n JT^ 8 thatuse for development of i hate lncidents canhate incidents." 3 °lnt annual rePort on
To accomplish these objectives and *6Sf to further technical
-novations in crime reporting> ^^ ^
the funded project include a series of "no less than
four workshops of groups involved in costing hate
incidents (e.g. lawyers, law enforcement, civil rights
organizations, etc., to foster the collaborative
process" and to produce the informational materials
defined above; and a national three- to four-day
conference to disseminate the materials delivered."
What the federal agency is recruiting then is the
cooperation of established monitoring groups, such as
those cited above as having produced statistics and
reports on hate violence, in reorganizing if not
inventing crime detection and community relations
models." It is in effect marshaling the existing
"Ibid., 27270.
"Ibid.
"Examples of such organizations include any of thegroups previously identified as monitoring hate
Poverrv
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S ^ • K *anwatch Project of the Southernty La Center which monitors white supremacitst
activities across the country. See footnote 24.
resources of orga„i 2ations which have shown their
expertise i„ the area of prejudice-related cri.es, in
collecting and sharing reliable crime data. Further, by
providing nominal monetary incentive the agency is
nudging their efforts in a particular direction, namely,
toward the development of more effective crime-reporting
methods and ultimately the dissemination of these
methods to other communities of interpretation in the
criminal "justice fie»lri ta « ir lcl
<
e *9- lawyers, police, civil
rights groups)
.
45
The conditions for receiving federal assistance are
stipulated in detail. Apart from the usual review
criteria applied in the evaluation of project proposals,
the means of achieving the agency's goals are also
defined (i.e. a series of workshops to produce
curricular materials and/or guidelines), the federal
government is to be "substantially involved" during the
conduct of the project and, finally, a time limit is
set. Federal commitment is limited to a maximum of
twelve months; the agency does not anticipate continuing
its involvement or support beyond the first year. 46 In
Lawyers, police, and civil rights groups, asexamples of "communities of interpretation in the
criminal justice field," are communities which do notordinarily work in concert. Conflict often arises amongthem, and their relations can be adversarial.
46See Federal Register, p. 27271, where the award
announcement stipulates that the agency will not
continue the program beyond the initial project and
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other words
, the agency plans tQ withdraw ^
once it has established the structure for ongoing
discussions about the detection of bigotry-related
violence and adequate conununity responses in mitigating
ensuing tensions.
The arrangements stipulated by the funding program
announcement~the limited time period, the "substantial
involvement" of the state, the type of materials to be
produced and the manner in which they are produced-help
to underscore the appearance that state power operates
as an exterior constraint to methods of social
organization and control. The language used implies a
dyadic relationship between the state, which exists as a
political subject or an autonomous, self-willed entity,
and society. It conveys the sense that the state is an
actor that intervenes in society, creating the image of
a binary order, of state versus society. Further the
temporary, perhaps ephemeral nature of the federal
government's involvement is stipulated in the limitation
of support to a maximum of twelve months, imparting the
sense that the state operates outside of society as a
deus ex machina.
However this is misleading; state-society relations
are more complex than that. It is more accurate to say
that the evolution of methods of v hate crimes'
budget periods, which will not exceed twelve months.
surveillance is the result of the intersection of what
might ordinarily be understood as state (i . e
. official,
authority and the efforts of private sector human rights
groups as well as Victims', whether collectively or as
individuals, in the maintenance of social order, it
provides a good example of what Timothy Mitchell
identifies as the boundary problem in conceptualizing a
state-society distinction." The appearance of a
boundary' separating state and society, Mitchell
argues, is an elusive Structural effect", more the
result of complex power relations than an actual
division or functional differentiation. For Mitchell
the state should not "be located apart from and opposed
to another entity called society," giving a two-
dimensional effect." Yet Mitchell does not go so far
as to say that there is no practical distinction at all,
that the state and private organizations operate as an
undifferentiated monolith, or together form "a single,
totalized structure of power. »" Rather he argues that
the line is uncertain and the effect of a boundary's
existence is a crucial shared construct that needs to be
explored if the nature of the modern state—i.e., its
apparent autonomy
—is to be understood. Mitchell
"See Mitchell, 77-96.
"Ibid., 95.
"Ibid., 90.
proposes not to tak<*ke the appearance of a two-dimensional
system for granted* 'ttiko j • ^_
.
" . [T ]he distinction between state and
society should
. . be i-=,i™• taken seriously, as the defining
characteristic of the modern order.- How this
distinction is maintained, arrogati„g certain functions
to society while others are seen as belonging
appropriately to the state, is the central question.
The performance of such disciplinary functions as crime
detection is a characteristic feature of the modern
state yet one which is not imposed upon society from
outside but produced--.™, reproduced-from within in the
ordinary practices of its citizens and in the shared
understandings of right and wrong, of what is
permissible and fair.
In this instance, by setting up a means to improve
police methods the funding program sponsored by the
Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of
Justice helps to create the impression that the state
stands apart from society as the author of policies on
crime detection. it is communicating a policy change-
defining acts as criminal not simply on the basis of
their outcome but also, importantly, the perpetrators'
motivation. This change is justified then in terms of
the larger impact this category of crime has on society.
The announcement reads,
50Ibid., 95.
SSjS£3££fS llTil^ the united s^*»impact of a prejudice-re^S^ • • • The
act may extend far beyond the ?
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victim. Such incidents of t " " e
the network of"human*relatTons
i
that
endan<Jering
constitutes civil soc-iet-,,
a. law enforcement r^ponL to hate^ f°rgiven, there is a comparable need forT " *community response to \i . a
community bacHolether a„I £%?lace: ° £ theso that the potenrial for future h^fhen Uincidents is diminished." te
This presents a vivid image of an imminent danger, a
crisis of law and order in terms which explicitly call
for the mobilization of society to reorganize the
Community response' to police itself more effectively
and thus prevent crime-i.e. future hate incidents-frem
happening. The need for a Uaw enforcement response--
separate and distinct from a societal response-is a
given; a similar Community response' is the desired
cutcome of the funding program. Again, the implication
of these arrangements is that the state is »a subjective
starting point »» of law enforcement and community
relations, with the ability to impose its will on
society. it suggests that the state stands apart from
the community and provides a framework for its
collective life. Moreover it enhances the apparent
power of the state.
"Federal Register
,
27269.
"Mitchell, 91.
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This produces the effect that law exists "as a sort
of abstract, formal framework, superposed above social
practices- rather than arising fro, the,, and that
what is incumbent upon society is compliance with the
law. Law is accepted as an autonomous agent which
brings order and discipline to what is considered to be
a chaotic and potentially dangerous situation. The
appearance of the state as an authoritative structure is
an elusive effect which obscures the dependent,
reciprocal nature of the power relationships that are at
the foundation of state-society relations. If, aS
Mitchell asserts, "the essense of modern politics" "
is the production and maintenance of this structure and
the illusion that the state acts autonomously, "with
coherence, agency, and subjectivity," 55 then the
political process will continually camouflage the whole
story, namely, the crediting of particular practices and
actors involved in the evolution of such policy as the
hate crimes bills. It gives the impression that the
state precedes society in generating efforts at crime
control, and imparts a certain logic to such newspaper
headlines as "Rules on v Hate Crime' Set for Police by
"Ibid., p. 94.
54Ibid., 95.
55Ibid., 90.
State.- Such processes as fchese contribute ^
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* *ere the state e*ists as
an intrinsic obiert- ar,^wijject, and masks the» roa i ~ -,une real complexity of
social practices. 57 a s MitnUnA tchell points out and this
case illustrates,
the limit of the oroc^Lf * d°SS not mark
is itself a product of thn
re9ulation. itF a t ose processes. 58
Leading individuals of the communities protected by
the hate crimes legislation supported the passage of the
bills and have been active in encouraging the reporting
of hate crimes. 5 > In a sermon delivered afc ^
Center of Southern California just two days after the
56Boston Globe
, 12 September 1991, p. 51.
"Ibid., 94.
58Ibid.
c r , mJr*U5h u^gnS Act Requiring Records on HateC i es, Washington Post, 11 January 1990? Thecomplexity of pluralism and of state-societv rll»*iis evident in the concerted action of ?£ disparage
legislation
C°n^SS
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to adoptthe'h^imes
the Hate Crimp I American Civil Liberties Union calledrn e Statistics Act the "fruit of an
unprecedented collaboration" among law enforcement
anTS' CiVil Uberties groups? and reUgious and gaynd lesbian organizations. Tim McFeeley, executive
«v
r1 d°ri°Vhe Hu-n Rights Campaign Fund? a naUonalgay an lesbian political organization, lauded the billand President Bush's support of it. Gay and lesbian
S£ wM^f » end?rsed the bil l were official guests atthe White House signing ceremony, marking the first timeat
TT
r?Pres_entatives of such groups had been invited tothe White House.
b0mbing
" Ba9hdad^ " the Persian Gulf war
, DrMaher H.thout, an Egyptian .born cardiologist ^
Prominent leader of the „uslim conmnnity ^
CaU£0rnia
'" MUSli™s ^ guard against bigotry
and abuse and to report such i„cidents as crimes
_
(1
*n addition Th^Mi^,
. quarterly ^ ^
I Slamic center of Southern California,
„ow prints a
telephone number for a Southern
Discriminate Hotline- through which people can report
incidents of discr i mi n = +- n- ^ation against Muslims. The copy
-ads, "Call
. .
. immediately u you ^ ^
become
.
victim of anti-Muslim slurs, racial attacks or
remarks. " 62
An anticipated problem of the new laws was the
potential Overbreadth' of the reporting of hate crimes
SliSSi? "v 61601 9r°UP ° f leaders or 'southernCal forn a religious communities to be granted an
visiTro Los
h
Anoe ]
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Cath0liC ^hl" 1982
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th m°Vement t0
°al1 for an end'to t„e
'
61Chazanov.
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and the use,s, to which such information^ ^
put." As a result a prov . s . on w , tten ^ ^
legislation to protect t-v^he anonymxty of the victims
reporting the crimes. However th„n , e question whether
surveillance methods constituted unfair scrutiny
(bordering on harassment, arose during the Persian^
War when the FBI contacted and questioned several
Africans of Arab descent, Arab-American organi 2ations
feared that FBI questions were perhaps a prelude to
internn-ent or deportation, m an interview with the Lo_
^U^s an Arab-A.erican M. reported an instance
of the FBI putting the hate crime lw tQ quest . onabie
use imbued with discriminatory overtones. He relates
that an FBI agent who interrogated him about his
knowledge of any "terrorists" tried to allay his
the most vo
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in°r
rth
°Ut here that
particular i« Congress objected to aGSS&r?hey1o?ced°theK5ectiLr?oerh:d " ^
leat^°?-
0f the
t
te™ orientation" to thegislation They argued that an earlier version of thebills, passed by the House durina the gffh
version*^ "°
ref
— to sexual ortentation^^^^he
McCoilum SkfsPPr
r
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d
- 5°" inSta"Ce RePs ' Dannemeyer,
exDanded'dS ^- X? and Sn,ith ar9ued that thep nded definition of protected classes, which by the
unfair wfeSS - inC^ded h°m°s<^ls, was excessive andvis a vis other affinity groups such as reliaiousgroups which were, in their estimation, properly coveredby the legislation. They also stated that "there is nomention of homosexual rights in the Constitution." SeeCongress, House, "Dissenting Views of Mr. Gekas? Mr.
H R ^ "ru ?*ie f "r - ^""^Y", and Mr. Smith to31"' "ate Crime Statistics Act-
, 100th Cong., 2ndsess., Congressional Record . 17. y '
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suddens about the line o£ questioning fay ^
that the FBI was merely ..concerned about hate^
against our people" and, presumably, „as gathering
information in the best interest of »Arab-Americans. The
FBI agent asked for names of members of the Arab-
American institute and whether this particular man was
familiar with any dissident student groups, telling him
that the FBI was "trying to get a handle on the (Arab-
American ] community .
"
64
On a related point another Arab-American contacted
by the FBI i„ connection to the Gulf War, a San Diego
city clerk named Charles Abdelnour, queried the Los
Angeles Times reporter, "Why would they [i.e. the FBI]
even want to talk to me? I „as born in Brawley," a
rural community in southern California where
Abdelnour 's father settled upon emigrating from Lebanon
in 1917. "The closest I've come to terrorism," said
Abdelnour, "is at City Council meetings when land use
matters are discussed." 65
While hate crime is a virulent offense, it is by no
means the only threat to the safe operation of mosques.
The processes of spatial organization in suburban
communities have also had their effect. Zoning and
64See "FBI Quest Leaves Many Arab-Americans
Fearful," Los Angeles Times.
65 Ibid.
land-use regulations, and the citizen^ which ^
evolved as suburban populations ^ ^ ^
significant impact on the develops and growth of
mosques during the 1980s anH i e 4-uu
'
d ls the subject of the
following chapter.
CHAPTER 6
Everyone^
S
iri^y^:ed-P-- s^e suburbs.Sra^.^,,-^^^ in
suburbs Everyons
y
?hInks
n
the«
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r
^st too*"much suburbs. The You and I v i" L
SJ2h alarm ' and lustration? £lU"
makina TEF^ll business is dedicated tog life m the suburbs more and more anHmore enjoyable. The suburbs are cr ibore and desolating disappointment "he 9suburbs are exactly what we asked for. Thesuburbs are exactly what we've got!
—Humphrey Carver, Cities in theSuburbs -
Suburbia is one of the most distinctive aspects of
North American society. The vast majority of the
American and Canadian populations now live in suburbs
and the complexity that characterizes suburban life in
the post-Second-World-War era extends further to touch
the lives of nearly everyone in society, including those
who live in congested inner cities and rural small
towns. Not only suburban residents but x outsiders' who
are kept out of most communities as a result of local
housing policies and land-use control play a significant
role in shaping the social relations that constitute
279
suburban life.* The pressures of metropolitan growth,
deluding the influx of recent immigrants, have
contributed to changing suburban patterns in North
America. Suburban policies, in turn, influence
settlement patterns in the metropolitan region at large
to such an extent that in the 1970s these policies
became the focal point of nnliHnal 4. • •P 1 0t Polltical activism designed to
promote greater racial integration.
The position of blacks in suburbia in particular
has received much attention. In the 1970s the NAACP
called the suburbs "the new civil rights battleground"
and urged blacks "to do battle in townships and villages
to lower zoning barriers and thereby create new
opportunities for [blacks] seeking housing closer to
today's jobs at prices they can afford to pay." 2
1
1
Editorials ln major metropolitan newspapers warnwell "t?-do
x
suburbanites that they must recognize "thatone-half of the nation cannot afford to build barriers
of any sort against the other half," whether in the form
ot racial discrimination, prohibitive housing costs, or
any other arrangements that benefit the wealthy and
middle-class residents of the suburbs at the expense ofthe poor. See Michael N. Danielson, "The Politics of
Exclusionary Zoning in Suburbia," Political ScienceQuarterly 91 (Spring 1976): 1-18; quotation, 2.
2Cited in Geoffrey Shields and L. Sanford Spector,
"Opening Up the Suburbs: Notes on a Movement for Social
Change," Yale Review of Law and Social Action . 2 (Summer
1972): 305. See also Danielson, 1.
Despite laws barring discrinlination
.„ ^
suburbs in large part remain segregated.'
Observers of suburbia in the United States and
Canada analyze suburban patterns of land use and sooial
class in order to understand better the connections
between "abundant land, democratic ideals and
exclusionary practices.- i„ the process they reveal
of New xork Press) 1983
,
;lini^Iile^IuSur™"^Neighborhood and Community in Forest Pa^,^ril
gfif.ffiffT^" 8 University of Tennessee Press, 1981)-Elizabeth K. Burns, "The Enduring Affluent Suburb "LaMscapg 24 (1980): 33-41; Constance Serin Sthino
" lts ElaSSj gocia] Order and T.„nH Ogg in L^T^T^(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Michael
SolSXf! fi°" '
Ihe
."°mif-5 " f ExglHsjo^ (New York-C umbia University Press, 1976); and Anthony DownsOpening Up the Suburbs: a„ Urban gjaategv for iZrU,(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). For an
7?k™^e?Tbibi in9£aph? °f ?uburban studies, see JosephZikmund II and Deborah Ellis Dennis, Suburbia: A Guideto Information Sources (Detroit: Gale Research, 1979)Examples of literature on Canadian suburbs includePeter C. Pineo, "Socioeconomic Status and the ConcentricZonal Structure of Canadian Cities," Canadian Review of
Sociology and Anthropology 25, (1988): 421-38; M.Goldberg and P. Horwood, Zoning: Its Costs and Relevancefor the 1980s (Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute, 1980);S.D. Clark, The New Urban Poor (Toronto, ON, and New
York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978); and Samuel Delbert
Clark, The Suburban Society (Toronto: University of
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something of the political, social, and economic
differing ethnic and class cultures found in
metropolitan areas including suburbia. Land-use
classifications, definitions, and standards that were
developed in order to regulate the size, quality, and
quantity of housing and commercial building available in
a particular community came under increasing scrutiny
beginning in the 1970s as concerns for "growth
management" escalated. Pro-housing advocates clashed
with environmentalists, city planners, and others who
for one reason or another wanted to preserve the quality
of suburban neighborhoods. Exclusionary politics in the
suburbs had consequences for life in the central city-
resulting in the persistence of urban poverty, de-facto
segregation, and the restriction of economic
opportunity. Much attention has been given to
discrimination in housing and education and planning
analysts have accentuated the socio-economic impact of
suburban policies on the urban poor. However, not much
has been said about the ideas behind suburban policy
decisions and we still have much to learn about social
Toronto Press, 1966).
Comparative of the U.S. and Canada is Land Rites
and Wrongs; the Management. Regulation and Use of Land
in Canada and the United States
,
ed. Elliot J. Feldman
and Michael A. Goldberg (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy, 1987).
perspectives-!.
e. shared assumptions about society's
structure-by examining anew the use of restrictive
land-use regulations as mechanisms to exclude unwanted
outsiders from the suburban community.
Ideas about the way society is and ought to be
organized are reflected in suburban zoning and land-use
decisions. Efforts to decipher the implications of
categories used to define and regulate land use
primarily have focused on the role and impact of
economic interests.
-
According to this view, land-use
and zoning decisions reflect the impact of socio-
economic forces at play in a community. They create and
rely on land-use categories and define what are believed
to be the correct relationships among them. The
putative aim in regulating land use is economic. That
is to say that a framework of categories is created and
maintained by suburban city councils and planning boards
in order to protect property values and preserve
economic relationships that at least implicitly are
recognized as being valid and vital to the community's
well-being. It has been a long-standing principle in
the United States that zoning should be used to protect
and preserve property values. 6 The nature of one
5See Perin.
David E. Dowall, The Suburban Squeeze, Land
Conversion and Regulation in the San Francisco Bay Area(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
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category affects the potential land-use value-and thus
the market value-of land that is located nearby.
However, a land-use classification system which
defines zoning districts in terms of their permitted and
forbidden buildings and activities' attaches differing
values to the land it regulates and, in the process, to
those who use the land. m this way the classification
system creates not just economic categories but social
categories, and it regulates not just economic but
social relationships as well. Exclusionary policies
about land use in the suburbs are not motivated strictly
by economic interests but by extra-rational motivations
such as racial prejudice, the fear of crime, and the
desire to maintain community character, including
appearance. Suburban decisions to restrict or exclude
altogether certain land uses (e.g. multifamily
dwellings, mobile homes) in effect excludes certain
people (e.g. low- and moderate-income people) from the
community and reinforces an economically and racially
segregated society. Such decisions reflect conceptions
about the desirability of potential land users and the
appropriate relationships among them. They are the
Press, 1984), 31; cf. Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning
Game. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966).
7Perin, ix.
Product of the penetration of wider social forces into
the particular realm of zoning.
Suburban life in North America has a number of
visible symbols, such as the single-family detached
house surrounded by lawn, the commuter car, and the
freeway system.
-
Readily recognized among these
symbols are the church and, increasingly with the large-
scale suburbanization of Jews beginning in the 1950s,
the synagogue.' To the suburban American public,
however, mosques symbolize
^outsiderhood < at two levels.
Mosques represent the presence of Islam, a foreign
creed' that is perceived to be inherently violent and at
odds with the Judeo-Christian tradition; and the
proximity of immigrants, a class whose transition to the
suburbs traditionally has been resisted. Immigrants are
Pattprnc f / O'Connor, "Sorting Out the Suburbs:e s of Land Use, Class and Culture," AmericanQuarterly (1984): 382. ' :Lca
.
i
According to Arthur Hertzberg, former president ofthe American Jewish Congress, "Between 1945 and 1965about a third of all American Jews left the big cities
?950s
S
™h^ th*mselves in the suburbs. . . . m the1 and 1960s, at least a billion dollars were raisedand spent building a thousand new synagogue buildings.It was the largest building boom in the history ofAmerican Jews" ( The Jews in America: Four Centuries of
tn^neaSY Encounter [New York: Simon and Schuster,1990], 321-333; quote at 321).
See also Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum,
Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier. A Study ofGroup Survival in the Open Society
, 2nd. ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979 [1st. ed. 1967]).
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"interstitial,- at least at the initial stages,
meaning that they are caughfc ^ ^ ^^
city and the suburban outskirts. Migrants typically
arrive and initially settle in large port-of-entry
cities but tend to nove Op' and out of the inner city
and into the more affluent suburb as their incon.es
increase and they acquire the means to escape city
problems-e.g. gangs, smog, and congestion." Yet the
impulse on the part of suburbanites is to confine these
Outsiders' to the inner city because they are viewed as
not being One of us. - Institutions of immigrant
groups, such as mosques, present a visible sign of the
proximity and material success of Outsiders' and are
often perceived to threaten the character, if not the
security, of the suburb.
Victims of Oate crimes'—including vandalism,
arson, and bombing of religious property—now would
appear to have legal recourse by virtue of the "hate
10Ibid., 203.
However new immigrant patterns signal a shift inthe distribution of recent arrivals to North America.Census figures show that instead of settling in urban
enclaves— "the traditional barrios, ghettos, andChinatowns"—many immigrants now choose to bypass thebig port-of-entry cities altogether and, upon arrival,
settle in small towns and suburbs. This new trend has
resulted in suburban growth due to direct immigration as
well as to immigrant urban dwellers who have also sought
refuge in smaller communities. See "More Newcomers
Bypass Big Cities," Christian Science Monitor . 5 March
1991, p. 6.
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crime - laws disaussed in Chapter 5
victimized by more subtle forms of discrimination such
as exclusionary praotioes in zoning, however
, have a
more difficult obstacle to overcome, what follows
focuses on the politics of zoning i„ residential
neighborhoods where Muslims propose to buUd places rf
worship, and how apprehensions about Islam are expressed
when construction of a mosque is proposed.
Zoning
From 1926, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
use of municipal zoning as a legitimate police power',
cities and towns have relied on zoning and land use
regulations, in conjunction with a general plan, to
guide development.- An examination of the history of
land use regulations shows that, over time, they have
become increasingly complicated, rigorous and demanding,
requiring environmental impact assessment, permits, and
review procedures to protect neighborhoods from the
negative impact of encroaching urban sprawl. As David
r-i^/
2
?°Wa11
'-,
3
; J
he P°lice P°wer gives the state the
™ i o regulatejfor the common good, protecting thegeneral health and safety of the community under itsjurisdiction. In terms of zoning practices residential,industrial, and commercial properties are generally
separated and confined to their respective areas for the
sake of the common good (e.g. noise abatement). Modern
zoning practices specify not only permissible uses and
minimum lot sizes, but also dimensions—the length and
width of the lot, setback limits, and building height.See Ibid., 77.
Dow.ll points out in his study of land conversion and
regulation in the San Franoisoo Bay area, growth
manager techniques beginning chiefly in the 1970s
have effectively curtailed suburban growth, ostensibly
to minimize traffic congestion, protect the natural
environment, and avoid overtaxing the existing
infrastructure. They have also helped to keep down
local taxes. 13
While in the early post-Second World War period,
suburbanites were generally passive about accepting new
development, or even in some cases aggressively pursued
it, by the 1970s they had adopted a different attitude.
They took on an active and vocal role in local planning
to advocate limited growth." This can be seen as part
of the ^gangplank' syndrome, which in effect closed off
opportunities to build as a way of preserving the
quality of life that local residents felt was
jeopardized by rapid development. As concerns for
environmental protection intensified and land use
controls became more complex, local citizen groups (from
13lt>id *' 11 * Neitner 1 nor Dowall wish to arguethat the development of regulations sensitive to the
ecology of a neighborhood is "entirely pernicious" (4).However, these controls affect residential development
more than industrial and commercial, and are often
relaxed in the face of pressing economic conditions such
as high housing prices. Thus to suggest that land use
controls exist solely for the benefit of the natural
environment is overly simplistic.
14 Ibid., 31.
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small neighborhood associations to broadly based
environmentalist ooalitions, forced and beoame assertive
xn local decision making. Pressure groups formed
because it „as felt that city ^
commissions represented a ^progrowth- position and that
that tendency had to be countered. Consequently,
suburban citizen groups have become familiar with and
influential in shaping city regulations. They have had
a say in determining the rate and type of development
permitted within the communities in which they live.
Suburbanites have used such devices as restrictive
zoning, traffic planning, and architectural review
boards to establish and maintain a comfortable community
for themselves through the instrumentality of local
government
.
In terms of religious institutions, many cities and
towns have sought to exclude churches and other
religious property from residential neighborhoods by
law, arguing that from a traffic and safety standpoint
such property is unsuited or harmful to the
neighborhood. Where such regulations have been
challenged in court, judicial opinions have varied.
Many courts have found that exclusion is an infringement
on the freedom to worship. Others have sought to
"balance' interests, arguing that if exclusion is an
undue infringement—in other words, if exclusion
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overburdens reliqion to9 11 0 a d6gree exceeding the "general
welfares-then it should not be allowed.- The
prevailing standard has developed that zoning
regulations which effectively ban churches from certain
neighborhoods are constitutional provided that a means
of requesting exemption, exists. As land.use regulation
has evolved many cities and towns have paid attention to
the assorted and sometimes divergent court rulings on
this issue and have allowed churches special or
conditional exemptions from governing ordinances in
residential neighborhoods on an ad hoc basis.
In some places zoning ordinances have also
regulated land use on the basis of aesthetic
considerations, architectural appeal, and functions on
the theory that protection of property values is a
legitimate interest of the state. Again many appellate
courts have upheld this. m Berman v. Parker (1954) the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the public welfare was
defined broadly enough to include aesthetics. 16 The
Missouri Supreme Judicial Court in State ex. rP 1.
Stovanoff v. Berkeley (1970) upheld an ordinance in a
St. Louis suburb which required that a review board
approve plans for structures in order to promote
15See for example, State ex. rel. Lake Drive
?o?
tJ
!-?L?
nUrch V
-
Bayside, 12 Wis. 2d 585, 108 N.W. 2dZoo ( 1961 ) .
16 348 US 98 (1954)
.
conformity to "Minimal architectural standards" and
prevent "unsightly, grotesque and unsuitable structures"
on the basis that it promoted the general welfare and
protected property values.- r„ 1963 a leading CQurt
case in New York, People^stoyer
, held that land-use
regulations based on aesthetic considerations alone
performed a valid police power' objective."
Architectural review boards have become an authoritative
part of the zoning approval procedures.
Efforts to block all but the most desirable
developments are nothing new, and the citizen's role in
local planning is predicated on the individual's private
property rights." This principle, along with the fact
17458 S.W. 2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
191 NF
P
?H
P
979
V
*
St°V
f
r
J.
12
-
NY 2d 462
'
240 NYS 2d 734,i*i we 2d 272, appeal dismissed 375 US 42 (1963)
on ?h^»
nt
+t
S
?
S have
n
cited Stover as the "leading case-t e aesthetics only" rule. See Cromwell v.
*1967?!'
NY 2d 263
'
279 NYS 2d 22
'
225 NE 2d 749
individual's property rights in the Americancontext are seen as constitutionally protected. Thus
t
S 5 constitutional guarantee that no individualshall be deprived of property without due process oflaw, a tradition which serves in part as a basis for
citizens' participation in community planning anddevelopment. The claim that certain types ofdevelopment might adversely effect the value of privateproperty gives citizens groups some authority indeciding property questions such as zoning and land use.For a brief discussion of American property rights andhow they differ from the Canadian conception of property
rights, see John Brigham, "The ^Giving Issue': A View of
Land, Property Rights and Industrial Development in
Maine and Nova Scotia" in Feldman and Goldberg, 247-268
especially 253.
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that citizen groups and architectural review boards are
now an authoritative part of the municipal land use
decisionmaking process, are factors which affect the
character of the Muslim experiences as they build new
"-osques in the suburbs in which they work and live.
Those experiences will be examined below.
Mosques
Muslims have tried to build new mosques and to
convert existing property into places of worship
increasingly throughout the 1980s and expect that they
will continue to do so. In many places they have
encountered indifference at best and, at worst,
hostility from non-Muslim residents. For example, in
December 1980 in Burnaby, a suburb of Vancouver, British
Columbia, "300 residents
. . . booed and stamped their
feet at the very thought of allowing a Moslem mosque in
their neighborhood."- The ostensible objection to the
planned $500 million mosque was "traffic congestion,"
although a Burnaby planner said that such an objection
was "unfounded."" Many residents said that "the
. „
"Edmonton Journal, 18 December 1980, p. A9: cited
Th» m ,
AbU
;
Laban
:
"The Ca"adian Muslim CoLunity" ine Muslim Community in North a.P rir-a
| ed . Earle H.H'?fa 2bU 7i:ab!n ' and Re9ula B - Qureshi (Edmonton:University of Alberta Press), 91-2, n. 24.
!1 Ibid.
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mosque would affect their quality of life."" with
regard to zoning regulations, the president of the North
Central Burnaby Retailers Association "said a mosque is
not a church and could not be built as it did not fall
within the guidelines of the municipal bylaw." 23
This chapter examines the Muslims' experiences in
applying for the necessary approvals to build new
mosques. What follows is drawn largely from data
collected through interviews with people in places where
Muslims have successfully negotiated the approval
process. Their experiences show that the project of
building a mosque also entails a simultaneous process of
politicization. In other words, as Muslims proceeded
through the stages of organization, land purchase, and
public hearings, they were drawn into the local
practices governing property. Further, their chances
for success improved as they became familiar with the
social conventions and administrative procedures that
are important structural determinants of municipal
politics
.
Rochester, New York
22Ibid
"Ibid
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In the Rochester, New York area the Muslim
community decided in the early 1980s to build a new
mosque to meet the growing needs of Muslims in the
greater metropolitan area.- Two mosques already
existed, both in older properties converted into
mosques. One serves primarily the Turkish community in
the Rochester area and the other-known as the "local
masjid," 25 located in downtown Rochester—serves
primarily African-Americans. However, there are no firm
rules about ethnic divisions. Anyone can attend the two
mosques, but in practice they serve primarily these two
respective communities.
The proposed new mosque was planned primarily by
Pakistani Muslims in the Rochester area. Since the
early 1970s the Pakistani community in the Rochester
metropolitan area has grown steadily so that now the
community is comprised of over one hundred families.
However the new mosque was not built to serve the
Pakistani Muslim community only. it was intended to
bridge ethnic cleavages and to provide the foundation
for an overarching Islamic identity. The envisioned
constituency included Muslims of all national origins.
24'
'Information about the mosque and Islamic center
of Rochester is based on an interview with Professor M
on 16 March 1991.
25;sMasjid is one of the Arabic words, used in the
United States and Canada, which means mosque.
This is in keeping with the recent rise in Islamic
consciousness and the tenet of Islamic ideology which
stresses the universal nature of the religion. The
final selection of thp cs-i+- Q *r e site for the new mosque was, in
fact, determined in part by its convenience to the
various Muslim communities scattered throughout the
metropolitan area and the hope that this location would
accommodate as many Muslims as possible. Its present
location is roughly equidistant from the Pakistani,
Turkish, and African-American neighborhoods, and is
accessible by bus from the downtown area. It is close
to a major highway, giving ease of access to the Muslim
students at the local university and community college.
The new mosque was not meant to supplant the other
mosques in the Rochester area but to augment them as the
demand for religious and cultural services exceeded the
existing resources. This is clear in the words of a
founder of the new mosque, we "can't have [only] one
masjid in a metropolitan area." 26
The foundation stone for the mosque/Islamic center,
located in Brighton, a suburb on the East side of
Rochester, was laid in 1983. The first prayers were
said in the unfinished building in 1984 and construction
was completed in 1985. However, the process of
selecting the site and getting the necessary building
"Conversation with Professor M. , on 16 March 1991.
permits was a lengthy one. Two unsuccessful attempts
were made before the Brighton location was picked. The
first attempt was in Henrietta, on a three-acre parcel
on the western side of the Rochester Institute of
Technology. The Muslims bought the land outright and
then began to make construction plans. According to
Professor M.
,
a founding member of the Islamic center
who was involved in the conception and implementation of
the mosque project, the neighbors immediately expressed
their opposition to the proposed mosque. They "were not
comfortable" with the idea of having this type of
religious property (as opposed to a church or synagogue)
in the vicinity; they "didn't like us there."
"Indifference and hostile" sentiments were conveyed in
"unofficial ways."" At this site the mosque project
never reached the stage of a public hearing before the
city planning commission. Feeling unwelcome, the
Muslims eventually decided to sell the property in
Henrietta and try elsewhere.
The decision to abandon the Henrietta location was
based not simply on the neighbors' opposition, but on
internal dissent within the Muslim community as well.
Some of the African-American Muslims reportedly did not
support the plans to build in Henrietta because the site
was not convenient for those who would be traveling by
"Ibid.
bus fron, downtown Rochester
. The clQsest ^
the proposed site was three-quarters or a mile away.
Professor M. admitted that he *i ^ un also had opposed the
Proposed site in Henrietta on the grounds that it wouid
take too mUch time and effort to allay the neighbors-
fears about the roosgue and thereby gain comraUnity
acceptance. He fe]t- t-h=>4- t-i.« t lt at there was no guarantee that
such efforts would succeed. He explained his position
by saying,
- l8lanl neans sublnissio[if ^ ^
God's pleasure." Therefore from his perspective it
would have been futile for the Muslin* to direct their
energies to gain the understanding of an indifferent
neighborhood. Rather they should accept the
inhospitable reception as a sign of God's will and look
to build elsewhere.
The second attempt was across town on the northwest
side of Rochester in a "blue collar" suburb. Professor
M. characterizes this attempt as having benefited from
the Henrietta experience. First, the Muslims did not
buy the land outright and then try to gain zoning
approval and building permits. Instead, they made a
purchase offer pending zoning and construction
approvals. The parcel was next door to a Catholic
church, so that it would appear that the question of
zoning for religious land use was already settled. All
that was necessary were approvals from the city planning
Mission, the architectural revie„^ ^
other forums with the authority of review."
However, once again „eighbors had reservations
about the proposed mosque. The congregation of the
ohurch adjacent to the property resisted the pians for a
rcosgue and the church offioiais initially refused to
grant the necessary right of way over the easement
connecting the two properties. The Muslims saw this as
unfair, for as Professor M. understands it, the church
had already granted the right of way for construction on
the lot before there was a purchaser for the property.
Once it became clear that the Muslims intended to buy
the lot and build a mosque there, however, the church
refused to cede the right of way. At . public hearing
to review the applioation for site review the planning
commission refused to force the issue by taking the
easement at the Muslim buyers' appeal.
The planning commission's denial of the right of
way is not surprising given what David Dowall observed
in California: city planners and elected officials
reflect the interests of their constituents or they risk
losing their jobs. "When there is strong and vocal
opposition to a residential project at planning
commission or city council hearings, local officials see
"Each municipality has its own procedures. Ingeneral the proposed construction must fit within thegeneral plan of the city and not violate any bylaws.
298
^tle choice but to deny a permit .„ „^
« applied to the case at hand, the resistance of the
Catholic church to cede the right of way for
construction of a mosque on the adjacent lot would carry
considerable weight. The existence of a powerful public
merest in opposition to the Muslim plans was in fact
persuasive in determining the outcome.
The sense that the neighbors were hostile or
indifferent to Islam was manifested in this second
attempt to build a new mosque in the Rochester area.
There was a "lack of reception" or a "lack of at home
feeling" perceived on the part of the Muslims. The
purchase offer for the land was "on hold" for
approximately one year while the Muslim buyers made
attempts to win the necessary approvals. m the
meantime they looked for other possible sites where they
might find "a more welcome reception." 30
An alternative site was found in Brighton, an
upper-middle class suburb on the east side of Rochester.
Here the Muslims were pleasantly surprised by the warm
reception they received and the level of friendly
interest and support especially at town board meetings.
Once the Muslims made a purchase offer pending zoning
approval, the city sent out a notice announcing a zoning
29Dowall, 32.
"Conversation with Professor M. , on 16 March 1991.
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board hearing to consider their application for site
approval. Aproximately 20 to 25 people from the
neighborhood responded to the notice by attending the
hearing. In this initial hearing for site review, the
neighbors and city officials asked, "will you have the
call to prayer?" According to the architectural
sketches of the proposed mosque, a minaret was planned
for construction without a set of stairs visible. m
effect they were
-policing' the quality of the
residential neighborhood by voicing concern over the
possible noise level introduced by a mosque and the
prayer call. The Muslims responded by explaining that
while the function of the minaret in mosques in the
Middle East is to announce the call to prayer, this
would not be the case in Brighton, N. Y. According to
Professor M. the nearest Muslim household was over three
miles away so the call to prayer probably would not be
heard by Muslims. The minaret was simply a part of the
design because it is an integral part of Islamic
architecture and represents the purpose of a mosque,
which is to remind the faithful of their duty to pray to
God. It is a part of every mosque. 31
Approvals of the building plans for the mosque
proceeded without many problems. The entire process
took between five to six months. The general feeling
31 Ibid.
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the Muslim had of Brighton residents was that they
welcomed the addition of a mosque. Professor M.
attributes this to two factors:
,1, The Muslims „ere
well prepared to answer questions as a result of their
earlier attempts to find a site . They^^
experienced, knew what would be required of them, and
had developed architectural sketches and other
supporting materials.
,2, The fact that Brighton is an
upper-middle class professional city. Professor H. felt
that there was a "meeting of the minds" between the
Muslims who were planning the mosque, many of whom are
professionals, and the local community. Pakistanis in
the Rochester area are in large part middle to upper-
middle class professionals, physicians, engineers,
scientists, professors, pharmacists and businesspersons.
in essence a class-based explanation is given: educated
people are more tolerant as a function of their
education and knowledge. This is true not simply of the
Rochester area, in Professor M.'s words, but "true of
America—indifference [toward Muslims] is based on
ignorance." Even highly educated people are subject to
ignorance and misinformation, though, because, in the
words of Professor M. ( they are "hostage to prejudiced
writings on Islam." In his opinion this is slowly
changing, mainly because people are curious to know more
about Islam and are seeking to educate themselves on the
subject, and the available materials arP ie improving. As
a co„squence of the process Qf seeking approvais ^
burld a new mosgue and the greater visibility it gave to
the local Muslin, community, members of the Islamic
Center of Rochester have been invited to speak at a
growing number of public forums on Islamic topics. They
have addressed a number of church congregations and high
school classes over the last three years or so, thus
performing the function of informing the public about
Islam.
Fremont, California
Fremont is located in the East Bay-San Francisco
area in Alameda County. it is a growing suburb of over
150,000 residents which has grown tremendously since the
1960s as major transportation corridors in the San
Francisco and San Jose area have opened up. Residents
of Fremont can commute easily to Silicon Valley, San
Francisco and Oakland.
The process of rapid growth and urbanization of the
East Bay region and Fremont in particular have shaped
land use policies. Increasing awareness of the
environmental impact of urban sprawl—traffic
congestion, air pollution, and dwindling open space—has
led to efforts to limit residential growth which were
increasingly effective during the 1970s. Concerns for
neighborhood and environmental quaUty have meant that
local citizen groups have become much more influential
« taping land use policy.
„ith the expanding
population of Fremont in the 19 70s, Fremont city
planners reported "risinn a ff QnjSl g ttendance at public meetings
where residential projects are discussed, and new
homeowner and citizen groups continue to spring up.-,
The project approval process in Fremont involves
five separate steps, several reviewing agencies, and
numerous submittals of plans. 33 The steps
-zoning, preliminary site review, precise development
Plan review, preliminary approval and final permit
approval. The average length of the entire project
approval process ranges from six to eighteen months.
Those who plan construction must appear before the city
planning commission, the SPARE committee (city Site
Planning Architectural Review Board), and the city
council. Any of these review boards may stipulate a
design change which the others in earlier reviews did
not require. The change then means that the party
seeking approval must return to each review board to
gain approval of the altered plan, lengthening the
approval process. Once the proposal reaches the final
public hearing, neighborhood groups could ultimately
32Dowall, 47.
33Ibid., 79.
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undermine the entire proiect if +uj they voice opposition to
the plan.
in 1985 the islamic Society of East Bay-San
Francisco bought a 2.2 acre parcel of land at public
auction with the intention of building a Grand Masjid
(mosque and Islamic center estimated to cost $1.2
million).- There were two adjacent parcels offered at
auction which were zoned for religious property. Many
church groups bid on the property and the city of
Fremont sold the parcels to the Islamic Society and the
United Methodist Church. At the time of purchase the
land was already zoned for religious use, so the Islamic
Society did not have to go through the process of
rezoning before they proceeded to plan construction of a
mosque. The problems came later, according to Rifaat, a
key member of the mosque planning committee, from "the
shock wave in the neighborhood" once residents realized
that the Islamic Society had bought one of the lots. 35
Rifaat felt that "the reaction [was] shocking in the
neighborhood." To him the sentiment seemed to be
disbelief— "Where are the Muslims coming from?"—when
"Information about the Grand Masjid and IslamicCenter project of the Islamic Society of East Bay-SanFrancisco, located in Fremont, is taken from aninterview with Rifaat, a founding member of the project
on 30 March 1991 and issues of Al-Mashria . the monthlypublication of the Islamic Society of East Bay-San
Francisco.
"Conversation with Rifaat, on 30 March 1991.
the Muslim had been Uving in premonfc
were "very integral to the c_. ty _„ ^
professionals live in Fremont and the surrQund . . ng
crties and work in silicon VaUey ^
Plans to build the mosque gave the Musli™ sudden
visibility and, as a consequence, their presence was
felt and recogni Zed by the non-Muslim community."
Once the members of the Islamic Society realized
that the residents were somewhat alarmed by their plans
for a mosque, they organized a meeting with the
homeowners association in Fremont. Ten to fifteen
members of the association and about seven or eight
members of the Islamic Society attended the first
meeting, where everyone tried to get to know each other
and the Muslims answered general questions about Islam
and specific questions about the mosque project. In
sum, Rifaat expressed this observation: "People are
uneducated about Islam-and they showed an ignorance
about their own neighborhood" as well because they had
been unaware of the presence of Muslims in their
city."
The Islamic Society worked closely with the
architectural review board (SPARB) to make sure that the
size and height of the dome and minaret were within the
"Ibid.
"Ibid.
city's statutory guidelines %ay y la imes. The members of the SPARB
revie
"
board
'
in Rifaat ' s «*. - Fremont residents
,not city officii. They include an &
landscape architect, and an engineer among others. At
the first meeting of the review board the discussion
centered on fslamic architecture. Board members said
that the proposed mosque "looked like a cathedral" due
to its dome and minaret. Their conception of religious
architecture led them to prefer a structure that was
more modest and resembled a church. The Muslims
explained that "a mosgue cannot look like a church" and
that there were certain details that were integral to
the design of a mosque, such as the minaret. After two
or three more meetings the architectural review board
accepted the Muslims' explanations for the architectural
design. 38
In the process the review board members and the
members of the Islamic Society became better acquainted.
According to Rifaat it was a process of getting to know
each other better, and the successful completion of the
reviews was the product of better information. The
Muslims also established good relations with the city
mayor, the city council, and the review board in the
approval process. Like the residents the city officials
initially seemed to be unaware of the Muslims' presence
38Ibid.
306in Fremont before the purchase of th. land ^ ^
Proposed mosque, but Rifaat ^^^ ^
a "broader view than the residents from the outset
Therr support, which came onoe the publio officiais
understood the nature of the project, was oruoiai at the
public hearings for approval of the preliminary plans
which took only about fifteen minutes. Ml objection!
to the mosque, from the city and residents, were
anticipated and handled beforehand.
The preliminary approval process was "a task in
educating not only the City staff, but also the public"
about the functions of a raosque and the intention of the
prospective worshipers." Representatives of the
islamic Society tried to allay potential apprehensions
about the mosque by publicizing their plans broadly.
Plans for the mosque were published in such newspapers
as the Fremont Argus, the San Jose Mercury, the Oakland
Tribune and the San Francisco Chronicle .
The Fremont mosque is being built on a site
adjacent to the United Methodist Church lot, where
construction of St. Paul's Methodist Church is also
underway. The Islamic Society has cultivated amicable
relations with the Methodists, and the two groups go
together for approvals. The church and mosque will
share parking and landscaping, an arrangement which the
39al-Mashrig
f July 1990, 7.
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city favors. Rifaat felt that ^ ^ ^
especially cooperative because of the shared relations
between the church and mosque, something which is
symbolized by the placard at the site which announces
the future site of the church and mosque.
On the other boundary of the Islamic Society
property the city of Fremont has built a park. The
Islamic Society paid the city approximately $25,000 for
their share in improvements including street widening,
sidewalks, and the extension of utilities to the mosque
building site."
In February 1990 the city council gave its final
approval of the site plans and construction planning and
fund raising are in progress. Construction is expected
to begin by October 1991.
Rifaat advises others who plan to build a mosque to
get involved with local politics. "if you have
political strength you can achieve your objectives." 41
He is in fact personally deeply involved in state
Republican politics and believes that better
organization and mobilization of Muslim-American
political interests at all levels, local, state and
national, is necessary. Also central to better
relations in his opinion is interfaith involvement.
40al-Mashriq
.
August 1989, 6.
^Conversation with Rifaat, on 30 March 1991.
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^r^ Sies__of_As^ij^
With these two cases we have examples of different
-des of representation, both coming from professional,
middle class Muslim communities where substantial
material success has already been achieved and a
stronger religious and cultural identification is
sought. In the Rochester case Professor M. relates the
outcomes of a strategy exhibiting conflict avoidance,
offering little resistance to the alienating reactions
of non-Muslim neighbors. His story is one of isolation,
choosing to relocate when local prejudices became
overwhelming until a suitable neighborhood with
adequate, if not ideal conditions for the establishment
of an Islamic center is found. Once the critical
formative period is successfully negotiated, though, and
the mosque is functioning, lay volunteers from the
Islamic center such as Professor M. proceed in outreach
efforts to represent the Muslims to the surrounding
communities. They become engaged in projects of
community education about their culture, current events,
and religion, seeking to dispel the negative image of
the Islamic world presented by the American media.
Their purpose in addressing church congregations, high
school classes, and the like is one of offering
enlightenment and an Islamic witness while at the same
time preserving their religious culture from the
309
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:rom
potentially corrosive effects of »™rr accommodation with the
larger non-Muslim society. The emphasis .„ placed
maintaining a discrete corporate life, safe f
cultural accretions, through Islanuc observances and
institutions
.
in the case of the Fremont ntasji* Rifaat suggests
that greater participation and engagement in the
political life of the non-Muslim society is the
preferred alternative for negotiating a niche for Muslim
corporate life. Yet as in Rochester, a preference for
the distinctive aspects of Islamic life-what sets it
apart from the larger society-is indicated in the
Fremont experience. This is expressed in the assertion
of the right to preserve external form, to perpetuate an
Islamic architecture in the design of the mosque,
keeping the dome and minaret even though it reportedly
raised consternation. The remark, made by members of
the Fremont architectural review board, that the plans
for the proposed mosque "looked like a cathedral" was
received, at least by Rifaat, as a suggestion that
Christian forms were more appropriate and should be
adopted. Pressures for this type of accommodation in
design were resisted by the Muslims who argued that "a
mosque cannot look like a church," and that such details
as a minaret were integral to the mosque. Through
persistence the Muslims in Fremont succeeded in winning
approval of their plans with these des . gn
intact. A cultural aspiration, then, to naintain a
visible element of their religion, gives rise to
political expression.
The Fremont strategy differs fr-«™ t-u „ i_uxir t om the Rochester
case because of the IpvpI ~fn le el of engagement with the non-
Muslim residents of the city. Involvement in politics,
both local and state, in conversation with the home
owners' association and municipal officials, and in
sharing access to resources with the Methodists all show
a willingness to cooperate in the social processes
incumbent in the organization of city life and to learn
how things get done. Rifaat responds to the same
dynamics encountered in the Rochester case by increasing
efforts to be effective in the political process, and
recommends that other Muslims renounce isolation and
join in politics.
Important in this process of establishing mosques
in residential communities has been the role of non-
Muslims in supporting Muslims' efforts. Many who have
been involved in interfaith dialogue have long observed
and encouraged Muslim activity in the political and
social life of the general community. For instance in
Harrison, a suburb of New York City, the Muslims asked
Dr. Marston Speight, Director for Christian-Muslim
Relations for the National Council of Churches, to speak
« support of their petition tQ aoguire ^^^^
approvals to build
. mosque. ft^
lister a„d a stro„g propo„ent of interfaith dialogue
«*. Speight was invited to speak before a cQuncii
hearing where the Muslim* of ul s Harrxson sought approval of
construction plans for an Xslamic center and mosque
_
Some of the residents of Harrison objected to the
Muslims' project. Complaints were that the
center/mosque would be disruptive to the neighborhood
and would cause property values to decline. I„ Dr
.
Speight's opinion these objections were possibly
contrary to what they would say had the proposed
structure been a church; people "are suspicious of
things they don't understand. »«
The proposed site for the mosque was on the edge of
a residential neighborhood, across the street from an
office building. The State University of New York
campus at Purchase is not far away. Opposition to the
proposed mosque prolonged the approval process
considerably. Finally the city council convened a
public hearing on the matter. The hearing was packed.
At this hearing Dr. Speight, among others, spoke in
support of the Muslims' project." He told the
"Conversation with Dr. Speight, on 19 March 1991.
"In our conversation Dr. Speight made it a pointto say that another witness for the Muslims was a localJewxsh woman and that the Muslims' attorney was Jewish.
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gathering that the mosque and Islamic center would be an
asset to community life and they "shouldn't pass up the
opportunity" for cultural enrichment.- when asked by
a council member how much the Muslims paid him to attend
the hearing and speak on their behalf, he pointedly
answered that he was not paid anything, "not even
reimbursement for mileage.- The Muslims eventually
gained the requisite approvals to build their mosque and
Islamic center in Hamilton.
Dearborn, Michigan, is home for the largest
concentration of Middle Easterners in North America.
The city hosts five Islamic centers, all but one in
converted properties. Of the converted properties, one
Muslim group converted an old bank building, another a
former public school, and a third an electric company's
abandoned offices. These sites were selected because of
the relative af fordability of the properties-conversion
is less costly that construction—and their convenience
to the Muslims who would use the services of the
mosques. The principal public concerns addressed in the
approval process were the ease of public access
"Conversation with Dr. Speight, on 19 March 1991.
45Ibid.
(preventing traffic congestion,, adequate parking
, ^
rezoning for religious use. 46
in September 1979 neighbors of a mosque in the
city's heavily Arab, blue-collar southeastern section
asked the courts to stop the mosgue from broadcasting
the islamic call to prayer over outdoor speakers,
charging that the mosgue officials were violating the
city's noice ordinance.- The legal battle continued
into the early 1980s and eventually was resolved when
the court placed a limit on the decibal level of the
prayer call similar to limits placed on church bells.
Observing these changes has been the Reverend
William Gepford of the Presbytery of Detroit Interfaith
Ministry, the rector of the Littlefield Presbyterian
Church in Dearborn. Rev. Gepford has worked in
interfaith ministry in Dearborn over the last thirteen
years. Like Rifaat in Fremont and Professor M. in
greater Rochester, Rev. Gepford stresses the importance
of education as a means to allay fears and overcome
, nm
^formation about the Dearborn community is takenfro an interview with the Reverend William Gepford,Prebytery of Detroit Interfaith Ministry and RectorLittlefield Presbyterian Church, Dearborn, MI, on 4April 1991. I was referred to the Reverend Gepford byDr. Marston Speight as a leading and well-informed
advocate for interfaith relations within the Arab-American community in the greater Dearborn area.
47
"Muslims Call to Prayer Arouses the Neighbors,"
Christian Science Monitor
r 18 September 1979, 2.
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prejudice. „hile he asserts ^ ^
responsibility for good co^unity relations and a "war™
reception" rests with the host community, the non.Muslim
residents who "have power," he advises Muslim to take
an active role i„ contributing to the life of the
community. His recordation to Muslim is »to get to
be known, [to] come out and set the tone.- He points
to the service projects in the southeastern section of
Dearborn associated with the Islamic center there,
helping in translation, health care and networking, as
positive examples of this kind of activity. These, he
says, are "active and involved" especially among the
immigrant population."
Conclusi on
In the process of creating and enforcing zoning
restrictions, suburbanites display their hopes, fears
and prejudices. A look at suburban zoning decisions
indicates the kinds of things that can happen when
subjective fears about newcomers infect powerful actors
in the local community and will, hopefully, enlarge our
understanding of the mood of this era. It provides an
important insight into the suburban setting as well as a
"Conversation with Reverend Gepford, on 4 April1991.
49Ibid.
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special perspective on how national and global trends
affect the quality of Muslim lives in North America.
More importantly, it illustrates hoW ordinary practicesm determining particular spatial arrangements govern
residential communities and influence the character of
those communities.
The increased involvement of Muslims in the
political life of suburban communities has resulted from
their efforts to create places of worship for
themselves. The politics of municipal zoning has had a
significant impact on the transformation of the North
American Muslim community from a state of relative
isolation from the general community to active
involvement in it. The consequences of this
transformation for their religious mission, and
specifically the current debates within the Muslim
community whether they should remain Marginal' to
secular power relations or adopt a strategy of
assimilation, continues to be a subject of debate within
the community as Muslims reflect on their status as a
minority in the modern world.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
in the preceding pages I have studied the Muslim
experience in North Africa historically, hoping to shed
some light on the complex interactions of law and
politics: how law functions as a social control
mechanism, how court decisions are products of
historical conditions, and how the daily concerns of
people are influenced by legal norms. As Jim Thomas
notes, law "does not exist independently of other forms
of social action.
. . . [Rather,] legal concepts,
theories, and principles emerge, are modified, or pass
out of existence as a response to changing social
factors and interpretations of order, right, and
obligation.- The approach I have adopted, then,
historicizes law to examine how ideas about law are
continually redefined and transmitted.
Central to these processes are the pattern of
events that shapes particular responses, which ^make
sense' in their own given context. At the core of this
common ^sense' lies a unity of shared assumptions-about
social arrangements, etc.
-which are often unexamined
and always mutable. What roles do such categories as
race, ethnicity, and citizenship play in expressions of
collective identity and tolerance over time? How has
2Jim Thomas, Prisoner Litigation, The Paradox ofthe Jailhouse Lawyer (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1988), 13.
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law functioned in constructing these categories and,
through them, in conveying an "image of social relations
and shaping popular consciousness in accordance with
that image?- This study has been an attempt to
address these questions, deriving insights from the
specific circumstances of Muslims in North America. The
focus has been on the Muslims' recognition and adoption
of law as a legitimate means of social control,
manifested in their efforts to temper an increasing
attentiveness to North American legal institutions with
a sense of cultural and religious Wsiderhood
' . By
examining this process, and the attendant tensions it
produces, we can begin to advance our understanding of
the intersection of law and social processes, and the
impact this has on the corporate life of the involved
community.
Acceptance of law as a legitimate institution of
social control, allocating values, resolving disputes,
and guiding how ^things get done', both suggests and
inhibits behavior. This study began with an
investigation of modes of representation, how immigrants
from the Muslim world characterized themselves before
the court officials who determined whether they made
admissible citizens at the turn of the century. Lengthy
"From the Special Issue Editors," Law and Society
Review 22 (1988): 631, cited on 27, n. 57, above.
efforts at documentation ensued as these applicants for
membership in the polity tried to show that they
approached the Vhite', rather than the Colored', end
°f the spectrum in accordance with contemporary legal
standards. In the case of John Mohammed All, we have an
instance where the applicant for naturalization had
acquiesced in the court's characterization of him as a
^high-caste Hindu' until his certificate of
naturalization was placed in jeopardy some years later
once Congress changed the standards for citizenship so
as to exclude those of South Asian origin. when the
government challenged All's citizenship he altered his
self-representation before the court by insisting that
he was of Arabian', not » Hindu', background and thus
was a fit citizen. His efforts failed.
In many other instances immigrants from the Muslim
world also had to master and manipulate the elusive
elements which defined ethnicity or ^race' at the turn
of the century, as ties between ^race' and moral
character were extremely relevant to the construction of
a peculiarly American identity. There was no apparent
consistency in the legal outcome of this mastery; many
courts granted citizenship but others did not. However
one result seems clear: as the applicants mobilized to
comprehend and respond to the fickle standards, to
discern a coherence in the judicial approach, they
argued in kind
. Tne aspiring
^
whatever legal and social principles appeared ^ ^
pattern of judicial rulings, and cohered in those
standards. This adoption of governing norms not only
altered the mode of representation to the larger society
and its legal institutions but also, inevitably, had an
impact on their self-definition.
The enduring debates within the global Muslim
community about minority status and the appropriate
model for living in a non-Muslim society continue to
move between two poles: accommodationism, seeking
religious equality and equal access to society's
resources, versus isolationism, which emphasizes the
distinctiveness of Islam and seeks to preserve Islamic
cultural modes of representation. 3 Those who
approximate the isolationist paradigm have advocated
maintaining a separate existence as a discrete, insular
entity which can serve as an Islamic witness in the
midst of an unenlightened society until such time that
return to the Islamic world is possible. This model
allows no cultural adaptations in a non-Islamic setting
as Islam alone, in its unadulterated form, stands as the
F°r a discussion of accommodation and isolation as
models of minority identity, see Yvonne Y. Haddad, "TheChallenge of Muslim Minorityness : The American
Experience," The Integration of Islam in Western Europeed. W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld (Kok Pharos
Publishing House)
, 134-151.
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governing norm for the religiously observant Muslim,
islam is seen as a comprehensive and inherently superior
and self-sufficient mode of existence, set forth for the
global community of believers whether living within the
domain of Islam- or beyond. As Haddad characteri.es
it, according to this position,
..Muslims therefore must
not accept minority status as a permanent condition in
which they accommodate and acquiesce to those in
power.
"
4
This position is heard somewhat in the words of
Sher Ali, presented here in Chapter 3, when he objects
to the American ban on polygamy, and the preaching of
polygamy, held against Mr. Sadiq of the Ahmadiya
movement during the second decade of this century. Sher
Ali, in protest, writes from England decrying the
treatment of the Ahmadiya missionary in America whose
prosyletizing efforts are constrained by the necessary
concession to ^America's intolerance'. Preaching Islam
without reference to the Islamic laws on polygamy is
seen as an abridgement of Islamic tenets.
However, the preponderance of Muslim settlers in
North America have approximated the accommodationist
model. Promises of religious liberty and the
entitlement to equal treatment and access have led
Muslims to think about and assert ^rights' in the
4Ibid., 136.
predominant legal idiom
. For instance ^ ^
neighbors challenged a mosque's use of loudspeakers to
broadcast the call to prayer, rationed in Chapter 6,
the mosque officials saw the complaint as an
infringement of their constitutional guarantee to the
^free exercise- of religion, citing the constitution to
maximize their religious freedom and protect a practice
which they consider to be "inviolable.- The court
decided in this case to impose the same restrictions on
the mosque as were imposed on churches in Dearborn with
regard to the decibel level. The result, then, of what
must have seemed like a liberating paradigm-the notion
of absolute freedom to worship-turned out to be parity.
The mosque became subject to the same restrictions
placed on Christian worship.
Changes wrought by the civil rights struggle of the
middle decades of the twentieth century had a profound
effect on the prevailing social and legal principles.
Late nineteenth-century concerns for color distinctions
and their connections with morality gave way to beliefs
about equality and discrimination as the basis for legal
claims. These changes redirected the conceptualization
of needs, rights, and obligations within the Muslim
community as well.
'"Muslims' Call to Prayer Arouses the Neighbors,"
Christian Science Monitor . 18 September 1979, 2.
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The story of the Black Muslims in prison best
illustrates this tendency. Beginning in the 1960s
Muslim in prison called for recognition as a distinct
religious group. Once they achieved moderate success,
they moved from
"outsiderhood < toward claiming a
minority status. They gained, through federal court
intervention, greater access to such resources as law
libraries, and some relief from the restrictions of
prison life which were judged to interfere with
religious worship. Other inmates followed suit, with
street gangs organizing themselves as religious groups
making religious liberty claims, leading to the
'balkanization' of prison society. 6 This
transformation from the status of someone outside the
system, to identification as a religious minority, has
been shaped by using the law to assert and protect
particular rights.
When immigrants from the Muslim world who aspired
to citizenship and prison Muslims raised legal claims,
the categories they desired already existed. What they
sought was inclusion in what appeared to be a
"liberating' process, staking a claim to the
entitlements that attached to official recognition as
particular legal categories— "citizen ' and "religion'.
6James B. Jacobs, New Perspectives on Prisons and
Imprisonment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983)
63. "
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However, i„ the cases Qf ^^
and municipal zoning
, acUve partic . pation ^
-novation of change was & ^
irrevocably altered the „ature of the^
xn North America and understandings about social order.
Over the past two decades mosques have been
especially pivotal in the Muslims' corporate life, in
forming the basis for representation to the non-Muslim
society and stronger identification internally. By
virtue of the legislation of federal 'hate crimes'
statutes, the interests and rights of Muslims, including
the sucurity of religious property, have become a
protected category. Presumably the state is empowered
to safeguard mosques and Muslim practices from the
inherent risks raised by their increased visibility, in
becoming targets of animus directed toward the Islamic
world, and Muslims who report the incidence of such
crimes acquiesce in the recognition of the capability of
the state to do so. Similarly, increased contact with
neighborhood groups and municipal politics has been part
of the Muslim experience in establishing mosques, and
has brought out the human factor in the social processes
of determining important spatial relationships. Such
legal practices, deciding how "things get done', serve
as a mediating and transformative link. As Muslims have
moved from isolationism and religious exclusivity to an
enhanced consciousness of their status as a religious
minority in North America, their identity has evolved.
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